Jenkins v. Pilot Life Ins. Co.

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: FISHBURNE, Justice.
• Citation: Jenkins v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 197 S. E. 28, 186 S. C. 518 (S.C. 1938)
• Decision Date: 03 May 1938
• Docket Number: 14678.
• Parties: JENKINS v. PILOT LIFE INS. CO.

197 S.E. 28

186 S.C. 518

JENKINS v. PILOT LIFE INS. CO.

No. 14678.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 3, 1938

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Chesterfield County; G. B Greene, Judge.

Action by John M. Jenkins against the Pilot Life Insurance Company for actual and punitive damages for an alleged wrongful breach of a contract of insurance issued on plaintiff's life by defendant. Verdict for plaintiff for actual and punitive damages, judgment for plaintiff as to actual damages and for defendant as to punitive damages, and both parties appeal.

Affirmed.

Knight & Arant, of Chesterfield, for appellant.

Leppard & Leppard, of Chesterfield, for respondent.

FISHBURNE Justice.

This action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for the recovery of actual and punitive damages for the alleged unlawful and fraudulent breach of a contract of insurance issued upon the life of the plaintiff by the defendant. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $500 actual damages, and $200 punitive damages.

During the course of the trial, the defendant made unsuccessful motions for a nonsuit and for a directed verdict. And after the publication of the verdict it made a motion for a new trial upon substantially the same grounds as were advanced in its motions. In passing upon the motion for a new trial, the trial judge stated in his order that, "after a careful consideration of the evidence in the case, I have reached the decision that there is ample evidence to sustain the verdict for actual damages, but there is no evidence to sustain a verdict for punitive damages, and that defendant's motion for a directed verdict as to punitive damages should have been granted by me when it was made."

He thereupon refused the motion as to actual damages, and ordered that judgment be entered for the defendant as to punitive damages, without allowing the plaintiff the option of a new trial nisi.

There are several appeals and cross-appeals growing out of the main issues, and arising from an order subsequently made by his honor, Judge Dennis, in settling the case for appeal.

We shall first discuss what we regard as the vital issue made in the case by the exceptions on appeal. The solution of this question will for all practical purposes determine the case.

Did the court err in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant on both the issue of actual damages and punitive damages? Our attention will first be directed to the question of actual damages. The determination of this issue depends upon whether there was any evidence from which the jury could draw a reasonable inference that the defendant waived the prompt payment of premiums and wrongfully breached the contract of insurance.

The plaintiff paid ten annual premiums of $62.51 each. Before the eleventh annual premium fell due, on October 6, 1933, the plaintiff arranged with the defendant for an extension of the days of grace to January 6, 1934. On or before the 6th day of January, 1934, the plaintiff arranged for an additional extension of the days of grace until April 6 1934; and on that date arranged a further extension of the days of grace until June 6, 1934; each extension period being had upon the payment by the plaintiff of a fractional part of the premium which fell due on October 6, 1933. This litigation springs from what occurred on June 6, 1934.

The defendant contends that the policy lapsed for the nonpayment of $38.63, which was the remainder due on the premium and which became due and payable on June 6, 1934. The plaintiff contends that the defendant breached the said agreement which it made with the plaintiff on June 6, 1934, to make him a policy loan in the sum of $322, and to accept the proceeds of such loan and $8.87 as payment in full on the existing policy loan and interest, which items included the sum of $38.63, balance due on the 1933 premium and interest. The plaintiff further contends that the policy at that time, by reason of the conduct of the defendant, was in full force and effect, by reason of the fact that the defendant had waived the prompt and punctual payment of the quarterly premium.

With reference to the receipt by it of the loan agreement and of plaintiff's check for $8.87, the defendant asserts that they were not received in time.

The issue under discussion will be made clearer by a brief reference to the facts.

On October 6, 1932, the plaintiff procured a policy loan for $281, which became due on October 6, 1933, with interest from that date at 6 per cent. per annum. On June 6, 1934, which was the last day of the extension period, the plaintiff went to the office of Mr. Duke, the defendant's general soliciting agent at Pageland, and requested him to arrange a further policy loan sufficient to pay the previous policy loan referred to, and the sum of $38.63 which was due on that date. Pursuant to this request Mr. Duke on the same day wrote and mailed a letter to the home office of the defendant, requesting it to forward the necessary papers for this purpose direct to the plaintiff for execution.

In response to this letter the defendant, on June 11, 1934, wrote the following letter to the plaintiff:

"Re: Policy No. 53 674

At the request of Mr. C. M. Duke we are enclosing loan papers filled in for the full loan value which amounts to $322.00. This covers the former loan and interest of $292.24, and part of the balance of the October 6, 1933, annual premium, leaving a balance of $8.87 that you will have to pay in cash to supplement the loan papers.

Please complete these papers by having your signature witnessed by some disinterested person, not a relative, and return both copies to us with your check for $8.87."

The plaintiff upon receipt of this letter executed and returned to the defendant the loan agreement and a cashier's check for $8.87, which were received by the defendant on June 25, 1934.

On that day, in a letter to the plaintiff, the defendant acknowledged receipt of the loan agreement and the payment of $8.87, but stated that since this settlement was not made on time, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to furnish current evidence of his insurability. Thereafter, they rejected his reinstatement, upon the ground that he was not a good insurance risk.

On the trial of the case the assistant treasurer of the defendant testified that the reason that the defendant refused to accept the loan agreement and check in settlement of the premium was that they were not received in the home office on or before June 6, 1934.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the defendant's conduct with its contention that the loan agreement and the...