Jenkins v. State

• Decision Date: 30 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2005-KA-00859-SCT.,2005-KA-00859-SCT.
• Citation: 947 So.2d 270
• Parties: Orlando JENKINS v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

947 So.2d 270

Orlando JENKINS v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2005-KA-00859-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

November 30, 2006.

Rehearing Denied February 8, 2007.

Raymond M. Baum, Winona, attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, attorney for appellee.

Before WALLER, P.J., EASLEY and CARLSON, JJ.

WALLER, Presiding Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. Orlando Jenkins was convicted in the Attala County Circuit Court of the murder of Andre Porter Barnes and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, Jenkins argues (1) the indictment against him should be dismissed because the State violated his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial, and (2) he should be granted a new trial because his conviction was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Finding that each of Jenkins' claims is without merit, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

¶ 2. In the evening on July 10, Jenkins' co-indictee, Dewon Winters, and a female companion met Jenkins at the Hannah Heights apartment complex in Ethel, Mississippi. Jenkins approached Barnes at the complex and convinced him to accompany them in Winters' car. Winters left his companion at a trailer belonging to his sister, and he, Jenkins, and Barnes drove to a remote dirt road. Winters maintains that Jenkins then shot and killed Barnes with Winters' gun. Jenkins claims Winters killed Barnes.

¶ 3. The two men hid Barnes' body in the woods and returned to the trailer, where they found Winters' cousin and his girlfriend with Winters' companion. Winters and Jenkins placed their clothing and the gun and bullets used in the crime in a bag and told Winters' cousin to bury it. Winters, his companion, and Jenkins then drove to Jackson. Winters' cousin borrowed a shovel from another cousin and buried the evidence. Barnes' sister overhead Winters' cousin ask about the shovel. She found the request suspicious, and when she could not find her brother in the morning on July 11, she notified the police that Winters' cousin might be involved in Barnes' disappearance. Winters' cousin implicated Winters and Jenkins, and the police arrested Jenkins on July 11, 2003. Winters fled the state, and was arrested in Illinois nine months later.

¶ 4. On August 4, 2003, the police officer investigating the case sent Jenkins' clothes to the Mississippi Crime Lab for serology analysis to determine if there was blood on the clothing. Winters and Jenkins were indicted together for murder on March 4, 2004. On July 29, 2004, the state crime lab confirmed that there was blood on Jenkins' shoes. Jenkins filed a motion for severance which was granted by the trial court on August 26, 2004. On September 17, 2004, Jenkins filed a motion to dismiss his indictment for want of a speedy trial. On September 24, 2004, the police requested DNA testing of the blood found on Jenkins' shoes. The report on the DNA testing, which confirmed that Jenkins' shoes had the victim's blood on them, was issued in March of 2005.

¶ 5. Jenkins' trial began on March 28, 2005. Winters testified for the prosecution at Jenkins' trial, stating that he and Jenkins were involved in a drug deal together and that Jenkins killed Barnes for disrespecting him. Jenkins maintained that he did not know Winters and that Winters killed Barnes because Barnes would not give him information. After being convicted of murder on March 31, 2005, and sentenced to life in prison, Jenkins appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

¶ 6. Jenkins claims that the delay in his trial violates both his statutory right to a trial within 270 days of his arraignment under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (2006) and his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Article 3, section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution, and the United States Supreme Court's holding in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

¶ 7. Jenkins asserted his right to a speedy trial, or a dismissal of his indictment in the alternative, on September 17, 2004. The circuit court granted Jenkins motion on September 22, 2004, and ordered his trial set for the first weeks of October 2004. For reasons that are not provided in the record, Jenkins was not tried in October 2004, and his trial was set for March 28, 2005. On March 2, 2005, Jenkins filed a second motion to dismiss his indictment for want of a speedy trial. Another trial judge considered Jenkins' motion on March 3, 2005, and found that neither Jenkins' statutory right nor his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. Jenkins renewed his motion again at the beginning of the trial on March 28, 2005, noting that one of his witnesses could not be found. The State argued that the proposed testimony of the missing witness concerned issues not in dispute by the State, that the testimony was duplicative of other witnesses' testimony, and that Jenkins therefore suffered no prejudice. The trial judge reserved ruling on the issue until the close of Jenkins' case. After the close of Jenkins' case, the trial judge found that, because the proposed testimony was cumulative, Jenkins suffered no prejudice from its absence. He therefore denied the motion to dismiss.

¶ 8. Reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for want of a speedy trial "necessarily entail[s] questions of fact regarding whether the trial delay rose from good cause." Manix v. State, 895 So.2d 167, 173 (Miss.2005) (citing DeLoach v. State, 722 So.2d 512, 516 (Miss.1998)). We adopt a deferential standard of review for such factual determinations and will reverse only if the trial court's decision is clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 118, 122 (Miss.1989)). We will uphold the trial court's decision based on substantial, credible evidence of a finding of good cause. Young v. State, 891 So.2d 813, 817 (Miss. 2005) (citing Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243, 1247 (Miss.1991)).

A. The Statutory Right

¶ 9. Section 99-71-1 of the Mississippi Code requires that all offenses be tried within 270 days of arraignment, unless the court shows good cause and enters a continuance.¹ The statute is not applicable to delays between the alleged act and the indictment. Coleman v. State, 725 So.2d 154, 156 (Miss.1998). When the accused is not tried within 270 days of his arraignment, the State has the burden of establishing good cause for the delay since the accused is under no duty to bring himself to trial. Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 953 (Miss.1997); Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 199 (Miss.1982)

¶ 10. Delays caused by a backlog at state or federal crime lab constitute good cause and will not be attributed to the State. See Manix v. State, 895 So.2d 167, 176 (Miss.2005) (delay caused by backlog in state crime lab does not prejudice State); State v. Magnusen, 646 So.2d 1275, 1281 (Miss.1994) (five-month delay by crime lab not attributed to State); Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 48 (Miss.1998) (delay caused by FBI crime lab does not weigh in favor of defendant). This Court has also recognized congested dockets as good cause. Herring, 691 So.2d at 953; Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243 (Miss.1991).

¶ 11. There was a delay of 389 days between Jenkins' arraignment on March 4, 2004, and the beginning of his trial on March 28, 2005. The delay from March 4, 2004, to July 29, 2004, was due to the backlog at the state crime lab, which the trial court found to be good cause. The delay from July 29, 2004, to September 21, 2004, was due to the investigating officer's deployment with the military, which the trial court found to be good cause. The delay from September 21, 2004, to March 27, 2005, was due to delays in DNA testing, requested from the state crime lab but ultimately performed by a private company, which the trial court also found to be good cause. Finally, on its own initiative, the trial court noted that its docket was congested, and that the court would not have been able to try Jenkins between October 1, 2004, and March 7, 2005.

¶ 12. In the trial court's hearing on Jenkins' motion to dismiss for violation of the right to a speedy trial, the State provided witnesses from the police, the state crime lab, and the district attorney's office, all of whom testified to the delays caused by the crime lab's personnel shortages and backlog of requests. The determinations of the trial court were supported by substantial, credible evidence of good cause. Therefore, Jenkins' statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated by the delay.

B. The Constitutional Right

¶ 13. Jenkins also claims that the delay of his trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court articulated the standard of review for determining whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101; see also Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 992 (Miss.2001). Under the Barker test, courts must balance: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. No one factor is dispositive. Poole v. State, 826 So.2d 1222, 1229-30 (Miss.2002).

(1) The Length of the Delay

¶ 14. The length of the delay is a threshold issue under Barker. 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The Barker factors will be considered only if the length of the delay is "presumptively prejudicial" to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182; Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss.1989). The constitutional right to a speedy trial, unlike the statutory right created by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1, attaches when a person has...