Jenkins v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision
| Decision Date | 18 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | SC S061812.,CA A144545 |
| Citation | 335 P.3d 828,356 Or. 186 |
| Parties | Michael W. JENKINS, Respondent on Review, v. BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST–PRISON SUPERVISION, Petitioner on Review. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. With him on the briefs were Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General.
Lindsey K. Detweiler, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.
This case involves the interpretation and application of two statutes, ORS 144.335(3)1 and ORS 144.135,2 to a final order of the Board of Parole and Post–Prison Supervision (the board) that postponed petitioner's release date from prison. The threshold question on review is whether, by amending ORS 144.335(3) in 1999,3 the legislature intended to exempt the board from the “substantial reason” standard that this court had identified and applied in Martin v. Board of Parole, 327 Or. 147, 957 P.2d 1210 (1998). Under that standard, the board's orders must provide “some kind of an explanation connecting the facts of the case (which would include the facts found, if any) and the result reached.” Id. at 157, 957 P.2d 1210. If the legislature did not intend to exempt the board from the “substantial reason” standard, the second question is whether the board's order in this case satisfied the substantial reason standard. The third question is whether the board's order complied with ORS 144.135, which requires the board to “state in writing the detailed bases of its decisions.”
As explained below, we conclude that ORS 144.335(3) (1999) did not eliminate the substantial reason requirement that inheres in the substantial evidence standard of review to which the board's orders are subject. However, we further conclude that the board's final order in this case satisfied that requirement and satisfied ORS 144.135. Because the Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion with respect to the second and third questions, we reverse the decision of that court and affirm the board's final order postponing petitioner's release date.
The relevant facts are procedural. In July 1980, petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree rape, and one count each of first-degree kidnapping and first-degree sodomy; he was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment on each count, consecutive to each other and to previous sentences for attempted murder and first-degree robbery. On the same day, petitioner was convicted of third-degree robbery and sentenced to three years' imprisonment, consecutive to the other sentences. In 1990, petitioner was convicted of supplying contraband while he was incarcerated, and he was sentenced to 15 months in prison for that offense, consecutive to his previous sentences.
In September 2008, the board conducted an exit-interview hearing to determine whether petitioner was suitable for parole on his projected release date—March 2009—or whether his circumstances warranted a two-year postponement of that date. Before the hearing, the board obtained a psychological evaluation from Dr. Frank Colistro. In that evaluation, Dr. Colistro diagnosed petitioner as having a “severe” “Antisocial Personality Disorder
” with a “very high degree of psychopathy.” In Colistro's opinion, petitioner's personality disorder continued “to predispose [petitioner] to the commission of crimes to a degree rendering him an ongoing threat to the health and safety [of] the community.” No other psychological evaluation was submitted to the board.
After the exit-interview hearing, the board issued a Board Action Form (BAF) that postponed petitioner's release date for 24 months pursuant to ORS 144.125(3) (1977),4 which authorized the board to postpone parole release dates for inmates who suffer from a present severe emotional disturbance (PSED). The BAF explained that, “[b]ased on the doctor's report and diagnosis, coupled with all the information that the board is considering, the board concludes that the inmate suffers from a present severe emotional disturbance that constitutes a danger to the health or safety of the community.”
Petitioner sought administrative review of that decision; in response to that request, the board issued a more detailed administrative review response (ARR) that provided, in part:
Ultimately, the board denied reconsideration in the ARR, and it advised petitioner at the conclusion of the ARR:
Petitioner sought judicial review in the Court of Appeals, asserting that the board's order did not provide “substantial reason” because the board failed to “explain its findings or the reasoning supporting its conclusion” in the order. The board responded that the order was legally sufficient for two reasons. First, the board argued that ORS 144.335(3) exempted the board's order from the substantial-reason requirement. Second, and alternatively, the board argued that the final order, including the board's administrative review response, contained substantial reason and was otherwise sufficient, because it “provided petitioner with a legal basis for deferring his parole release, as well as a factual foundation for its legal conclusion,” by referring to and relying on Colistro's evaluation.
The Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that, notwithstanding the 1999 amendment to ORS 144.335(3), the “substantial reason” requirement continued to apply to the board's parole release postponement orders. Jenkins v. Board of Parole, 258 Or.App. 430, 443, 309 P.3d 1115 (2013). The court further held that the board's order in this case lacked substantial reason, because it “offer[ed] a mere conclusion” and did not permit a reviewing court “ ‘to determine if the board's findings, reasoning, and conclusions demonstrate that it acted in a rational, fair, and principled manner in deciding to defer petitioner's parole release.’ ” Id. at 444, 309 P.3d 1115 (quoting Gordon v. Board of Parole, 343 Or. 618, 634, 175 P.3d 461 (2007) ). The dissent would have affirmed. Id. at 444–52, 309 P.3d 1115 (Armstrong, P. J., dissenting). After examining the statutory text, context, and legislature history of the 1999 amendment, the dissent concluded that “the legislature intended to relieve the board of the substantial-reason requirement otherwise implicit in the judicial-review provisions of ORS 183.482(8).” Id. at 452, 309 P.3d 1115.
The first issue presented on review is whether the 1999 amendment to ORS 144.335(3) exempted the board from the substantial-reason requirement that this court identified in Martin. That issue presents a question of legislative intent to be resolved by applying this court's methodology for construing statutes. See State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009). According to the board, the statutory text, context, and legislative history demonstrate that ORS 144.335(3) (1999) was intended to relieve the board from the substantial-reason requirement and that, instead, that provision merely requires that it appear from an order that the board acted within the scope of its authority. Petitioner disagrees; he asserts that, after the 1999 amendment, board orders need not adhere to strict requirements of form; but, to allow for meaningful judicial review, an order must demonstrate on its face that the board acted within the scope of its authority by identifying the statutes and rules that it applied and “the specific evidence in the record that the board relied on to reach its conclusions.” By “conclusions,” petitioner appears to refer to the board's determinations with respect to each of the criteria—both factual and legal—that it is required to address in reaching a decision.5 The board rejoins that, if its orders remain subject to the substantial-reason requirement, the order in this case satisfied that requirement because it identified the evidence on which the board relied, and that evidence supported its decision to postpone petitioner's parole release.
We begin with the text of the statute. ORS 144.335(5) (1997) provided:
As noted, the 1999 amendment did not alter any of that text. Instead, it added the italicized first sentence below:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ossanna v. Nike, Inc.
...that" or "on account of the cause that." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 194 (unabridged ed. 2002); see Jenkins v. Board of Parole , 356 Or. 186, 194, 335 P.3d 828 (2014) (where "the legislature has not expressly defined the words ***, dictionary definitions *** can be useful"). And a ......
-
Couey v. Atkins
...text.”). If the undefined term is not a term of art, we ordinarily begin with its dictionary definition. Jenkins v. Board of Parole, 356 Or. 186, 194, 335 P.3d 828 (2014) (“Because the legislature has not expressly defined the words in the disputed phrase, dictionary definitions * * * can b......
-
Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus.
...reason. The Kleins' argument in that regard "misconceives the nature of the substantial reason requirement." Jenkins v. Board of Parole , 356 Or. 186, 208, 335 P.3d 828 (2014). As the Supreme Court explained in Jenkins , an order satisfies the substantial reason requirement so long as it "p......
-
Robin v. Teacher Standards & Practices Comm'n
...and to ensure that the agency gives responsible attention to its application of the [governing] statute.' " Jenkins v. Board of Parole , 356 Or. 186, 195, 335 P.3d 828 (2014) (quoting Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19 , 294 Or. 357, 370, 657 P.2d 188 (1982) ). Thus, the agency must "a......