Jenkins v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 11 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 8:18-cv-1643-MSS-AAS |
| Parties | CHARLES JENKINS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Jenkins petitions for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2254 challenging his state court conviction for sexual battery, for which he is serving a life sentence. After reviewing the petition (Doc. 1), the response and appendix (Doc. 9), and the reply (Doc. 13), the COURT ORDERS that the petition is DENIED.
A jury found Jenkins guilty of lewd and lascivious battery on a minor, K.F. (Doc. 9-2 at 417-18), and a second jury in a separate trial found Jenkins guilty of sexual battery on a minor, A.B. (Doc. 9-3 at 2-3) The trial court sentenced Jenkins to life for the sexual battery conviction and a consecutive 15 years for the lewd and lascivious battery conviction. (Docs. 9-2 at 420-23 and 9-3 at 5-8) In a consolidated appeal, the state appellate court affirmed. (Doc. 9-3 at 29, 61) The post-conviction court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 9-3 at 209-26), and the state appellate court affirmed. (Doc. 9-3 at 399)
Jenkins's timely federal petition followed. In the petition, the claims concern Jenkins's conviction for sexual battery on A.B only. (Doc. 1 at 4-15)
FACTS [1]
A.B testified at the sexual battery trial as follows. Jenkins lived with A.B., A.B.'s mother, and A.B.'s brother. A.B.'s mother dated Jenkins whom A.B. called “Dad.” When A.B. was 10 years old, Jenkins and A.B. stayed home while A.B.'s mother went to the doctor. Jenkins told A.B. to remove her dress. Jenkins took off his own pants and placed his penis in A.B.'s “pocketbook.” A.B. referred to her vagina as her “pocketbook.” Jenkins told A.B. not to tell anyone because Jenkins would go to prison and authorities would take A.B. away from her mother.
On cross-examination, A.B. testified that Jenkins disciplined her, required her to complete chores around the home, and frequently fought with her mother. Jenkins's fights with A.B.'s mother upset A.B. A.B. was happier before Jenkins moved in with her family. A.B. first called Jenkins a rapist during a fight between her mother and Jenkins. Police came to her home that night. A.B. did not immediately tell police about the sexual battery because she was scared. A.B. told police that she had seen Jenkins naked in the kitchen in the middle of the night and the next day Jenkins asked her if she wanted to touch his penis. A.B. told Jenkins no and left to go to school. A.B. denied that Jenkins had touched her.
A detective testified that A.B. disclosed the sexual battery two months later. The detective arranged for a physical exam for A.B. But a medical examiner testified that she would not normally find forensic evidence of sexual abuse 72 hours after the abuse occurs.
The prosecutor introduced evidence that Jenkins abused A.B.'s cousin, K.F., as similar fact evidence of other crimes wrongs, or acts. § 90.404(2), Fla. Stat. K.F. testified that she spent the night at A.B.'s home. K.F. and A.B. slept in the same room. Jenkins came into the room, pulled down K.F.'s pants, and placed his penis in her vagina. A partial DNA profile from vaginal swabs from K.F. and a full DNA profile from K.F.'s underwear matched Jenkin's DNA.
The defense presented a case-in-chief. A.B.'s mother testified that, the night when K.F. spent the night, A.B.'s mother and Jenkins loudly argued about something unrelated to the sexual battery. A.B.'s mother called the police. Before police arrived, Jenkins told A.B.'s mother that she was going to jail. A.B. responded that Jenkins was going to jail for molesting her. When police arrived, A.B.'s mother reported A.B.'s accusation to police.
Because Jenkins filed his federal petition after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, AEDPA governs his claims. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to require:
A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the U.S. Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” 529 U.S. at 413. Clearly established federal law refers to the holding of an opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state court decision. 529 U.S. at 412.
“[AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). An unreasonable application is “different from an incorrect one.” 535 U.S. At 694. Even clear error is not enough. Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S.Ct. 1726, 1728 (2017). A federal petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).
Jenkins asserts ineffective assistance of counsel - a difficult claim to sustain. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) explains:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
“There is no reason for a court . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697. “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” 466 U.S. at 690. “[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.” 466 U.S. at 690.
“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 691. A reasonable probability is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694.
Strickland cautions that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. A defendant cannot meet his burden by showing that the avenue chosen by counsel was unsuccessful. White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992). Because the standards under Strickland and AEDPA are both highly deferential, “when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly' so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. “Given the double deference due, it is a ‘rare case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding.'” Nance v. Warden, Ga. Diag. Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
The state appellate court affirmed in an unexplained decision the post-conviction court's order denying Jenkins's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Doc. 9-3 at 399) A federal court “‘look[s] through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume[s] that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
Because the post-conviction court recognized that Strickland governed the claims (Doc. 9-3 at 210), Jenkins cannot meet the “contrary to” test in Section 2254(d). Jenkins instead must show that the state court either unreasonably applied Strickland or unreasonably determined a fact.
Jenkins asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for not interviewing and presenting testimony by A.B.'s aunt Kristina Boyd. (Doc. 1 at 4-5) The post-conviction court denied the claim as follows (Doc. 9-3 at 210-12) (state court record citations omitted):
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