Jenkins v. Petitioning CreditorRay E. Friedman & Co.
| Decision Date | 18 November 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-1972,CREDITOR-RAY,80-1972 |
| Citation | 664 F.2d 184 |
| Parties | 5 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 1313, 8 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 631, Bankr. L. Rep. P 68,426 Brent Thomas JENKINS and Brent Thomas Jenkins, d/b/a Jenkins Stock Farms, Alleged Bankrupt, Appellee, v. PETITIONINGE. FRIEDMAN & COMPANY, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Ronald H. McLean (argued), of Tenneson, Serkland, Lundberg, Erickson & Marcil, Ltd., Fargo, N. D., for petitioning creditor-appellant.
Dorsey, Windhorst, Hannaford, Whitney & Halladay, Paul J. Scheerer (argued), Minneapolis, Minn., Lamb, Schaefer, McNair & Larson, Ltd., Fargo, N. D., for appellee.
Before McMILLIAN and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and HANSON, * Senior District Judge.
Appellant Ray E. Friedman & Co. (Friedman) seeks reversal of the district court's 1 order dismissing its involuntary petition in bankruptcy. Friedman contends the district court erred in concluding that the alleged bankrupt, Brent Thomas Jenkins, was a "farmer" within the meaning of § 4(b) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 2 and therefore exempt from an adjudication of involuntary bankruptcy. We affirm.
Friedman, a Chicago-based brokerage firm, commenced this involuntary bankruptcy proceeding on June 28, 1978, alleging that Jenkins had fraudulently and preferentially transferred certain assets and property to local creditors during the months of February and March, 1978. 3 In part, these transfers were accomplished through the foreclosure and sale of property encumbered in favor of the local creditors. At this time, Jenkins was allegedly indebted to Friedman in the amount of $224,280. The debt resulted from losses incurred by Jenkins in commodities futures trading, mainly pork bellies, with Friedman acting as his broker. 4 Jenkins' trading activities consistently resulted in losses; through his trading with Friedman in the first three months of 1978, Jenkins suffered a net loss exceeding $560,000. Funds were advanced by Friedman to cover margin call deficits incurred by Jenkins, who in turn borrowed a total of $330,000 from a local bank to repay the brokerage firm.
Following the transfer of property by Jenkins, Friedman initiated this action, seeking to have Jenkins adjudicated an involuntary bankrupt. Jenkins filed a motion to dismiss, contending he was a "farmer" and was therefore exempt from an adjudication of involuntary bankruptcy under § 4(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 22(b). The Act defines a "farmer" as
an individual personally engaged in farming or tillage of the soil, and shall include an individual personally engaged in dairy farming or in the production of poultry, livestock, or poultry or livestock products in their unmanufactured state, if the principal part of his income is derived from any one or more of such operations.
11 U.S.C. § 1(17) (emphasis supplied).
After a hearing the bankruptcy court denied Jenkins' motion, concluding that by transferring his farming assets, he had waived any right to claim exempt status as a farmer. On appeal the district court reversed and remanded for a determination as to whether Jenkins was a "farmer" within the meaning of the Act. The bankruptcy court on remand concluded that Jenkins was personally engaged in farming, but found that the principal part of his income was derived from his activities in the commodities market. Although he had consistently lost money in trading, the bankruptcy court concluded that the $330,000 Jenkins had borrowed to finance his trading activities constituted "income" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. Consequently, the bankruptcy court determined that Jenkins was not a "farmer" and denied his motion to dismiss. The district court on appeal again reversed, finding that the principal part of Jenkins' income was derived from farming and that he therefore fell within the farmer exemption of § 4(b). This appeal followed.
Section 4(b) of the Bankruptcy Act expressly provided that certain classes of persons, including farmers, would be exempt from involuntary bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 22(b). Section 1(17), quoted previously, establishes a two-fold standard for determining whether an alleged bankrupt is a "farmer" for purposes of the Act: (1) he must be "personally engaged in farming," and (2) the "principal part of his income" must be "derived from ... such operations." The date of the alleged act of bankruptcy is the time when the determination of exempt status is to be made. 11 U.S.C. § 22(b). Where the issue is controverted, the petitioning creditor bears the burden of proving that the alleged bankrupt is not a farmer. See In re Hinrichs, 314 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir. 1963); In re White, 238 F.Supp. 454, 455 (D.Colo.1965).
We believe the definitional standard of § 1(17) is satisfied in this case. The bankruptcy court specifically found that Jenkins was "personally engaged in farming" from 1963 through the 1978 season; Friedman apparently does not challenge this finding. Further, examination of Jenkins' income at the time in question supports the district court's conclusion that the principal part of Jenkins' income was derived from farming. The record indicates that Jenkins earned gross income of approximately $60,000 from his farming operations during the first three quarters of 1978. During this period, Jenkins also received $2,820 from the sale of hail insurance, a business he maintained in addition to farming. Jenkins did not realize any income from his commodities trading. Like the district court, we do not believe that the term "income" as used in § 1(17) was intended to include borrowed funds. Consequently, it is clear that the principal part of Jenkins' income during 1978 was derived from farming. The requirements of § 1(17) are therefore satisfied in this case.
Friedman contends, however, that § 1(17) must not be applied literally, arguing instead that factors in addition to income, particularly the source of the alleged bankrupt's indebtedness, must be considered in determining whether a debtor falls within the "farmer" exemption. In this case, the company asserts,...
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