Jenkins v. Woodbury Cnty.

Decision Date31 March 2021
Docket NumberNo. C20-4013-LTS,C20-4013-LTS
PartiesANGELA JOY JENKINS, J.A.S. ex rel. ANGELA JOY JENKINS and PAMELA JO DAWSON, Plaintiffs, v. WOODBURY COUNTY, IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, MARCHELLE DENKER, DAWN BOYLE and SHANE FRISCH, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before me pursuant to a motion (Doc. 15) to dismiss filed by defendant Marchelle Denker and a motion (Doc. 20) to dismiss filed by defendants Dawn Boyle, the Department of Human Services (DHS) and Shane Frisch (hereinafter the Department Defendants). Plaintiffs Angela Jenkins and Pamela Dawson did not file a resistance to the motions to dismiss but filed a motion (Doc. 35) to amend the complaint. They have also filed a motion (Doc. 27) to appoint counsel.

In their complaint, plaintiffs state the basis of their claim is "legalized kidnapping, cruel & unusual punishment, racial discrimination, fraudulent statements, the CPS and DHS failed to follow their own policies, family law, [] abused their privileges and failure to protect the family." Doc. 1 at 3. Plaintiffs' claim is that:

this has been on-going, my daughter died instead of placing [J.S.] with family members her biological family they denied us to see her to explain her mother's death and lied.
The shock and actions of these officials left our family in total disbelief. Donnelle before she died stated she felt they didn't want to give her daughter back. There was so much hostility, game playing, even in the court system. Motions for intervention, motion to add people of interest. Family were ignored. None of this was justified.

Doc. 1 at 5.1

I. BACKGROUND

On February 28, 2020, plaintiffs filed their complaint (Doc. 1) in the Southern District of Iowa.2 Jenkins also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. On March 2, 2020, the United States District Judge Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger granted Jenkins' motion to proceed in forma pauperis.3 Doc. 3. The Clerk of Court for the Southern District of Iowa then issued a summons packet to the plaintiffs. Doc. 4. Judge Ebinger did not conduct a review of the case for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) but, approximately a week after granting in forma pauperis status, transferred the case to this court. Doc. 5.

I typically conduct an initial review of any case in which a plaintiff seeks in forma pauperis status. If the plaintiff is incarcerated, the authority for that initial review is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If the plaintiff is not incarcerated, as in this case, the authority for that initial review is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Benter v. Iowa, Dep't of Transp., 221 Fed. App'x 471 (8th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). However,because this case had already progressed to a point where plaintiffs had been issued a summons packet before it was transferred to this court, I did not conduct an initial review. See Doc. 7. And to avoid confusion due to the transfer, I directed the Clerk's office to serve the defendants. Id.

Defendant Woodbury County filed an answer (Doc. 14) on May 6, 2020. Denker and the Department Defendants filed their motions (Docs. 15, 20) to dismiss on June 1, 2020. On August 31, 2020, plaintiffs filed several motions, including their first motion (Doc. 26) to amend and the pending motion (Doc. 27) to appoint counsel. On September 1, 2020, the court denied the motion to amend because plaintiffs failed to provide a copy of the proposed amended complaint with their motion. Doc. 31. On September 10, 2020, the Department Defendants filed a resistance (Doc. 34) to the motion to appoint counsel. On September 18, 2020, plaintiffs filed the current motion (Doc. 35) to amend. On October 5, 2020, Denker filed a resistance (Doc. 37) to the motion to amend.

II. PENDING MOTIONS
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a pre-answer motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court has provided the following guidance in considering whether a pleading properly states a claim:

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As the Court held in [Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)], the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require "detailed factual allegations," but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Id., at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. Nor does acomplaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Id., at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id., at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (brackets omitted).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009).

Courts assess "plausibility" by "'draw[ing] on [their own] judicial experience and common sense.'" Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118, 1128 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Also, courts "'review the plausibility of the plaintiff's claim as a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation.'" Id. (quoting Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010)). While factual "plausibility" is typically the focus of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, federal courts may dismiss a claim that lacks a cognizable legal theory. See, e.g., Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 469 (3d Cir. 2013); Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, L.L.C. v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 2011); accord Target Training Intern., Ltd. v. Lee, 1 F. Supp. 3d 927 (N.D. Iowa 2014).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ordinarily the court "cannot consider matters outside the pleadings without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment." McMahon v. Transamerica Life Ins., No. C17-149-LTS, 2018 WL 3381406, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Iowa July 11, 2018); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On the other hand, when a copy of a "written instrument" is attached to a pleading, it is considered "a part of the pleading for all purposes," pursuant to Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 10(c). Thus, when the pleadings necessarily embrace certain documents, I may consider those documents without turning a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id.

When a complaint does not state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face, the court must consider whether it is appropriate to grant the pleader an opportunity to replead. The rules of procedure permit a party to respond to a motion to dismiss by amending the challenged pleading "as a matter of course" within 21 days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Thus, when a motion to dismiss highlights deficiencies in a pleading that can be cured by amendment, the pleader has an automatic opportunity to do so. When the pleader fails to take advantage of this opportunity, the question of whether to permit an amendment depends on considerations that include:

whether the pleader chose to stand on its original pleadings in the face of a motion to dismiss that identified the very deficiency upon which the court dismissed the complaint; reluctance to allow a pleader to change legal theories after a prior dismissal; whether the post-dismissal amendment suffers from the same legal or other deficiencies as the dismissed pleading; and whether the post-dismissal amendment is otherwise futile.

Meighan v. TransGuard Ins. Co. of Am., 978 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (N.D. Iowa 2013).

B. Motion to Amend

As noted above, plaintiffs have 21 days to file an amended complaint in response to a motion to dismiss as a matter of course. Plaintiffs did not file an amended complaint within 21 days of when the motions to dismiss were filed. Rather, three months after the motions to dismiss were filed, plaintiffs filed a motion (Doc. 26) to amend along with a motion (Doc. 29) to extend the deadline to resist the motions to dismiss. On September 1, 2020, the court denied the motion to amend without prejudice because plaintiffs failed to comply with the Local Rules (see Doc. 31) but, in a separate order (Doc. 33), for "good cause," granted plaintiffs until September 18, 2020, to "file any response or resistance" to the pending motions to dismiss.

On September 18, 2020, plaintiffs filed a document (Doc. 35) captioned as a motion to amend. Doc. 35. However, once again plaintiffs did not attach a proposed amended complaint as is required by LR 15. Instead, the only attachment (Doc. 35-1) appears to be a photocopy of the original complaint filed in the Southern District of Iowa. The motion itself describes the proposed additions to the existing complaint within the argument in favor of amendment. In that argument, plaintiffs state that they seek to add additional plaintiff (Sharon Jenkins-Wells)4 and three new defendants (Tricia DeHarty, Amy Hennies and Dezirae Pangelina) to the case. The...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT