Jenkins v. State
| Decision Date | 16 December 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 69,69 |
| Citation | 215 Md. 70,137 A.2d 115 |
| Parties | Charles JENKINS v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Jerome Niport, Baltimore, for appellant.
E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (C. Ferdinand Sybert, Atty. Gen., J. Harold Grady, State's Atty. and John C. Weiss, Asst. State's Atty., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
Before BRUNE, C. J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ.
Charles Jenkins has appealed from the judgment and sentence of the Criminal Court of Baltimore, wherein the court, sitting without a jury, found him guilty under an indictment charging illegal possession and control of a certain narcotic drug, to wit, cannabis; and he also has appealed in the same record from the judgment of the same court entered after the appellant was found guilty under the third count of an indictment charging a violation of an ordinance of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, to wit, unlawfully carrying a certain pistol in a vehicle.
At about 7:00 o'clock p. m. on March 9, 1957, Officers Burke and Davis of the Baltimore City Police relieved two other police and continued the surveillance of a gasoline station on Fayette Street in Baltimore. Officer Burke verified that a package of marijuana, a popular name for the drug, cannabis, and a 'pipe' for smoking the narcotic, were secreted under the washbowl in the men's room of the station. The evidence does not prove who placed the drug in the men's room, but the police did not put it there. The police remained in a back room of the station, and each time a man left the washroom one of the police immediately ascertained whether the marijuana was still under the sink. The men's room was locked, and each entrant was required to obtain the key from the office of the station.
At about 11:15 p. m. a Buick automobile was driven to the gasoline pumps. A man by the name of Laird Rose was operating this automobile and the appellant, Charles Jenkins was sitting in the front seat with the driver. The appellant, who owned the automobile, went to the men's room, stayed only a short time, and returned to the vehicle. As soon as the appellant left the lavatory, Officer Burke looked and discovered that the cache of narcotic had been removed. Burke called Davis; they stopped the automobile as it was leaving the station, and arrested the occupants, Rose and Jenkins. The police found the marijuana package in the appellant's coat pocket, and a loaded pistol in the glove compartment of the automobile, which the appellant admitted belonged to him.
The appellant testified that he found the package containing the drug on the floor of the washroom, and that he took it because he thought it might contain money or some other valuable. He said that he did not know that it contained marijuana. He further testified that he was taking the pistol from his mother's home to his new apartment where he and his bride were residing. He did not look at the package, because he was in a hurry to return home, and he did not tell the station attendant of him find because he did not want to surrender it, particularly if it were valuable. The package was in his pocket, and the pistol was in the glove compartment of his automobile when found by the officers.
The single question presented for our determination is whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain convictions of the offenses with which the appellant was charged. When reviewing a judgment and sentence of the trial court, sitting without a jury in a criminal proceeding, our only duty is to determine whether there was evidence, or proper inferences from evidence, upon which the trial court could properly find the defendant guilty. Craig v. State, Md., 136 A.2d 243.
For all practical purposes, the appellant seems to have abandoned the appeal relating to the carrying of a pistol in his automobile. He simply asks this question, Did the court have sufficient evidence to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of illegally carrying a deadly weapon (sic) in his vehicle? He then presents his argument with reference to the narcotic charge, but says nothing more concerning the pistol. However, we shall consider the question briefly. The Baltimore City ordinance, introduced in evidence provides that 'No person shall carry a pistol in any vehicle * * *.' The police testified they found a pistol in the glove compartment of the appellant's automobile; the defendant testified he knew it was there--that he was transporting it from his former place of abode to his new residence. With this evidence, it should be obvious that we cannot say the trial court was clearly in error in convicting the appellant of carrying a pistol in a vehicle, which was prohibited by the ordinance. Md.Rules, rule 741, subd. c.
With reference to the second conviction, it is conceded by the appellant that he had a narcotic drug in his possession. He argues, however, that the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact that he knowingly had it in his possession. He contends that the circumstances clearly bear out his contention that he merely found the drug in a package, and did not know what it was; consequently, his conviction was wrongful in that the evidence offered by the State failed to establish that he knew that it was a narcotic drug that he had in his possession. This argument assumes a fallacious premise: that under the indictment in this case, it was necessary for the State to prove that the appellant knowingly had the drug in his possession. It is to be noted that the indictment did not allege that the appellant wilfully or knowingly had the cannabis in his possession, but alleged that he illegally possessed the same. The statute under which he was charged, Art. 27, sec. 346 (Code 1951), makes it 'unlawful for any person to * * * possess, * * * any narcotic drug, except as authorized in this sub-title.' 1
The type of offense that is guarded against by this statute has been included by, at least, one author in what he termed 'Public Welfare Offenses.' 2 The statute was properly enacted under the general police powers of this State; it is a mandate of the legislature designed to promote the public health, the public morals, the...
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Garrison v. State
...narcotics-both are contraband and neither require proof of scienter. See Ford v. State, 85 Md. 465, 37 A. 172 (1897); Jenkins v. State, 215 Md. 70, 137 A.2d 115 (1957). In Tucker v. State, 19 Md.App. 39, 308 A.2d 696 (1973), police received information that a room at a motel was occupied by......
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