Jennings v. Allstate Ins. Co.

CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana
Writing for the CourtLOTTINGER
CitationJennings v. Allstate Ins. Co., 273 So.2d 534 (La. App. 1973)
Decision Date01 February 1973
Docket NumberNo. 9150,9150
PartiesWinifred PELLEGRIN, wife of and Marion JENNINGS v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

Frans J. LaBranche, Jr., Connolly & LaBranche, New Orleans, for appellant.

John J. Hainkel, Jr., Porteous, Toledano, Hainkel & Johnson, New Orleans, for Allstate Ins. Co.

Ernest Kelly, Houma, for Lee Ellender.

Before LOTTINGER, ELLIS and CRAIN, JJ.

LOTTINGER, Judge.

This suit was instituted against Darrel J. Ellender, Lee P. Ellender, and Allstate Insurance Company by appellants, Winifred Pellegrin wife of and Marion Jennings, for damages relating to the stillborn birth of their infant child allegedly caused by an automobile accident which occurred on June 15, 1968. The Lower Court rendered judgment in favor of defendant-appellees dismissing the claim of plaintiff at their costs. Plaintiffs have filed this appeal .

On June 15, 1968, at approximately 4:20 P.M., a vehicle operated by Darrel J. Ellender was proceeding South on Louisiana Highway 57, passing another vehicle. There were some vehicles proceeding North and Ellender attempted to pull back into his lane of traffic, left the highway, crossed the shoulder of the road and struck a utility pole. The pole was in a cane field on the western side of the highway. Allstate Insurance Co. insured Ellender.

The plaintiffs-appellants herein, Mr. and Mrs. Jennings, allege that one of the wires on the pole struck the windshield of the vehicle being driven by Mrs. Jennings, shocking her right hand and resulting in the still birth of her child some eight days after the alleged incident.

The Trial Judge gave no Reasons for Judgment in finding in favor of the defendants. Therefore, we can only speculate on the reason or reasons he felt the plaintiffs failed to prove their case.

The first question the Trial Court would have to decide is whether Mrs. Jennings actually received a shock as a result of Darrel J. Ellender's negligent act. If the Lower Court dismissed plaintiffs' suit because it found that Mrs. Jennings did not receive the shock in question, we would not find the Trial Judge manifestly erroneous because there was testimony from two witnesses in the vehicle which was being passed by Ellender that there was no vehicle such as that being driven by Mrs. Jennings approaching the accident at the time it occurred. This in itself would be sufficient to find that Mrs. Jennings did not receive a shock as alleged, but we would be inclined to believe otherwise. Without reciting all of the testimony relating to this point, we will assume for the sake of argument that Mr. Ellender was negligent in losing control of the vehicle he was driving causing it to hit the pole, causing the wire on the pole to snap, causing the wire to hit Mrs. Jennings' vehicle, and causing her to receive a shock.

The more pertinent question would be whether the shock Mrs. Jennings received caused the still birth of her child. Plaintiffs offered the testimony of three experts concerning this point; namely, Dr. Saul Landry, Terrebonne Parish Coroner, who the parties stipulated to be an expert in the field of the general practice of medicine; Dr. Joel Comeaux, who the parties stipulated to be an expert in the field of obstetrics and gynecology; and Dr. Frederick D. Peppler, Ph.D. in anatomy, who was qualified as an expert anatomist. Each admitted that he had no personal experience as to the effect of electrical shock on an unborn infant.

In connection with this question plaintiffs believe that the Trial Judge erred in refusing to allow Drs. Comeaux and Peppler to testify as to the effect of shock to a mother on her unborn child. Did the Trial Judge act improperly by limiting expert witnesses in the questions he allowed them to answer? We think not, and on this point we quote from Carvell v. Winn, La.App., 154 So.2d 788, 791 (1963) (writ refused).

'As previously stated herein, whether or not a witness meets the qualifications to testify as an expert is largely within the discretion of the trial judge. In our opinion, it is also largely within the discretion of the trial judge to determine the competency of expert witnesses to testify to specialized areas on inquiry not necessarily within his general competency to give an opinion as an expert, or at least not shown to be so by the facts of the record. That is, the trial court is not under a mandatory duty to permit an expert witness to testify to any matter upon which the expert himself says he is qualified to give an expert opinion; the court must have some discretion to limit the witness's testimony as an expert to the actual field of his expertise and as applicable to the facts of the particular litigation, then before it (subject of course to a showing that the court abused its discretion in this regard, State v. Carter, 217 La. 547, 46 So.2d 897.)

'Thus referring to the ability of a witness to testify as an expert based upon his 'experiential capacity', Dean Wigmore noted that 'The capacity is in every case a relative one, i.e., relative to the topic about which the person is asked to make the statement * * *. His fitness, then, is a fitness to answer on that point. He may be fitted to answer about countless other matters, but that does not justify accepting his views in the matter in hand.' 2 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed., 1940), Section 555(1) at p. 634. 'In most jurisdictions it is repeatedly declared that the decision upon the experiential qualifications of witnesses should be left to the determination of the trial court', referring to 'the fact of the possession of the required qualification by a particulr witness.' Ibid, Section 561, p. 641. Cf. LSA-R.S. 15:466; State v. Mills, 229 La. 758, 86 So.2d 895 (syllabus 8).'

Also on this point, plaintiffs' counsel argues that the Lower Court improperly excluded Dr. Peppler's reference to and explanation of a German Medical Article entitled 'Intrauterine Death of the Fetus in a Mother Shocked by Electric Current.' We agree with the Trial Judge in ruling that the article itself was inadmissable as hearsay since its author was not present to be cross examined. The Trial Judge had already decided that he did not consider Dr. Peppler qualified to answer questions regarding the effect of electrical shock on a fetus because he had no personal experience on the subject. Certainly his reference to and explanation of the article would have been on this same subject which the Lower Court, in its discretion, had decided the witness...

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11 cases
  • Carpenter v. Besco Corp.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana
    • February 8, 1988
    ...of experts and the reception of their expert opinion into evidence. The general rule is set out by Jennings v. Allstate Ins. Co., 273 So.2d 534, 536 (La.App. 1st Cir.1973), quoting Judge (subsequently Justice) Tate in Carvell v. Winn, 154 So.2d 788, 791 (La.App. 3d Cir.1963), writ denied, 2......
  • 96 2373 La.App. 1 Cir. 11/7/97, McClendon v. Keith Hutchinson Logging
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana
    • November 7, 1997
    ...See Forstall v. Daigrepont, 551 So.2d 653 (La.App. 4 Cir.1989), writ denied, 556 So.2d 1279 (La.1990); Jennings v. Allstate Ins. Co., 273 So.2d 534 (La.App. 1 Cir.1973). [96 2373 La.App. 1 Cir. 13] Initially, we recognize that workers' compensation judges are not strictly bound by the techn......
  • Pregeant v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • June 17, 1985
    ...Railway Company, 226 La. 834, 77 So.2d 411 (La.1954); Jones v. Mason, 234 La. 116, 99 So.2d 46 (La.1958); and Jennings v. Allstate Insurance Company, 273 So.2d 534 (La.App.1973). ...
  • Neumeyer v. Terral
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana
    • November 12, 1985
    ...Justice) Tate in Carvell v. Winn, 154 So.2d 788 (3rd Cir.1963) at page 791, and subsequently quoted in Jennings v. Allstate Insurance Company, 273 So.2d 534 (1st Cir.1973) at page 536, and in Succession of Armshaw, et al v. Succession of Marbury, et al, 428 So.2d 1180 (5th Cir.1983) at page......
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