Jenkins v. Collrd
Citation | 36 L.Ed. 812,145 U.S. 546,12 S.Ct. 868 |
Parties | JENKINS et al. v. COLLRD |
Decision Date | 16 May 1892 |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
STATEMENT BY MR. JUSTICE FIELD.
This is an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiffs to recover of the defendant two lots of land in the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, with the buildings thereon, known as 'Nos. 50 and 52 West Pearl Street,' in that city. The plaintiffs below, who are also plaintiffs in error here, are the children and only heirs of Thomas J. Jenkins, deceased. They are residents and citizens of West Virginia. Two of them, Albert Gallatin Jenkins and George R. Jenkins, are minors under the age of 21 years, and appear by their mother and guardian. The defendant is a citizen of Ohio and a resident of Cincinnati.
The petition, the designation given to the first pleading in the case, alleges that prior to 1863 Thomas J. Jenkins was the owner of the real estate mentioned, which is fully described, and that while such owner he joined the Rebel army, and such proceedings were had in the district court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio, in the year 1863, that the property was confiscated, and the life estate of Jenkins was sold, and the defendant William A. Collard, then or subsequently in the year 1865, and during the lifetime of Jenkins, became the owner of the life estate; that Jenkins died on the 1st day of August, 1872; and that thereupon the plaintiffs became seised of the legal estate in the premises, and entitled to the possession thereof; but that the defendant since that time has unlawfully kept them out of possession. The petition also sets forth that the defendant has been receiving the rents, issues, and profits of the premises from the 1st day of August, 1872, up to the commencement of this action without the consent of the plaintiffs, and has refused to account for them; that their yearly value has been, on the average, $1,800 and that the plaintiffs have been deprived of all profit and benefit from the premises since that time, to their damage of $40,000. They therefore pray judgment for the possession of the premises and for the damages alleged.
The defendant appeared to the action, and set up nine defenses. The first defense, which was substantially the general issue, was subsequently withdrawn. To the several other defenses demurrers were interposed, and all of them, except the one to the second defense, were sustained, and no further proceeding respecting them was taken. The second defense was as follows:
'For a second defense the defendant says that he denies that such proceedings were had in the district court of the United States within and for the southern district of Ohio, in the year 1863, or at any other time, that the said property was confiscated, but defendant avers that in a proceeding instituted in said court in the year 1863 a decree was entered in the words and figures following, to wit:
'Defendant says that the above was the only decree touching said property, except the decree of confirmation of the sale and distribution of proceeds.
'Defendant says that thereafter such proceedings were had in said cause that there was sold and conveyed by the marshal, in accordance with said decree, the life estate of said Thomas J. Jenkins to one Esward Bepler.
To this defense the plaintiffs demurred, on the ground that it constituted no defense, and was insufficient in law on its face; and they claimed and asked the court to hold that by the decree set up there was an adjudicated forfeiture and sale of the lots described under the confiscation act of congress of July 17, 1862, and the joint resolution of even date therewith, and that there was not left in Thomas J. Jenkins any interest which he could convey by deed, but that all which could become the property of the United States, and could be sold by virtue of a decree of condemnation and order of sale, was the life estate of Thomas J. Jenkins, and that a decree condemning the fee could have no greater effect than to subject the life estate to sale, and therefore the deed executed and delivered by him on the 26th day of August, 1865, was a nullity, and the plaintiffs inherited and were entitled to the property as prayed for in their petition. But the court held that by reason of said decree all the estate of Thomas J. Jenkins in the property was not condemned and sold, but only a technical life estate therein, and that there remained in him the reversion or remainder in fee of the property after the termination of the life estate sold to said Bepler, which he could sell and convey by deed, and which he did sell and convey by the deed of August 26, 1865, and that consequently the plaintiffs had not inherited any interest in the property; and overruled the demurrer, to which the plaintiffs excepted. The plaintiffs then had leave to reply to the defense, and they replied as follows: 'That by the proceedings in the district court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio, in the year 1863, all the estate of Thomas J. Jenkins in the property was confiscated and sold, and there did not remain in him the reversion or remainder in fee after the sale to Bepler; that they admit the execution and delivery of a deed to the defendant on the 26th day of August, 1865, by Thomas J. Jenkins, at Cincinnati, in the state of Ohio, but deny that Jenkins had any interest in the property at that time which he could convey, and aver that defendant took nothing by the deed from him.' To which reply the defendant demurred, and, after hearing the case, the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio, at October term, 1888, held that only the technical life estate of Thomas J. Jenkins was confiscated by the said decree, and that there was left in him the reversion or remainder, which he sold and conveyed to the defendant by the deed of August 26, 1865, and that consequently the plaintiffs had no interest in the property; and sustained the demurr...
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