Jenkins v. Chief Justice of Dist. Court Dept.

• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: Before LIACOS; LIACOS
• Citation: 416 Mass. 221,619 N.E.2d 324
• Parties: Torre JENKINS & others 1 v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF the DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT & another. 2 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk
• Decision Date: 13 September 1993

Page 324

619 N.E.2d 324 416 Mass. 221 Torre JENKINS & others ¹
v.
CHIEF JUSTICE OF the DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT & another.
²
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Suffolk. Argued May 4, 1993.
Decided Sept. 13, 1993.

Page 326

[416 Mass. 222] Patricia A. O'Neill, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Boston, for Torre Jenkins.

Martin R. Rosenthal, Boston, for Reginald Waller.

LaDonna J. Hatton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

William J. Leahy, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Boston, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, was present but did not argue.

[416 Mass. 221] Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

[416 Mass. 222] LIACOS, Chief Justice.

On September 30, 1991, the plaintiffs, Torre Jenkins, Reginald Waller, and the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS), petitioned a single justice of this court pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3 (1992 ed.), to order that all warrantless arrests in this Commonwealth be followed by a prompt judicial determination of probable cause on completion of the administrative steps incident to arrest. ³ On October 3, 1991, the defendants, the Chief Justices of the District Court and of the Boston Municipal Court Departments of the Trial Court, filed a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs' petition together with a motion to dismiss CPCS as an improper party. See Slama v. Attorney Gen., 384 Mass. 620, 623-625, 428 N.E.2d 134 (1981). A hearing was held on that day, in the course of which the single justice directed the parties to prepare a joint statement of facts. In the ensuing sixteen months, the parties prepared and filed a joint stipulation of facts, a joint stipulation of agreed and unagreed facts, an appendix to such stipulation containing various documents, several affidavits, and a statement of issues for reservation and report to the full court. On February 2, 1993, the single justice reserved and reported the case on the following documents: The plaintiffs' initial petition, the defendants' motion to dismiss CPCS, the joint stipulation of facts, the appendix [416 Mass. 223] to the joint stipulation, two affidavits, and the statement of issues for reservation and report. ⁴

We summarize the underlying facts, which we shall supplement as relevant to a particular issue. On Friday, August 16, 1991, at 10:05 P.M., Boston police arrested

Page 327

Torre Jenkins without a warrant. ⁵ Police transported Jenkins to a Boston police station, where he was detained until the following Monday. On that day, Jenkins was brought to Boston Municipal Court for arraignment. The judge conducting the arraignment hearing set cash bail in the amount of $150. ⁶ Jenkins sought review of such determination in the Superior Court and, on the same day, a judge in that court ordered his admission to bail on personal recognizance without surety.

Waller was arrested without a warrant by the Boston police on a Friday evening, and detained until the following Monday. At 9 A.M. on that day, police brought Waller to the Roxbury District Court for arraignment. ⁷ Waller was arraigned [416 Mass. 224] within approximately one minute. The issue whether police had probable cause to arrest him was never raised. Waller was admitted to bail on personal recognizance without surety.

According to the parties' stipulation of facts, police in this Commonwealth adhere to the following practices with respect to a warrantless arrest. After the arrest, police transport the arrestee to a police station for processing. Police then bring the arrestee to court if the court is in session. ⁸ If the court is not in session, the arrestee is detained at the police station or transported to another detention facility. ⁹ An arrestee so detained may be admitted to bail out of court. See G.L. c. 276, § 58 (1992 ed.). Officials authorized to admit such an arrestee to bail are designated by statute. See G.L. c. 276, § 57 (1992 ed.). ¹⁰

Detained arrestees who are not admitted to bail are brought to court at its next session. See Mass.R.Crim.P. 7(a)(1), as amended, 397 Mass. 1226 (1986) ("A defendant [416 Mass. 225] who has been arrested shall be brought before a court if then in session, and if not, at its next session"). If the arrest occurs on a Friday, the arrestee remains in custody for the duration of the weekend. If the following Monday should be a holiday, the arrestee remains in custody until Tuesday. Moreover, some divisions of the District Court do not hold daily sessions during the week. In those divisions, arrestees may be detained for more than four days before being brought to

Page 328

court. ¹¹

With this factual background, we turn to a discussion of the questions of law raised by this report. ¹²

[416 Mass. 226] 1. Requirement of a Judicial Determination of Probable Cause Following A Warrantless Arrest Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125, 95 S.Ct. 854, 869, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates the States to "provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pre-trial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest." The Gerstein Court also concluded that the existence of probable cause to arrest must "be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate," id. at 112, 95 S.Ct. at 862, and that such a "judicial determination of probable cause [is] a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest." Id. at 114, 95 S.Ct. at 863.

Following Gerstein, Federal appellate courts disagreed as to how "promptly" a State must provide a probable cause determination following a warrantless arrest. A majority of courts understood Gerstein to mandate that such determination be made immediately after the completion of the administrative procedures necessitated by the arrest. See McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.1989), vacated, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1567-1568 (7th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 478 U.S. 1044, 107 S.Ct. 16, 92 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986); Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1139-1141 (4th Cir.1982). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on the other hand, concluded that Gerstein authorized the States to delay the probable cause determination in order to combine it with other pretrial proceedings. Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 386 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020, 109 S.Ct. 818, 102 L.Ed.2d 807 (1989). See Settle, Williams v. Ward: Compromising the Constitutional Right to Prompt Determination of Probable Cause Upon Arrest, 74 Minn.L.Rev. 196 (1989).

In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 1665, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991), the Supreme Court undertook to define "what is 'prompt' under Gerstein." The Court rejected the

Page 329

view thatthe Fourth Amendment requires a determination of probable [416 Mass. 227] cause immediately following completion of the administrative steps incident to arrest. The Court held that principles of federalism demanded that States be given the flexibility to experiment with their criminal procedures. Id. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1668. Such flexibility, the Court concluded, encompassed the States' right to delay judicial determination of probable cause in order to combine it with other pretrial proceedings. The Court reasoned that, in order to ascertain the outer time limit to such delay, the State interest in "protecting public safety" should be balanced with the individual's interest in avoiding "prolonged detention based on incorrect or unfounded suspicion." Id. Applying this balancing test, the Court settled on a "practical compromise," id., whereby "a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein." Id. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1670. ¹³

Four Justices dissented and expressed disagreement with the Court's conclusion that the administrative convenience of a State justifies delaying the grant of a probable cause determination to individuals arrested without a warrant. Id. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1671 (Marshall, J., dissenting, with whom Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joined). Id. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1675 (Scalia, J., dissenting). ¹⁴ Justice Scalia argued that the Fourth Amendment embodied the long-standing common law rule that police must bring an arrestee to a magistrate for a neutral determination of probable cause as soon as reasonably feasible. Justice Scalia wrote that, at common law, "the only element bearing upon the reasonableness of delay was ... the arresting officer's ability, once the prisoner had been secured, to reach a magistrate [416 Mass. 228] who could issue the needed warrant for further detention." Id. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1672. After an extensive survey of the relevant authorities, Justice Scalia concluded that States need no more than twenty-four hours to complete the administrative steps incident to arrest and to arrange for a probable cause determination by a magistrate. Id. at ---- - ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1672-1675.

The plaintiffs essentially urge us to adopt as matter of State constitutional law the views stated in Justice Scalia's dissent. The defendants argue in response that the balancing test followed by the five Justices in the majority provides the construct of constitutional analysis that we should follow under the State Constitution. The defendants contend that, under this balancing test, a forty-eight hour delay between arrest and judicial determination of probable cause represents an acceptable compromise between the competing interests at stake. ¹⁵

2. State Constitutional Mandate With Respect to Judicial...