Jenkins v. E. St. Louis Hous. Auth.
Decision Date | 01 May 2012 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 11–100–GPM. |
Citation | 863 F.Supp.2d 785 |
Parties | Terrance F. JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. EAST ST. LOUIS HOUSING AUTHORITY and Leroy Estes, Defendants. Leroy Estes, Counter–Claimant v. Terrance F. Jenkins, Counter–Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mark C. Scoggins, Crowder & Scoggins, Columbia, IL, for Plaintiff.
David Peter Salvatore Frenzia, Robert W. Stewart, Lowenbaum Partnership, L.L.C., St. Louis, MO, for Defendants.
Terrance F. Jenkins brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his First Amendment rights by the East St. Louis Housing Authority (“ESLHA”) and Leroy Estes. Estes in turn has counterclaimed against Jenkins for assault and battery. Currently, this matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment brought by ESLHA and Estes (Doc. 28) and a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability brought by Estes with respect to his counterclaim against Jenkins (Doc. 29). The pertinent facts of this case are as follows. On November 9, 2009, Jenkins was hired by ESLHA as a temporary maintenance mechanic. Estes was Jenkins's supervisor at ESLHA. During Jenkins's employment with ESLHA, Jenkins was assigned to a project to install shower stalls in public housing in East St. Louis (“ESL”), Illinois, using federal “stimulus” funds. While working on the shower-stall installation project, Jenkins complained to co-workers about the shoddy workmanship of various ESLHA employees working on the project. Jenkins complained also that the work by his co-workers at ESLHA was being logged as completed, although later complaints by tenants of public housing in ESL disclosed that the logged work was not completed.
On July 7, 2010, Jenkins met with Qiana Bennett, ESLHA's human resources coordinator at the time, and Estes in a conference room at ESLHA's offices. Bennett informed Jenkins that his employment with ESLHA was terminated on Estes's recommendation by reason of Jenkins's poor workmanship on the shower-stall installation project. Jenkins responded to the news of his termination by assaulting Estes, punching Estes repeatedly and knocking him to the ground. Estes was taken by ambulance to Memorial Hospital in Belleville, Illinois, where he initially was treated for his injuries. Subsequently, Estes was treated by Dr. Graces, his family physician, Dr. Ferguson, an eye doctor, and Dr. Branham, an ear, nose, and throat specialist. Estes suffered a broken nose as a result of the attack on him by Jenkins. Estes saw Dr. David Brown, an orthopedic surgeon, for injuries that Estes had suffered to his hand as a result of the attack. Estes also saw a psychiatrist for emotional problems arising from the attack. Jenkins alleges that his termination by ESLHA and Estes was in retaliation for his criticisms of the execution of the shower-stall installation project. He seeks compensatory damages, including lost wages, costs, including attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and equitable relief reinstating Jenkins to his former position and expunging all record of Jenkins's termination by ESLHA. Estes in turn seeks compensation for the injuries allegedly inflictedon him by Jenkins, including medical bills, emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. The summary judgment motions before the Court have been fully briefed, and the Court rules as follows.
As an initial matter, the Court notes the standard under which it must evaluate a motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, generally at any time until thirty days after the close of discovery in a case, “[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The rule provides further that Id. Under Rule 56, “[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be ... genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record ... or ... showing that the materials cited do not establish the ... presence of a genuine dispute[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). The rule provides also that “[t]he court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). With respect to affidavits and declarations in support of, or in opposition to, summary judgment, Rule 56 provides that “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).
In responding to a summary judgment motion, the non-moving party may not simply rest upon the allegations contained in the pleadings but must present specific facts to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir.1996); Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir.1995). A genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties or by some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126 F.3d 926, 933 (7th Cir.1997). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party on the evidence presented. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.2000). In considering a summary judgment motion, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir.2010); Perdomo v. Browner, 67 F.3d 140, 144 (7th Cir.1995). On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, because these are tasks for a factfinder. See O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir.2011); Morfin v. City of E. Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 999 (7th Cir.2003). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, “the court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir.2003) (quoting Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994)) (brackets omitted). See also Watson v. Amedco Steel, Inc., 29 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir.1994) (quoting Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Horne's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25, 87 S.Ct. 193, 17 L.Ed.2d 23 (1966)) (“In denying ... a [summary judgment] motion, the court ‘decides only one thing—that the case should go to trial;’ that denial ‘does not settle or even tentatively decide anything about the merits of the claim.’ ”). With the foregoing standard in mind, the Court turns to consideration of the summary judgment motions before it.
ESLHA and Estes argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Jenkins's First Amendment retaliation claims. To show unlawful retaliation for constitutionally-protected speech or conduct, a public employee must prove three elements: first, that he or she engaged in constitutionally-protected speech or conduct; second, that but for the protected speech or conduct an employer would not have taken an adverse action against the plaintiff; and third, that the plaintiff suffered a deprivation because of the defendant's action. See Gross v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 619 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir.2010); Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 983 (7th Cir.2009). In the past controlling authority in this Circuit did not require but-for causation in a case involving alleged retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir.2006) ( ); Hasan v. United States Dep't of Labor, 400 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir.2005) (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)) () . However, the Supreme Court of the United States clarified recently that, unless a federal statute provides otherwise, a plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating but-for causation in suits brought under federal law. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ( ); Waters v. City of Chicago, 580 F.3d 575, 584 (7th Cir.2009) (...
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