Jenkins v. City of Lawrence
| Decision Date | 07 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:09-cv-01099-TWP-DML |
| Parties | WILLIAM T. JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LAWRENCE, LAWRENCE POLICE DEPARTMENT, PAUL RICKETTS, LAWRENCE MAYOR, Individually and/or in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Lawrence, AND OFFICER SHAWN ROMERIL, Individually Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This case comes before the Court on Defendants' - City of Lawrence ("City"), Lawrence Police Department, Paul Ricketts, individually and in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Lawrence and Officer Shawn Romeril ("Officer Romeril or Defendant ") (collectively "Defendants") - Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 36). Plaintiff William T. Jenkins ("Plaintiff or "Jenkins") filed suit in this Court alleging deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the common law of the state of Indiana, stemming from alleged excessive use of force by police officer Romeril. Defendants' deny these allegations and seek resolution of Jenkins' claim through the entry of summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 36) is GRANTED in its entirety.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment. Under 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). As articulated by the Supreme Court, "summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather an integral part of the federal rules as a whole." Id. at 327. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the admissible evidence presented by non-movant must be believed and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in their favor. Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F. 3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. When the moving party produces proper support of its motion, the burden then shifts to the non-movant. It is not enough for the non-movant merely to raise factual arguments that cast "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Baker v. Elmood, 940 F. 2d 1013 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue ... must "affirmatively demonstrate, through specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial." Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007).
In Count II of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. 25), Jenkins has brought suit against Ricketts, the Mayor of the city of Lawrence, in his individual and official capacities and the Lawrence Police Department. Plaintiff, however, has presented no evidence relating to Rickettsand the City of Lawrence and through his Response to this Motion, Plaintiff has agreed that he is unable to gather sufficient evidence to show that the Lawrence Police Department had a policy, practice or custom with regard to tasering and thus, those claims are abandoned. Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of defendant Ricketts and defendant Lawrence Police Department. Facts and argument related to these claims have been excluded from consideration.
The parties submitted a videotaped record of the incident from the time Jenkins was engaged with the two security officers until after he was arrested (Dkt. 38 Exh. 5). The video, taken by Plaintiff's friend Christopher Norman, accurately depicts the events of September 9, 2007. The Court has viewed the said videotape prior to rendering this ruling. Although Plaintiff did not dispute the majority of material facts given by Defendants, where dispute occurred, the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom, will be presented in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the nonmoving party. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000).
During the evening hours of September 9, 2007, gunshots were heard by Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD") officers near the address of 9400 Stouffer Court, which is located within an apartment complex. Individuals were seen running from the area. IMPD officers secured five individuals at gunpoint but another suspect remained at-large. Shortly thereafter, Officer Romeril of the Lawrence Police Department ("LPD") was dispatched to the scene to assist the IMPD officers.
While the five individuals were handcuffed and on the ground, IMPD Officer Ferguson and LPD Officer Romeril observed Jenkins speaking loudly to two apartment complex security officers in the courtyard of the complex. The security guards instructed Jenkins to leave thecourtyard area, which ran between the apartments, and go inside his home.1 Jenkins refused. Jenkins admits that during the time he was speaking to the security guards, he got mad and raised his voice. When Officers Ferguson and Romeril came up to the security officers and Jenkins, Jenkins was still refusing to obey the demands to go inside his home. Jenkins had never met or had any encounters with Officer Romeril prior to September 9, 2007.
Upon the officers' arrival, Jenkins was now facing five people, the two security guards who were already engaged with Jenkins, Officers Ferguson and Romeril, and a plain clothes officer, Officer Torres. At the time of the incident, Plaintiff had been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder and was actively taking the medication Seroquel. One of the side effects of Seroquel is slurred speech. Officer Ferguson noticed a strong odor of alcohol on Plaintiff’s breath as well as blood shot eyes and slurred speech. Romeril also smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Plaintiff’s breath.
Officer Ferguson then instructed Jenkins to go inside his residence. Jenkins refused and told Officer Ferguson that he did not have to leave because he was on private property. Officer Ferguson explained to Jenkins that the search for the remaining suspect in the earlier gunfire incident was ongoing and that Jenkins needed to vacate the courtyard area. Jenkins again refused to leave the courtyard, to go inside his apartment. Jenkins was ultimately told several times by Officer Ferguson to vacate the area and go back to his home. Jenkins refused each of these demands. Jenkins friends, a male voice and a female voice on the video, can be heard attempting to coax Jenkins to obey the officers' command and to go into his residence or at least onto his porch.
The conversation between Officer Ferguson and Jenkins lasted approximately ninety seconds. Officer Ferguson then attempted to reach out to grab Jenkins' left arm. Jenkins stepped back and away from Officer Ferguson and began walking backwards with his arms outstretched parallel to the ground. From there a third party female, Tonita Toney ("Toney"), holding an infant in her arms, approached and became involved in the incident. Officer Romeril grabbed Jenkins' shirt and began to pull him to the left while Toney and the infant were removed. During this time the video indicates that Jenkins allowed his weight and body to shift in the direction he was being pulled.
For the majority of the time Jenkins was standing, his hands were behind his back. It was not until Toney reached to move the arm of the Officer which was holding Jenkins, that his arms became free and movement from Jenkins took place. While Officers Ferguson, Romeril, and Torres were attempting to place Plaintiff into custody, Officer Romeril tasered Jenkins. Plaintiff does not know how many times he was tasered by Officer Romeril. Officer Romeril tasered Jenkins two (2) times.2 The first taser deployment lasted four (4) seconds and the second taser deployment lasted two (2) seconds. Thereafter, Jenkins was placed into handcuffs. Jenkins was not tasered while in handcuffs. Jenkins was ultimately arrested and charged with the following offenses: a violation of I.C. 35-44-3-3 - Resisting Law Enforcement, I.C. 7.1-5-1-3 - Public Intoxication and I.C.35-45-1-3 - Disorderly Conduct. The allegations against Jenkins were ultimately dismissed as a result of the State's untimely reinstatement of charges.
At the time of the incident, Officer Romeril was certified in taser usage and had attended and passed the prescribed TASER International user course. This user course covered all aspectsof taser usage including nomenclature, operation, liability, policy, deployment considerations, practical exercises and a written test. At the time of the incident, Lawrence Police Department General Order 5.02 - Continuum of Force, as well as Lawrence Police Department General Order 4.20 - Less Lethal Review Board Policy, were in existence.
On September 9, 2007, the LPD had a policy in place to investigate both the circumstances surrounding the use of a taser as well as claims of excessive force. Pursuant to General Order 5.02 Use of Force, when an Officer uses his Taser, the officer's supervisor will investigate the circumstances surrounding the deployment and complete a Special Report. The officer using the Taser will complete a Taser Use Report. The Special Report and the Taser Use Report along with the case report are forwarded to the Operations Captain. Once reviewed by the Operations Captain the reports go to the Administrative Captain for review. In the event a complaint was received about the use of a Taser implying excessive force, the Deputy Chief's Office would assign the investigation of the complaint to either an Administrative Inquiry or an Internal Investigation. The Deputy Chief determined...
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