Jenkins v. State ex rel. Dotd
| Citation | 993 So.2d 749 |
| Decision Date | 19 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006 CA 1804.,2006 CA 1804. |
| Parties | Shad Everett JENKINS and Jennifer Ann Casanova Jenkins, Individually, and on Behalf of their Minor Children, Dillon Shad Jenkins, Baleigh Victoria Jenkins, and their Two Unborn Sons v. STATE of Louisiana, through The DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Town of Franklinton, Louisiana, The Franklinton Police Department, and Clarendon Insurance Company. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US) |
Ronnie G. Penton, Bogalusa, Louisiana, for Plaintiffs/Appellees, Shad Everett Jenkins and Jennifer Ann Casanova Jenkins.
Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General by William S. Culver, Jr., New Orleans, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appellant, State of Louisiana, through The Department of Transportation and Development.
Before KUHN, GAIDRY, and WELCH, JJ.
The State of Louisiana, through the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), appeals a judgment on a jury verdict, finding it liable to the plaintiffs, Shad E. Jenkins and Jennifer C. Jenkins, for damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident on a state highway. For the following reasons, we reverse and amend the judgment in part and affirm it in all other respects.
This action arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 23, 2003 on Louisiana State Highway 25 in Washington Parish. Earlier that day, another accident had occurred in the same general vicinity. A pickup truck traveling southbound slid off the roadway during inclement weather, striking a residential fence and a utility pole. The collision with the utility pole caused a power line to sag over the roadway, and shortly thereafter a southbound tractor-trailer unit's windshield and side mirror struck the power line.
Because the Washington Parish sheriff's office did not at the time have any available unit to assist in responding to the single-vehicle accident, it requested assistance from the Franklinton police department. The plaintiff, Shad E. Jenkins, a self-employed lawncare business owner, was a volunteer reserve police officer for the Town of Franklinton at the time of the accident. He was accompanying Officer Chad Dorsett, a regular officer, on routine patrol when they received the radio call from the sheriff's office requesting assistance.
Officer Dorsett proceeded toward the accident location. When the unit left the incorporated limits of Franklinton, it was travelling at a speed of about 55-60 miles per hour in a heavy rain, with its emergency lights and siren activated. The posted speed limit at the accident location was 55 miles per hour. As the police unit approached the location, it hydroplaned and slid across the center line, entering the opposite lane where it collided with the tractor-trailer, which was traveling at approximately 25 miles per hour. As the result of the accident, Mr. Jenkins was rendered unconscious and sustained serious head injuries.
The police unit occupied by Officer Dorsett and Mr. Jenkins, Unit No. 6, had been previously damaged and declared a total loss in 2002, but the Town of Franklinton had repurchased the unit from an insurer and placed it back into service after having some repairs made. Those repairs, however, did not include replacement of the unit's airbags. Additionally, three of its tires were in poor condition on the date of the accident, prompting Officer Dorsett to prepare and file a maintenance report that morning.
On February 2, 2004, the plaintiffs, Shad E. Jenkins and Jennifer C. Jenkins, filed a petition for damages, naming as defendants DOTD, the Town of Franklinton, the Franklinton police department, and Clarendon America Insurance Company, in its capacity as the liability insurer of the Franklinton Police Department. In their petition, the plaintiffs alleged that the accident was caused through the negligence and fault of DOTD and the Town of Franklinton, including its police department. The plaintiffs claimed damages for themselves, on behalf of their two minor children, and on behalf of their unborn twin sons.1
DOTD answered the petition, denying its liability and alleging the fault of Officer Dorsett and Mr. Jenkins's contributory negligence, as well as the defense of third-party fault. The plaintiffs subsequently compromised and dismissed their causes of action against the Town of Franklinton, the Franklinton police department, and Clarendon America Insurance Company, reserving their rights against DOTD. DOTD filed an amended answer, reiterating its allegations of Mr. Jenkins's contributory negligence and third-party negligence and fault.
The case was tried before a jury on March 20-23, 2006. The jury returned a verdict finding DOTD 90% at fault and Officer Dorsett and the Franklinton police department 10% at fault. The jury made the following awards of damages to Mr. Jenkins individually:
General Damages: $3,000,000.00
Past Medical Expenses: $ 121,407.17
Future Medical Expenses: $1,313,047.00
Past Wage Loss: $ 85,000.00
Future Wage Loss: $5,622,262.00
Loss of Household Services: $ 87,215.00.
The jury additionally awarded Ms. Jenkins $250,000.00 for loss of consortium and $100,000.00 each for the minor children's loss of parental consortium. Thus, the total of all damage awards made by the jury amounted to $10,878,931.17.
The trial court's judgment based upon the jury's verdict was signed on April 13, 2006. In its judgment, the trial court first reduced Mr. Jenkins's general damages award to $500,000.00, based upon the statutory limitation of liability of La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(1), and then deducted the 10% liability assessed to the released tortfeasors from the revised total amount of damages of $8,378,931.17. It thereupon cast DOTD in judgment for the net sum of $7,541,038.05, without individual itemization of each damages award.2
We summarize DOTD's assignments of error as follows:
(1) The trial court erred in denying DOTD's motion for a directed verdict.
(2) The jury erred in finding DOTD liable, or, in the alternative, in apportioning 90% of the fault to DOTD and only 10% to the Franklinton Police Department.
(3) The jury abused its discretion in its awards to Mr. Jenkins of general damages, future medical expenses, past wage loss, future wage loss, and loss of household services, and in its awards for loss of consortium to Ms. Jenkins and the plaintiffs' children.
A motion for a directed verdict in a jury trial is authorized by La. C.C.P. art. 1810, and provides that such a motion must be made at the close of the evidence offered by the moving party's opponent. Generally, a motion for directed verdict is appropriately granted when, after considering all evidentiary inferences in the light most favorable to the opponent, it is clear that the facts and inferences are so overwhelmingly in support of the moving party that reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Rabalais v. St Tammany Parish School Bd., 06-0045, 06-0046, p. 6 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/3/06), 950 So.2d 765, 769, writ denied, 06-2821 (La.1/26/07), 948 So.2d 177. If there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion, i.e., evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motion should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. Id. A trial court has much discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for a directed verdict. Id. On appeal, the standard of review of the determination of a motion for directed verdict is de novo. See Rabalais, 06-0045 at p. 7, 950 So.2d at 770.
Based upon our de novo review of the evidence presented by the plaintiffs, detailed in our discussion of the other assignments of error, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented in the plaintiffs' case-in-chief to justify the trial court's denial of DOTD's motion. DOTD's assignment of error on that point has no merit, and we affirm the trial court's ruling.
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315 and 2316 are the codal foundation for delictual liability for negligence in our state. Louisiana Civil Code articles 2317 and 2317.1 define the basis for delictual liability for defective things. Article 2317.1 provides that the owner or legal custodian of a defective thing causing injury or damage is liable "only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of [the defect], that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care." Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800 further circumscribes the liability of public entities, including DOTD, under La. C.C. arts. 2317 and 2317.1. Hager v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 06-1557, pp. 12-13 (La.App. 1st Cir.1/16/08), 978 So.2d 454, 463-64, writs denied, 08-0347 (La.4/18/08), 978 So.2d 349, 08-0385 (La.4/18/08), 978 So.2d 349.
At the time of the accident at issue,3 La. R.S. 9:2800 provided, in pertinent part:
A. A public entity is responsible under Civil Code Article 2317 for damages caused by the condition of buildings within its care and custody.
...
C. Except as provided for in Subsections A and B of this Section, no person shall have a cause of action based solely upon liability imposed under Civil Code Article 2317 against a public entity for damages caused by the condition of things within its care and custody unless the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the particular vice or defect which caused the damage prior to the occurrence, and the public entity has had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defect and has failed to do so.
D. Constructive notice shall mean the existence of facts which infer actual knowledge.
DOTD has a duty to maintain the public...
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