Jenkins v. Elizabeth Jenkins.
| Decision Date | 30 September 1878 |
| Citation | 1878 WL 10248,91 Ill. 167 |
| Parties | JOHN JENKINSv.ELIZABETH JENKINS. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. ERASTUS S. WILLIAMS, Judge, presiding.
Mr. ARTHUR D. RICH, for the appellant.
On the 8th day of December, 1875, a decree for divorce was rendered in favor of appellee in the circuit court of Cook county. The decree contained a provision for alimony and solicitor's fees. The defendant in the case prayed for and obtained an appeal to this court. While the appeal was pending in this court, and on the 21st day of October, 1876, appellee entered a motion in the circuit court for a further allowance of solicitor's fees to be used in the payment of her attorneys for attending to her case in this court. The court sustained the motion and awarded complainant $300. From this order or judgment appellant also appealed.
Three grounds of reversal are relied upon: first, that the court had no jurisdiction or right to entertain the motion and order solicitor's fees after the cause had been removed into the Supreme Court; second, that the court erred in decreeing the allowance, because no sufficient ground for divorce existed; third, that the amount allowed was excessive.
In regard to the first point relied upon, were it not for sec. 15, chap. 40, R. L. 1874, page 421, we would have no hesitation in holding that appellant's position was well taken,--that after the appeal was consummated and the cause was removed to this court, the circuit court had no right to require appellant, by decree or otherwise, to pay attorney or solicitor's fees; but the section of the statute referred to in plain and express terms confers the power upon the circuit court, and the law as enacted by the Legislature must control.
As to the second question presented, we are not aware that it has ever been regarded as a prerequisite to obtaining a decree for alimony or solicitor's fees, pending a divorce suit, that the complainant should establish to the satisfaction of the court that she was entitled to decree for divorce. Where a bill is pending for divorce and the wife is without means to prosecute her suit, and it appears to the court that complainant has a probable ground for divorce, it has always been regarded proper for the court to enter an order requiring the defendant to pay solicitor's fees.
It is true, this court, on the hearing of the appeal, held the evidence insufficient to sustain a decree for divorce, yet the facts before the court were, doubtless, sufficient to...
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Red River Valley Brick Corporation v. City of Grand Forks
... ... 545; Ex parte Thatcher, 7 Ill. 167; ... Ambrose v. Weed. 11 Ill. 488; Jenkins v ... Jenkins, 91 Ill. 167; People ex rel. Frank v ... Prendergast, 117 Ill. 588, 6 N.E. 695; ... ...
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Marriage of Pease, In re, s. 81-483
...of section 15 of the Divorce Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 40, par. 16). Arndt v. Arndt (1948), 399 Ill. 490, 78 N.E.2d 272; Jenkins v. Jenkins (1878), 91 Ill. 167; Jacobs v. Jacobs (1946), 328 Ill.App. 133, 65 N.E.2d 588; Balswic v. Balswic (1912), 179 Ill.App. The legislature amended the Di......
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Arndt v. Arndt
...687. Neither of these cases was a divorce, separate maintenance or annulment of marriage proceeding. However, in each case Jenkins v. Jenkins, 91 Ill. 167, was cited. That case involved an order by the trial court for solicitor's fees for the wife's defense of the appeal taken by the husban......
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Cowdery v. Northern Trust Co.
...148, and cases cited.” In considering the allowance of solicitors' fees in a divorce case pending an appeal, the court in Jenkins v. Jenkins, 91 Ill. 167, said: “In regard to the first point relied upon, were it not for sec. 15, chap. 40, R.L.1874, page 421, we would have no hesitation in h......