Jenkins v. McKeithen

Citation286 F. Supp. 537
Decision Date26 June 1968
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 68-38,68-42.
PartiesRoderick JENKINS v. John Julien McKEITHEN, Cecil Morgan, Paul M. Hebert, Floyd C. Boswell, Ralph F. Howe, A. R. Johnson, III, and Burt S. Turner. Jerry SYLVESTER v. Cecil MORGAN, Thomas W. McFerrin, and William V. Redmann.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

J. Minos Simon, Lafayette, La., for plaintiff, Roderick Jenkins.

Dennis R. Whalen, Baton Rouge, La., William C. Bradley, Baker, La., for plaintiff, Jerry Sylvester.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., State of Louisiana, Ashton L. Stewart, Baton Rouge, La., Victor A. Sachse, Baton Rouge, La., for defendants.

Before AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge, and WEST and MITCHELL, District Judges.

PER CURIAM:

These two suits, consolidated for hearing on motion to dismiss, attack the constitutionality of Act No. 2 of the First Extraordinary Session of the Louisiana Legislature for 1967. This Act, LSA-R.S. 23:880.1-23:880.18, provides for the creation and operation of what is known as the Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry. Since injunctive relief is sought in both cases based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of said Act, this three-judge district court was convened pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2281 and 2284. A hearing on the motions to dismiss was held on June 6, 1968, and after careful study of the voluminous records and exhaustive briefs of counsel, it is the opinion of this Court that the motions to dismiss must be granted.

The constitutionality of this Act has been challenged previously in the state courts of Louisiana in the case of Martone v. Morgan, 251 La. 993, 207 So.2d 770, wherein the plaintiff was represented by the same attorney now representing the plaintiff Jenkins. At the district court level, Mr. Martone prevailed, but that decision was reversed in a well-written opinion by Mr. Justice E. Howard McCaleb of the Louisiana Supreme Court. We agree with the unanimous opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Martone that the case of Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 46 L.Ed.2d 1307, is dispositive of the issues pertaining to the constitutionality of the Act here in question. The Act was properly analyzed by the Louiana Supreme Court in Martone when it said:

"The Legislature of 1967, by Act 2 of the Extraordinary Session thereof (R.S. 23:880.1-880.18), created a commission denominated as the `Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry' to investigate and find facts relating to violations or possible violations of the criminal laws of this State or of the United States arising out of or in connection with matters in the field of labor-management relations. According to the preamble to the act, this Commission of Inquiry was conceived and created to examine the causes for the unprecedented conditions existing in the State in the field of labor-management relations under which, by reason of suspected violations of the State and Federal criminal laws, there has been a shutdown of construction work involving industrial development projects furnishing employment to thousands of persons; that the present conditions vitally affect the public interest and threaten to disrupt the conduct of normal labor-management relations. It was further stated that, in view of the presently existing conditions, the public interest requires that the causes thereof be investigated on a statewide basis as a supplement to assist activities of the district attorneys, grand juries and other law enforcement officials and agencies of this State and of the United States.
"In the body of the act, the Commission is created and invested with power to ascertain the facts surrounding and pertaining to any actual or possible violations of the criminal laws relating to, arising out of or connected with problems or disputes in the field of labor-management relations. This power was limited however, the act declaring, `* * * it shall be investigatory and fact finding only * * *', and it was further provided that `The commission shall have no authority to and it shall make no binding adjudication with respect to such violation or violations; * * *' and `No findings, conclusions, recommendations or reports of the commission may be used as prima facie or presumptive evidence of the guilt or innocence of any person in any court of law.' Additionally, the act provides that the Commission `* * * shall make and publicize its findings with respect to the question whether or not there is probable cause to believe that there are or have been violations of any criminal law * * *. Copies of its report shall be immediately furnished to the governor, the lieutenant governor, the attorney-general and the legislature.'
"After the membership on the Commission had been duly appointed and the body began to function conformably with the authority vested in it, plaintiff instituted the present suit for an injunction as a taxpayer to have the statute declared unconstitutional on various grounds which will hereinafter be set forth and discussed. The principal attack levelled by the plaintiff is that the act denies him due process as guaranteed by Section 2 of Article I of the Louisiana Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, because the powers vested in the Commission are such that, in their investigations and hearings authorized under the act, plaintiff and/or persons similarly situated are denied assistance of counsel, the right of confrontation, the right of cross-examination of witnesses and the right to compulsory process for their witnesses. The provisions of the act thus assailed have to do with the procedure rules set forth in the act for hearings by the Commission.
* * * * * *
"* * * we direct our immediate attention to plaintiff's principal attack, and the holding of the trial judge, that R.S. 23:880.1-880.18 denies plaintiff and those similarly situated due process under the State and Federal Constitutions in that it is an agency `* * * which makes determinations in the nature of adjudications affecting legal rights. * * * Its duty in large part is to find that named individuals are responsible for criminal actions and to advertise (publicize) such findings and serve as part of the process of criminal prosecution.'
"This ruling, in our opinion, does not conform with the nature of the statute and the purpose for its enactment, for the Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry is not invested with any power to make adjudications affecting legal rights. On the contrary it is, as its provisions expressly set forth, an administrative commission (R.S. 23:880.1) created for the special purpose of investigating and finding facts in relation to violation of existing criminal laws `* * * affecting in a significant manner labor-management relations in one or more areas of the state * * *' in various construction projects which may, in the opinion of the Governor, operate as a serious threat to the economic well-being of the affected area or the State as a whole (R.S. 23:880.5). By Section 880.6(A) it becomes the duty of the Commission, when called on by the Governor to investigate and hold hearings, to receive testimony and documentary evidence and make findings with respect to any actual or probable violations of criminal laws which relate to the problems or disputes in the field of labor-management relations.
"Under the provisions of Section 880.7(A), the Commission is required to publicize its findings with respect to the question whether or not there is probable cause to believe that there have been violations of any criminal law arising out of the subject matter of its investigation. But it `* * * shall have no authority to and it shall make no binding adjudication with respect to such violation * * *', however it may make such recommendations to the Governor for action as it deems appropriate, and copies of its report are to be furnished to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, the Attorney General and the Legislature. Nevertheless its findings, recommendations and conclusions may not be used as prima facie or presumptive evidence of guilt or innocence of any person in any court of law.
"It is seen from the foregoing that this administrative body has no right to adjudicate; it merely finds facts and recommends. Hence, it is difficult to perceive that these limited powers impinge upon any constitutional guarantee to which those being investigated are entitled under the Bill of Rights."

The Act here in question was obviously carefully drafted with Hannah in mind. Its provisions are carefully tailored along the lines of the statute creating the Commission on Civil Rights, 71 Stat. 634, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-1975e, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1975-1975e, which was at issue in Hannah, and we conclude that the holding there is completely dispositive of the constitutional question here involved. In Hannah, the court concluded:

"`Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. On the other hand, when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example, when a general fact finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used. Therefore, as a generalization, it can be said that due process embodies the differing rules of fair play, which through the years, have become associated with differing types of proceedings. Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all
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4 cases
  • Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • August 2, 1974
    ...so interrelated to the three-judge questions as to present one continuous transaction or set of operative facts," Jenkins v. McKeithen, 286 F.Supp. 537, 542 (E.D.La.1968) (three-judge court), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 411, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969), and after due considera......
  • Jenkins v. Keithen
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 9, 1969
    ...A three-judge court was convened and that court ultimately granted appellees' motion to dismiss the complaint. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 286 F.Supp. 537 (D.C.E.D.La.1968). We noted probable jurisdiction of an appeal brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.1 We Since the case was decided on a motion to d......
  • Murgia v. Commonwealth of Mass. Bd. of Retirement
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • December 12, 1974
    ...263 F.Supp. 581. At the least, the decision to retain three-judge jurisdiction may be within our discretion, see Jenkins v. McKeithen, E.D.La., 1968, 286 F.Supp. 537, 542, rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 411, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404, and, if so, we exercise that discretion in favor o......
  • United States v. Stevens
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • June 27, 1968

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