Jenkins v. Charleston St. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 02 August 1900 |
| Citation | 36 S.E. 703,58 S.C. 373 |
| Parties | JENKINS v. CHARLESTON ST. RY. CO. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Charleston county; J. C Klugh, Judge.
Action by Edward N. Jenkins against the Charleston Street-Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Mordecai & Gadsden, for appellant.
Trenholm Rhett & Miller, for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendant for the sum of $800. After judgment thereon, the defendant appealed to this court on three grounds: First, that the circuit judge erred in admitting certain testimony; second, that the circuit judge erred in overruling defendant's motion for a nonsuit; third, that the circuit judge erred in his charge and also in his refusal to charge the jury. We will examine these grounds of appeal in their order.
The circuit judge allowed the plaintiff, Edward N. Jenkins, while on the witness stand, to detail the grounds upon which he had based his claim for damages, by stating how he reached his conclusion that the defendant railway company had damaged him in the sum of $1,000 in refusing to award him, or, rather, in canceling, the contract for the construction of the power house of defendant, and also in allowing the same witness to detail the grounds whereon he thought the defendant electric railway company had injured him in the sum of $1,750 in canceling the contract for building the car barn of defendant. In his complaint plaintiff had, in effect, alleged that he was a contractor in the city of Charleston, S. C., of experience, skill, and responsibility; that on the 13th day of February, 1897, the defendant electric car company, a corporation under the laws of this state, offered the contract of building the power house and the car barn of the defendant company according to certain plans and specifications; that the plaintiff, at its instance and request, put in his bid to do that work, along with four other separate contractors, and that, in the preparation of plaintiff's said bid, he was subjected to labor and expense therefor; that on Monday afternoon, the 15th day of February, 1897, at the hour of 6 o'clock, and in the presence of all of said five contractors, their respective bids were opened, and it was then discovered and announced that the plaintiff's bid for the construction of each of the two buildings was the lowest, and that the defendant then announced that in a few days it would communicate with the plaintiff touching said contract; that on the 17th day of February, 1897, the defendant, by letter, requested the plaintiff to call at its office on that day; that the plaintiff did call, and then and there arranged with the defendant that the 1st day of May, 1897, should be inserted in the contract as the day on which the plaintiff was to complete the two buildings, and also that the demurrage of $25 inserted in the contract should be changed to $50 per day after May 1, 1897, until contract should be completed; that afterwards, but in the same interview, the defendant insisted that plaintiff should obtain a bond of some solvent surety company, in the penal sum of $7,500, for the faithful performance of said contract by the plaintiff; that, although no such stipulation or condition had ever been mentioned before between these parties, yet he agreed, and went out to see if he could arrange with some said company, and soon returned to the defendant office with the information that the America Surety Company, a corporation located in New York City, and which only issued policies or bonds from the home office, in New York City, would sign his bond as his surety; that then this plaintiff's contract with the defendant was complete; that, notwithstanding it would take a reasonable time to complete the bond, the defendant through its attorney, F. Moultrie Mordecai, Esq., when the plaintiff had announced that he had made arrangements with the Charleston agents and attorneys of the America Surety Company for said bond, at once thereafter announced that said bond should be filed with the defendant by 12 m. o'clock on the next day, the 18th of February, 1897, though afterwards this arrangement was by the defendant extended to 6 o'clock of the afternoon of the 18th of February, 1897; that such condition being impossible of performance, for lack of reasonable time, the defendant, in disregard of plaintiff's rights, awarded the contract to the bidder next to the plaintiff in the lowest amount bid.
The first and second exceptions: The two questions admitted over defendant's objection were: (1) "What was the difference between the cost of completing the contract, to you, and the bid which you made to the company?" (2) "When was the work finished by Mr. Oliver?" Great care is observed in courts to prevent any testimony relating to breaches of contracts, when such testimony is speculative and uncertain in its character. And this is entirely proper. Witnesses should always, when they can do so, speak from direct knowledge. The very best that any witness can do is to detail facts. It seems to us that a man who has devoted his life in acquiring the mastery over those classes of knowledge which enter in to make a contractor may be said to have the power to make estimates of the cost of a proposed building, so that he can announce the cost of such building. This witness testified that he had estimates made by experienced subcontractors of much of the work. This being so, we do not see why his testimony was not admissible. Feaster v. Cotton Mills, 51 S.C. 143, 28 S.E. 301, is a very good illustration of this doctrine. So, too, Moorer v. Andrews, 39 S.C. 427, 17 S.E. 948, where a man was allowed to recover the difference between the market price of certain cords of wood (36 cords), and what those 36 cords would have cost to render them marketable. Is this not the same principle? But, apart from all this, in the ease at bar the witness H. F. Zacharia testified, without any objection thereto, to the same matters covered by plaintiff's testimony on this point. Now, as to the second question, relating, as it does, to the time employed by Mr. Oliver in completing these buildings, we can see no harm to the defendant from any answer to this question. Possibly it might seem to develop any hypocrisy in the defendant, if any such existed, as to the deep anxiety professed by the defendant to have the work finished by May 1, 1897, when it was shown that such work was not actually finished until July 1, 1897, and no complaint was ever made by it. These exceptions are overruled.
The third ground of complaint urged by the defendant against the rulings of his honor, the circuit judge, related to his declining to grant the defendant's motion for a nonsuit. The rule governing nonsuits is so well settled that no extended reference to the rule in the abstract is necessary. Was there any material testimony bearing on the issues developed by the pleadings in the case at bar? The circuit judge decided that there was some such testimony. We agree with him. The contract was in issue. There was testimony bearing on it. The breach of the contract was in issue, and there was testimony bearing on that issue. There was some testimony relating to the amount of damages resulting from the breach of the contract. These things being true, the...
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