Jenkins v. General Motors Corporation
Decision Date | 30 January 1973 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 4384. |
Parties | Edward L. JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, and United Automobile Workers Local 435, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
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L. Vincent Ramunno, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.
Allen M. Terrell, Jr., of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, Del., for defendant General Motors Corp.
Harvey B. Rubenstein, Wilmington, Del., for defendant United Automobile Workers Local 435.
Jack L. Gould, E. E. O. C., Baltimore, Md., amicus curiae.
This action seeks redress for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981), and the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U. S.C. § 151 et seq.). Plaintiff is a black citizen of the United States who, as of July 9, 1968, was employed by defendant General Motors Corporation ("GM") at its auto assembly plant in Wilmington, Delaware and was a member in good standing of defendant United Automobile Workers Local 435 ("Local 435").
Count I of the complaint paraphrases the wording of the Title VII definition of an "unlawful employment practice"1 and charges GM with unspecified, racially discriminatory "policies, practices, customs and usages." The only factual allegations supporting these conclusory charges are found in the following two paragraphs of the complaint:
Count I also charges that Local 435 has made no attempt to correct this situation.
Count II of the complaint alleges that Local 435 violated its "duty of fair representation imposed . . . by the National Labor Relations Act in that . . . it acquiesced and/or joined in the unlawful and discriminatory practices and policies of GM complained of in . . . Count I and has failed to protect the Negro members of the company from said discriminatory policies and practices."
Plaintiff purports to bring this action on behalf of himself and all "Negro persons who are employed or might be employed by . . . GM at its auto assembly plant located in Wilmington, Delaware and who are members of . . . Local 435, who have been and continue to be or might be adversely affected by the practices complained of herein." In support of the class claim plaintiff expressly invokes Rule 23(b) (2) and alleges:
The complaint prays for an injunction restraining defendants from continuing the discrimination referred to in the complaint and a judgment requiring defendants to "pay the plaintiff for his loss of income, punitive damages and for the costs of this suit."
Both GM and Local 435 have moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the action is barred by state and federal statutes of limitations and that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The complaint and the supplementary affidavits filed by the parties reveal the following undisputed facts. Plaintiff first informed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the Commission") of the alleged racially inspired harassment and discharge referred to in the complaint by a letter received on November 22, 1968. On December 2, 1968 plaintiff sent the Commission a completed charge form which the Commission transmitted to the State of Delaware, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, on December 18, 1968, in accordance with Section 706(a) of Title VII. On January 2, 1969, the Commission received a letter from the Delaware Department of Labor and Industrial Relations stating that its receipt of the matter was untimely and that Delaware, therefore, was returning it to the Commission for handling. On January 2, 1969, plaintiff's charge was filed with the Commission. On March 18, 1969 plaintiff's charge was amended and the amended charge was served on GM on March 20, 1969. An investigation ensued.
On February 1, 1971, the Commission sent plaintiff a letter advising him that it found reasonable cause to believe that his charge was true and that conciliation efforts with GM would be undertaken. Conciliation efforts failed and on March 2, 1971, the Commission received a letter from plaintiff acknowledging that conciliation had failed and requesting the Commission's assistance in obtaining an attorney to handle his case in court. Subsequently, plaintiff retained an attorney admitted to practice before the bar of this Court. On January 27, 1972, pursuant to plaintiff's request, the Commission transmitted to plaintiff's attorney a Notice of Right to Sue Within Thirty Days. This notice was received by the attorney on January 31, 1972. This suit was filed 112 days later on May 22, 1972.
Before proceeding to a consideration of defendants' motions, I consider it appropriate to determine pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1) whether this action is properly brought as a class action and, if so, what class plaintiff may properly represent.
Plaintiff's claim for damages and costs is a personal claim. The class action phase of this case is brought under Rule 23(b)(2) which refers to situations in which the defendant "has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief . . . with respect to the class as a whole." The only relief requested for the class is injunctive relief against future discrimination.
Assuming without deciding that the complaint states a claim on behalf of the class for injunctive relief, I conclude that plaintiff fails to satisfy the requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) and, accordingly, cannot maintain the injunctive phase of this case as a class action.
Rule 23(a)(4) requires a showing that the representative party "will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Under this rule the representative party must have a sufficient stake in the class claim to assure that he will adequately litigate the issues upon which the class claim depends and the determination of which will ultimately be binding on the members of the class. Here the plaintiff has not been employed by GM for over four and one-half years and does not seek reinstatement. He is elsewhere employed and alleges no interest in returning to GM. Similarly, plaintiff does not allege that he is currently represented by Local 435 or that he desires to be so represented other than in connection with the events which occurred at GM in 1967 and 1968. Accordingly, he has no stake, other than perhaps a general interest in fair employment, in whether the injunctive relief prayed for is granted or denied. While he has a personal interest in proving discrimination in 1967 and 1968, he has no personal interest in establishing the existence of a pattern of discrimination from that time until the present which is, of course, a crucial element of the class claim for prospective injunctive relief. These deficiencies of plaintiff as a class representative preclude his representation of the class described in the complaint as well as any other sub-class thereof on whose behalf this claim for injunctive relief might be asserted.
Plaintiff has cited no case suggesting that one in his position may represent a similar class in pressing a claim for relief of this character. A number of cases, while not precisely on point, support the conclusion I here reach. E. g., White v. Gates Rubber Company, 53 F. R.D. 412, 413-414 (D.Colo.1971); Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242, 247 (D.Conn.1970); Burney v. North American Rockwell Corp., 302 F.Supp. 86, 90 (C.D.Cal.1969). See also Developments in the Law—Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1109, 1220-21 (1971).
This leaves plaintiff with his individual claims for relief. To the extent the complaint can be construed as seeking an injunction on behalf of plaintiff individually, it clearly fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. No threat of irreparable injury to plaintiff is alleged and it is difficult to see how the possibility of such injury might be claimed in this context.
Accordingly, the only questions remaining for decision at present are whether plaintiff's individual claims are barred by limitations.
Section 706(e) of Title VII provides that an individual may file a civil action within thirty days after the Commission notifies him that it has been unable to secure voluntary compliance with the Act. The notification sent to plaintiff's attorney at plaintiff's request was entitled "Notice Of Right To Sue Within Thirty Days" and provided in part as...
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