Jenkins v. Panama Canal Ry. Co.

• Citation: 208 P.3d 238
• Decision Date: 18 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08SC122.,08SC122.
• Parties: Herman JENKINS, Bebra Jenkins, Bonnie Bills, Travis Law, Rainey Estes, and Nathaniel Estes, Petitioners v. PANAMA CANAL RAILWAY COMPANY, d/b/a Panama Rail Tourism Company, The Estate of Stephen O'Donnell, and Kansas City Southern Railway Company, Respondents.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

208 P.3d 238

Herman JENKINS, Bebra Jenkins, Bonnie Bills, Travis Law, Rainey Estes, and Nathaniel Estes, Petitioners v. PANAMA CANAL RAILWAY COMPANY, d/b/a Panama Rail Tourism Company, The Estate of Stephen O'Donnell, and Kansas City Southern Railway Company, Respondents.

No. 08SC122.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

May 18, 2009.

Law Offices of James Peters, P.C., James J. Peters, Qusair Mohamedbhai, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioners.

Burns Figa & Will, P.C., Jennifer Osgood, Dana L. Eismeier, Greenwood Village, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents.

Justice MARTINEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

INTRODUCTION

Herman and Bebra Jenkins, Rainey and Nathaniel Estes, Bonnie Bills, and Travis Law (collectively, "Jenkins") took a cruise vacation to Panama, and while there took a train ride along the Panama Canal. In the course of the train ride, Jenkins's train collided head-on with another train, and he suffered injuries. Upon returning to Colorado, Jenkins sought to recover from multiple entities, including Panama Canal Railway Company, its owner, and the train's operator (collectively, "Panama Canal"). Relying on Colorado's two year statute of limitations, Jenkins filed a law suit within two years of the collision. Relying on Panama's one year statute of limitations, Panama Canal moved to dismiss the action as untimely. The district court converted Panama Canal's motion to a motion for summary judgment and granted it. It found Colorado's borrowing statute applied to Jenkins's claims, and pursuant to that statute, Panama's one year statute of limitations barred the action. Jenkins appealed, arguing that Colorado's limitations act applied to the claims and pursuant to that statute, Colorado's two year statute of limitations did not bar the action. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. Jenkins v. Haymore, No. 06CA0846, 208 P.3d 265, 2007 WL 4531712 (Colo.App. Dec.27, 2007) (selected for official publication). Jenkins sought review from this court to determine which statute, and thus which limitations period, applies. Because the borrowing statute is more recent, we hold it applies to Jenkins's claims. Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment on separate grounds.

FACTS & PROCEDURE

Jenkins was a Colorado resident when he booked a cruise vacation with Charlotte Haymore's Colorado company, Charlotte's Cruises-N-Tours (collectively, "Haymore"), for the fall of 2001. As part of the vacation package, Jenkins purchased tickets for a train ride along the Panama Canal, on a train operated by Panama Canal Railway Company. On December 2, 2001, Jenkins was aboard a Panama Canal Railway Company train operated by Stephen O'Donnell when the accident occurred. Jenkins's train collided head-on at 20-25 miles per hour with another Panama Canal train that was stopped on the same track. Jenkins received injuries as a result of this collision. O'Donnell subsequently died, but it is not clear whether the collision caused his death. Jenkins was offered medical treatment in Panama, contingent on signing a waiver written in Spanish. Jenkins does not speak Spanish; thus, he declined to sign the waiver and did not receive treatment at that time. Once back in Colorado, Jenkins incurred costs in treating his injuries.

On December 1, 2003, Jenkins sought to recover for these injuries, and brought a negligence action in Colorado district court against multiple entities, including Haymore and Panama Canal. After what appears to have been a fairly contentious discovery period, Panama Canal filed a motion to dismiss on November 28, 2005. It argued in part that Colorado's borrowing statute, section 13-80-110, C.R.S. (2008), applied to Jenkins's action because his claims arose in Panama. Therefore, under the borrowing statute, Panama's one year statute of limitations applied, and barred Jenkins's action filed two years after the collision.

Based on affidavits attached to Panama Canal's motion and Jenkins's response, the district court converted Panama Canal's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. On February 16, 2006, the district court found Jenkins's claims arose in Panama, and thus the borrowing statute applied. Pursuant to the borrowing statute, the district court applied Panama's one year statute of limitations, and found Jenkins's negligence action filed two years after the collision was time-barred. Therefore, the district court granted summary judgment to Panama Canal. Based on this ruling, Haymore filed an emergency motion to dismiss. On February 23, 2006, in accordance with its order granting summary judgment, the district court granted Haymore's motion.

Jenkins appealed the district court's February 16, 2006 order granting summary judgment, arguing the court erred in applying Colorado's borrowing statute to determine the correct statute of limitations. Instead of the borrowing statute, Jenkins argued the district court should have applied the Uniform Conflict of Laws—Limitations Act. §§ 13-82-101 to -107, C.R.S. (2008). Jenkins further argued that his negligence claims are substantively based on Colorado law, and therefore under the limitations act, section 13-82-104, Colorado's two year statute of limitations applies. In the alternative, Jenkins argued that even if his negligence claims are found to be substantively based on Panama law, the limitations act's "escape" clause, section 13-82-106, saves him from Panama's one year statute of limitations and applies Colorado's two year statute of limitations. Therefore, his lawsuit brought within two years of the collision is not time-barred.

The court of appeals disagreed with Jenkins's determination of the applicable statute. In a published decision, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. Jenkins v. Haymore, 208 P.3d at 269. The court of appeals held the borrowing statute and the limitations act are irreconcilable, and applied three rules of statutory construction to determine which governs: which statute is more specific, which statute was enacted last, and which statute employs the longer limitations period. Id. at 268. Without analysis, the court determined the borrowing statute was more specific than the limitations act. Id. at 268. It also noted the borrowing statute was enacted later than the limitations act; though the limitations act expressly repealed the borrowing statute when enacted in 1984, the borrowing statute was enacted again in 1986. Id. at 267. Finally, the court of appeals declined to address which statute has a longer limitations period, because the conflict could be resolved on specificity and recency. Id. at 268.

Jenkins petitioned this court for review of the court of appeals' decision, and both parties focused their arguments on which statute is more specific. We ultimately conclude neither statute is more specific than the other; thus we disagree with the court of appeals' holding that the borrowing statute applies because it is more specific than the limitations act. However, because the borrowing statute was enacted more recently than the limitations act, we hold the borrowing statute was appropriately applied. Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals and hold that summary judgment was proper.

ANALYSIS

A court may grant summary judgment only when the pleadings and supporting documents clearly demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. C.R.C.P. 56(c); Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 570 (Colo.2008); Friedland v. Travelers Indem Co., 105 P.3d 639, 643 (Colo.2005). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, a court grants the nonmoving party any favorable inferences reasonably drawn from the facts, and resolves all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Lombard, 187 P.3d at 570; Friedland, 105 P.3d at 643. We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Lombard, 187 P.3d at 570; Friedland, 105 P.3d at 643.

To review the grant of summary judgment in this case, we must determine which of these irreconcilable statutes, the borrowing statute or the limitations act, applies to Jenkins's claims. The borrowing statute applies to a claim arising in another jurisdiction, and imposes that jurisdiction's statute of limitations on the claim. It states:

If a cause of action arises in another state or territory or in a foreign country and, by the laws thereof, an action thereon cannot be maintained in that state, territory, or foreign country by reason of lapse of time, the cause of action shall not be maintained in this state.

§ 13-80-110. If the borrowing statute applies here, Jenkins is bound by Panama's one year statute of limitations, making his action time-barred and summary judgment for Panama Canal proper.

On the other hand, the limitations act imposes different statutes of limitations depending on the substantive law underlying a claim. That is, if a claim is based on another jurisdiction's substantive law, that jurisdiction's statute of limitations applies. But if a claim is based on Colorado's substantive law, Colorado's statute of limitations applies. The act states:

(1) Except as provided in section 13-82-106, if a claim is substantively based:

(a) Upon the law of one other state, the limitation period of that state applies; or

(b) Upon the law of more than one state, the limitation period of one of those states chosen by the law of conflict of laws of this statute applies.

(2) The limitations period of this state applies to all other claims.¹

§ 13-82-104. If the limitations act applies here, Jenkins may be bound by either Panama's one year statute of limitations or Colorado's two year statute of limitations, depending on whether the substantive law of Panama or Colorado governs his claims.²

When interpreting statutes, our primary task is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent. Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663, 667 (Colo.1995). To...