Jenkins v. Revolution Helicopter Corp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 June 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Citation | 925 S.W.2d 939 |
| Parties | Robert JENKINS, Respondent, v. REVOLUTION HELICOPTER CORP., INC., Appellant. 50602. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Thomas E. Hankins, Gladstone, for appellant.
David P. Chamberlain, Liberty, for respondent.
Before ULRICH, P.J., and BRECKENRIDGE and EDWIN H. SMITH, JJ.
Robert Jenkins sued Revolution Helicopter Corporation, Inc., ("RHC") to recover money RHC allegedly owed him. RHC then filed a five-count counterclaim against Mr. Jenkins, alleging, inter alia, that Mr. Jenkins made slanderous statements about the company on two occasions, and that Mr. Jenkins' filing of his petition constituted an abuse of process. At the close of all the evidence the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of Mr. Jenkins on the abuse of process claim. On RHC's claim for slander which involved two submissions to the jury, the jury found in favor of RHC, assessed its actual damages at zero dollars, and found that RHC was entitled to punitive damages. Because the jury did not assess any actual damages, the trial court ordered that RHC "recover naught" on each of its submissions on its slander count.
RHC appeals, contending that the trial court erred: 1) in overruling its objection that the jury's verdicts on the slander claim were inconsistent; 2) in excluding evidence of RHC's good reputation; and 3) in directing a verdict in favor of Mr. Jenkins on RHC's abuse of process claim.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court.
On October 20, 1993, Mr. Jenkins filed an amended two-count petition against RHC. Mr. Jenkins had previously worked as a dealer for RHC, a company which manufactures helicopters. The first count sought to recover $6,000 Mr. Jenkins had paid to RHC as an advance for the delivery of helicopters and $3,000 he had deposited with RHC in accordance with a dealership agreement. The second count alleged that RHC owed Mr. Jenkins $26,990 for certain computer equipment it had purchased from him.
RHC filed a counterclaim which sought compensatory and punitive damages on five counts: Count I--trespass; Count II--defamation; Count III--tortious interference with contract; Count IV--prima facie tort; and Count V--abuse of process. RHC later voluntarily dismissed the fourth count.
The trial court sustained Mr. Jenkins' pre-trial motion to bifurcate the trial, leaving the amount of punitive damages to be determined in the trial's second phase. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of Mr. Jenkins on RHC's abuse of process claim.
On Mr. Jenkins' petition, the jury found in favor of Mr. Jenkins on count one and count two and awarded him damages of $10,486.73 and $29,825.03, respectively. On RHC's counterclaim, the jury found in favor of RHC on the trespass count, assessed its actual damages at $179 and found Mr. Jenkins liable for punitive damages. The jury found in favor of Mr. Jenkins on the tortious interference with contract claim.
The jury entered two separate verdicts on the defamation claim, Verdicts D and E. Verdict D concerned false statements Mr. Jenkins allegedly made about RHC at an air show in Florida. Verdict E pertained to statements Mr. Jenkins allegedly made over the telephone to Thomas Payne, a bank officer. On both Verdict D and Verdict E, the jury found in favor of RHC, assessed its actual damages at zero dollars, and stated that RHC was entitled to punitive damages.
After the verdicts were returned, the trial judge expressed to the parties his "concern" with Verdicts D and E. RHC's counsel objected to the verdicts on the basis that they were inconsistent, and he requested that the court give a clarifying instruction to the jury or, alternatively, grant a mistrial. The court overruled the objection and ordered that the jury be prohibited from awarding punitive damages on the two slander counts, leaving only the trespass count on which the jury could assess punitive damages.
The second phase of the trial then began, to determine the amount of punitive damages on the trespass count. After the parties offered evidence pertaining to Mr. Jenkins' financial background, the jury entered a verdict awarding RHC $10,000 in punitive damages.
The trial court entered judgment per the verdict on the trespass and the tortious interference counts, and the two counts of Mr. Jenkins' petition. For the two slander submissions, the court ruled that the jury's finding that RHC was entitled to punitive damages was a "nullity" and ordered that RHC "recover naught."
RHC's first point alleges that the trial court erred in overruling its objection that Verdicts D and E on the two slander submissions were inconsistent, because the jury instructions required the jury to find for RHC only if it determined that RHC had suffered damage to its reputation. The award of zero actual damages, RHC contends, is inconsistent with a finding in favor of RHC.
In construing the verdict, this court observes the general rules set out by the Missouri Supreme Court in Morse v. Johnson, 594 S.W.2d 610, 616 (Mo. banc 1980). Those rules are:
(1) That the verdict must be clear and unambiguous so that a judgment may be written upon it without resorting to inference or to construction; (2) that if from a consideration of the whole record the meaning of the jury can be made clear and the judgment is based upon what the jury actually found, it will be upheld; (3) that verdicts should be construed to give them effect if it can reasonably be done; (4) that the jury's intent is to be arrived at by regarding the verdict liberally and (5) although defective in form, if a verdict substantially finds the question in issue in such a way as will enable the court intelligently to pronounce judgment thereon for one or the other party it is sufficiently certain.
To determine whether the jury's verdicts on the slander counts were inconsistent, it is necessary to examine the relevant jury instructions. Instruction Number 22, MAI 23.10(1) modified, read:
In Verdict D on the claim of Defendant Revolution Helicopter Corporation, Inc. against Plaintiff for damages based on slander for statements made at the Florida Fun 'N Sun Air Show in 1993, your verdict must be for Defendant if you believe:
First, Plaintiff stated that
Defendant "is robbing you," or
Defendant "is fleecing you," or
Defendant "is ripping you off," or
the aircraft Defendant is selling will never be delivered, or
Plaintiff was cheated out of money and "you will be too," and
Second, Plaintiff was at fault in making one or more such statements, and
Third, such statement or statements tended to expose Defendant to contempt or ridicule, and
Fourth, such statement was heard by persons attending the 1993 Sun 'N Fun Airshow in Florida, and
Fifth, Defendant's reputation was thereby damaged.
Instruction 27, MAI 23.10(1) modified, read:
Your verdict must be in favor of Defendant Revolution Helicopter Corporation, Inc. for damages based on slander for statements made by Plaintiff Robert Jenkins in a telephone conversation with Tom Payne in late 1992, if you believe:
First, Plaintiff stated that Defendant's aircraft "would not break ground effect," or
Defendant "was not building any aircraft," or
the helicopters Defendant was manufacturing would never work, and
Second, Plaintiff was at fault in making one or more such statements, and
Third, such statement or statements tended to expose Defendant to contempt or ridicule, and
Fourth, such statements were heard by Tom Payne, and
Fifth, Defendant's reputation was thereby damaged.
Both instructions required the jury to find in favor of RHC only if it found that RHC's reputation was damaged. The instructions conform to the rule that recovery on a slander claim requires a showing of actual damages. Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 313 (Mo. banc 1993); MAI 23.10(1) [1980 New]. By finding in favor of RHC but assessing its damages at zero dollars, Verdicts D and E appear to be internally inconsistent.
The jury's determination in Verdicts D and E that Mr. Jenkins was liable for punitive damages does not ameliorate this discrepancy. The jury was directed in Instructions 23 and 28 that if it found in favor of RHC on the slander claims, it "must award Defendant such sum as [it] believe[s] will fairly and justly compensate Defendant...." The jury could find Mr. Jenkins liable for punitive damages only if it believed his conduct "was outrageous because of Plaintiff's evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others." Instructions Number 24 and 29. Thus, the issue of actual damages was clearly separate from that of punitive damages. The confusion in interpreting the jury's verdict centers on how the jury could have determined that RHC's "reputation was damaged" without finding that RHC suffered any actual damages.
In Boone v. Richardson, 388 S.W.2d 68 (Mo.App.1965), the southern district of this court faced a similar situation. The jury in a negligence suit returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff but awarded her no damages. Id. at 70. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages only, and the defendant appealed. Id. The appellate court held that the verdict was "so contradictory as to be a nullity," because it could not be construed with certainty. Id. at 76.
The Boone court reasoned that before there can be a finding of actionable negligence, there must be a finding that the plaintiff suffered damages. Id. Thus, a verdict for the plaintiff implies that the plaintiff suffered some damages. "[T]he jury's finding of the issues for the plaintiff flatly contradicts its finding that the plaintiff suffered no damages whatever." Id. Because the verdict could not "be fairly resolved into a...
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