Jenkins v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas., 02-1779WA.

• Decision Date: 15 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. 02-1779WA.,02-1779WA.
• Parties: Leon JENKINS, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 741

307 F.3d 741

Leon JENKINS, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY, Appellee.

No. 02-1779WA.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 9, 2002.

Filed: October 15, 2002.

W. Kirby Lockhart, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellant.

William A. Waddell, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Leon Jenkins appeals from the District Court's grant of summary judgment on his claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (the ADEA). The District Court dismissed his claim on the ground that, as an independent contractor, he was not covered by the ADEA. The issue before this Court is whether Mr. Jenkins provided sufficient evidence that he was an employee, rather than an independent contractor, to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was covered by the ADEA. We hold that Mr. Jenkins did raise such an issue, and therefore, we reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment.

I.

Mr. Jenkins began working for Southern Farm Bureau Casualty (SFBC) when he was 24 years of age and served as SFBC's agency manager in Malvern, Hot Spring County, Arkansas, for about 35 years. On September 15, 2000, when Mr. Jenkins was 59 years of age, representatives of SFBC met with him and asked him to resign. He was told that if he did not choose to resign, he would be terminated. Mr. Jenkins decided to resign effective December 31, 2000, and notified SFBC of his decision. The parties dispute the reason for the company's forcing Mr. Jenkins out. Mr. Jenkins alleges that the company forced him out to replace him with a younger worker, while SFBC alleges that he was forced out because of repeated violations of company policy and because of inappropriate comments he allegedly made. Mr. Jenkins filed an ADEA complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. After receiving a right-to-sue letter, he commenced this lawsuit alleging that SFBC discriminated against him on account of his age.¹

SFBC moved for summary judgment on Mr. Jenkins's ADEA claim, asserting that he was an independent contractor and thus not subject to the protection of the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 623. The District Court granted SFBC's motion, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact, and that SFBC was entitled to judgment because the evidence established as a matter of law that Mr. Jenkins was, indeed, an independent contractor.

The District Court began its analysis by noting that the ADEA "protects `employees,' but not independent contractors," District Court Order at 7, and correctly concluded that the proper standard for determining whether a worker is an employee is set forth in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992). In that case, the Supreme Court noted that when a statute does not contain a helpful definition of the term "employee," the courts should look to that term's common-law meaning. Id. at 322-23, 112 S.Ct. 1344. The Supreme Court also included a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered:

we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.

Id. at 323-24, 112 S.Ct. 1344 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989)). The District Court also correctly noted that the inquiry "is fact intensive, and all facts concerning performance and work situation should be analyzed." District Court Order at 8.

The District Court then proceeded to apply the Darden factors to this case. The District Court first considered what facts supported Mr. Jenkins's claim that he was an employee. The District Court concluded that there were only a few such facts:

They would include that Jenkins accessed and used SFBC's mainframe computer system; he had to abide by SFBC's harassment policies; SFBC required him to maintain acceptable errors and omissions coverage; he participated in SFBC sponsored group insurance policies; SFBC had final authority to make underwriting decisions; and only SFBC had authority to contract with the insurance agents who worked out of Jenkins' agency.

District Court Order at 9. The District Court then considered the facts that supported SFBC's contention that Mr. Jenkins was an independent contractor:

The Agency Manager Contract expressly provided that Jenkins had the right to control his daily activities as agency manager and the means by which he carried out the provisions of his contract with SFBC. In addition, Jenkins exercised independent judgment as to who his customers would be, and how he would solicit their business. Other than specifying that the agency office would be located in Malvern, Arkansas, SFBC did not select the site of the office. SFBC did not pay for Jenkins' office space, office supplies or equipment, or prescribe office hours. Both Jenkins' and SFBC had the right to terminate their relationship at any time upon ten (10) days notice, and Jenkins received commissions and paid self-employment taxes.

District Court Order at 9-10. After listing the factors that it found relevant, the Court weighed the factors and concluded that Mr. Jenkins was an independent contractor. The District Court, therefore, granted summary judgment in favor of SFBC on the ground that Jenkins was not protected by the ADEA.² Jenkins is before this Court appealing that decision.

II.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must give that party the benefit of all justifiable inferences. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). This Court reviews decisions to grant summary judgment de novo. See Settle v. Ross, 992 F.2d 162, 163 (8th Cir.1993). An instructive case in the present context is Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 n. 1 (6th Cir.1992) ("The determination of employment status is a mixed question of law and fact. Normally, a judge will be able to make this determination as a matter of law. However, where there is a genuine issue of fact or conflicting inferences can be drawn from the undisputed facts, as here, the question is to be resolved by the finder of fact in accordance with the appropriate rules of law.")

With this standard in mind, we first note some relevant facts not mentioned in the District Court's opinion. In Darden, the Supreme Court noted that one of the factors to consider in deciding on a worker's employment status is the length of that worker's service. 503 U.S. at 323, 112 S.Ct. 1344. Mr. Jenkins had worked for SFBC for about 35 years without interruption. Yet...