Jennings v. City of St. Louis

• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: TIPTON
• Citation: Jennings v. City of St. Louis, 58 S.W.2d 979, 332 Mo. 173 (Mo. 1933)
• Decision Date: 23 February 1933
• Docket Number: 32753
• Parties: Thomas F. Jennings, Appellant, v. City of St. Louis, a Municipal Corporation; Victor J. Miller, Mayor; Louis Nolte, Comptroller; William G. Buechner, Treasurer

58 S.W.2d 979

332 Mo. 173

Thomas F. Jennings, Appellant, v. City of St. Louis, a Municipal Corporation; Victor J. Miller, Mayor; Louis Nolte, Comptroller; William G. Buechner, Treasurer

No. 32753

Supreme Court of Missouri

February 23, 1933

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Robert W Hall, Judge.

Affirmed.

Case Voyles & Stemmler for appellant.

(1) The city of St. Louis has no power to incur an indebtedness and issue bonds "for the purpose of providing for the support, maintenance and care of children, and sick, aged or insane, poor persons and paupers, and for poor relief, and of providing and maintaining charitable facilities and services," as such purposes contemplate the use of taxes for the benefit of a special class or special classes and are not "public" purposes within the meaning of Section 3, Article X of the Constitution of Missouri, nor "municipal" purposes within the meaning of Section 11, Article X of the Constitution of Missouri, nor "lawful, public or municipal purposes" within the meaning of Article I, Section 1 of the Charter of the City of St. Louis, or Article XVII, Section 1 of the Charter of St Louis. The ordinances are, therefore, unconstitutional and void. State ex rel. v. Switzler, 143 Mo. 326; Simmons Medicine Co. v. Ziegenhein, 145 Mo. 368; State ex rel. v. Osawkee Township, 14 Kan. 418; Lowell v. City of Boston, 111 Mass. 454; Feldman v. City Council of Charleston, 23 S.C. 57; William Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 75 Minn. 124, 77 N.W. 570; Lucas County v. State, 75 Oh. St. 114, 78 N.E. 955; Commonwealth ex rel. Kirschler v. Brown, 15 Pa. Dist. 582. (a) Indirect benefits to the general public do not make a purpose a "public" one where the direct benefits accrue to members of a special or particular class. State ex rel. v. Switzler, 143 Mo. 287; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 461; Feldman v. City Council of Charleston, 23 S.C. 57; Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. 124. (b) If, among the purposes of the taxation as expressed in the ordinances, there be one or more purposes not definitely public in their nature, then the whole must fail, as the ordinances lay down no rule of apportionment as to the application of the proceeds. State ex rel. v. Osawkee Township, 14 Kan. 420. (2) The powers of the city of St. Louis, granted to it in its Municipal Charter, must be strictly construed, and, if there is a reasonable doubt that the power has been granted, the doubt must be resolved against the city. The purposes of the bonds, as set out in the ordinances, are too broad to come within the authority, express or implied, granted to the city of St. Louis in its Charter. Dillon Mun. Corp. (5 Ed.) sec. 237; McQuillin Mun. Corp. (2 Ed.) sec. 356; State v. Butler, 178 Mo. 272, 77 S.W. 560; Knapp v. Kansas City, 48 Mo.App. 493; State ex rel. v. Orear, 277 Mo. 317, 210 S.W. 392; City of St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 628, 10 S.W. 197; William Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 75 Minn. 124, 77 N.W. 568.

Julius T. Muench and Oliver Senti for respondents; B. H. Charles and Carl Trauernicht of counsel.

(1) The expenditure of public funds for poor relief is for a public purpose. Cooley on Taxation (4 Ed.) sec. 215, p. 452; 2 Cooley's Const. Lim. (8 Ed.) p. 1030; State ex rel. v. Nelson County, 1 N.D. 98, 8 L. R. A. 287. (2) It is a positive governmental duty to care for the poor. Rummers v. Evans (Wash.), 13 P.2d 26; State ex rel. v. Braden (Ohio), 181 N.E. 138; City and County of San Francisco v. Collins (Cal.), 13 P.2d 912; State ex rel. v. Industrial Commission (Wis.), 242 N.W. 321; Commonwealth v. Liveright (Pa.), 161 A. 697. (3) Poor relief is recognized by the Missouri statutes as a public purpose and a governmental duty; because (a) Counties are authorized to spend money in support of the poor. R. S. 1929, secs. 12950, 12952. (b) A county "pauper fund" is provided for in R. S. 1929, sec. 9986. (c) Poorhouses in R. S. 1929, sec. 12058. (d) Needy mothers in R. S. 1929, sec. 8986. (e) The poor in county hospitals. R. S. 1929, sec. 13942. (f) Poor children in schools for the blind and the deaf. R. S. 1929, sec. 9697. (g) The county court is directed to set aside, out of its annual revenues, a definite fund for support of the poor. R. S. 1929, sec. 12961. (h) A state board of charities and corrections is created by, and functions under, Art. I of Ch. 90, R. S. 1929. (i) And this board is required to supervise public relief to the poor. R. S. 1929, sec. 12930. (4) Poor relief is a municipal purpose. (a) A social welfare board is authorized for cities by R. S. 1929, sec. 12938. (b) Municipal charters confer authority on the municipalities of the State to care for the poor as follows: In cities of the first class (poorhouses), Secs. 6107, 6171, Par. IX, R. S. 1929. Cities of the second class (in language almost identical with that of the St. Louis Charter) in Sec. 6486, par. XXVIII. In cities of the third and fourth classes by Secs. 6807 and 7023, respectively. Cities under special charter are authorized to maintain poorhouses and charitable institutions by Sec. 7330. And even villages are authorized to maintain poorhouses and hospitals under Sec. 7097. (5) The St. Louis Charter confers all of these powers and certain others in addition. Art. I, Sec. 1, Pars. (31) and (32). Incidentally, the language of the Kansas City Charter is similar to that of St. Louis. Kansas City Charter, Art. I, Sec. 1, Pars. (38) and (39). (6) It is primarily a legislative function to determine whether a proposed tax (or bond issue) is or is not for a public purpose; and courts are loath to interpose and declare any tax unlawful, and will only do so in the case of a palpable disregard of the wise limitations, express and implied, restricting the power of taxation. 2 Cooley on Constitutional Lim. (8 Ed.) 1030; Commonwealth v. Liveright (Pa.), 161 A. 702. (7) Relief of the poor is not for the benefit of a special or particular class. The whole of the public is benefited by such relief. See cases cited, supra, and 2 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8 Ed.) pp. 1030, 1031. (8) The duty to relieve the indigent is of state-wide interest. City and County of San Francisco v. Collins (Cal.), 13 P.2d 912. (9) Paragraphs (5) and (6) of Section 1 of Article I, and Section 1 of Article XVII of the St. Louis Charter clearly authorize the issuance of bonds for any public purposes. Halbruegger v. St. Louis, 302 Mo. 593; Dysart v. St. Louis, 321 Mo. 526. (10) The city of St. Louis, being expressly authorized "to provide for the support, maintenance and care of children and sick, aged or insane, poor persons and paupers," and "to provide and maintain charitable . . . facilities, instrumentalities . . . and services," it is authorized to issue bonds in order to exercise this authority. St. Louis Charter, Art. XVII, Sec. 1; R. S. 1929, sec. 7217; Haeussler v. St. Louis, 205 Mo. 656; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 233 Mo. 390; State ex rel. Boonville v. Hackmann, 293 Mo. 322; Halbruegger v. St. Louis, 302 Mo. 591; Dysart v. St. Louis, 321 Mo. 526; City and County of San Francisco v. Collins (Cal.), 13 P.2d 912. (11) The court will take judicial notice of the present destitution due to existing economic conditions. City and County of San Francisco v. Collins (Cal.), 13 P.2d 912; State ex rel. v. Industrial Commission (Wis.), 242 N.W. 321; State ex rel. v. Nelson County, 1 N.D. 98, 8 L. R. A. 287.

Tipton, J. All concur, except Leedy, J., not sitting.

OPINION

TIPTON

This is a suit in equity by Thomas F. Jennings, a resident of the city of St. Louis and a taxpayer on real estate therein, to restrain the city of St. Louis, Victor J. Miller, its mayor, Louis Nolte, its comptroller, and William G. Buechner, its treasurer, from signing, selling, issuing, or delivering bonds totaling $ 4,600,000 of the city of St. Louis provided for in Ordinances Nos. 39820, 39844, and 39845, on the ground that said ordinances are unconstitutional, null and void. Respondents demurred to the petition, and the demurrer was sustained. The appellant refused to plead further, and his bill was thereupon dismissed and final judgment entered against him and in favor of the respondents. After unavailing motion for new trial appellant duly appealed to this court.

The petition sets out that the various formal steps relating to the passage of the ordinances were all carried out in the proper manner according to law and that the indebtedness is not in excess of the limits prescribed by law for the city of St. Louis. The petition also sets out that the proposition for the issuance of the bonds was properly submitted to the voters at the election held on November 8, 1932, and received more than the two-thirds of the votes cast at the election.

The purposes of the indebtedness as set out in the ordinances are as follows:

"For the purpose of providing for the support, maintenance and care of children, and sick, aged and insane, poor persons and paupers, and for poor relief and of providing and maintaining charitable facilities and services, and containing an emergency clause."

Appellant, in his petition, asserts that, in the event the respondents carry out their expressed intention of issuing and selling the bonds, his property will be subject to taxation for some time to come and that such taxation will be unconstitutional as taking his property without due process of law. In his prayer appellant asks that the respondents be perpetually restrained and enjoined from issuing and selling the bonds.

The petition sets out two grounds for the alleged unconstitutionality of the ordinances, which are as follows:

"(1) That the purpose for which the indebtedness of four million six hundred thousand dollars ($ 4,600,000) is proposed to be incurred, and the purpose for which the proceeds of the sale...