Jennings v. Safeguard Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 May 1961
• Parties: Robert G. JENNINGS, Respondent, v. SAFEGUARD INSURANCE CO., a foreign corporation, et al., Appellants, Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., Impleaded Defendant.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 90

109 N.W.2d 90

13 Wis.2d 427

Robert G. JENNINGS, Respondent, v. SAFEGUARD INSURANCE CO., a foreign corporation, et al., Appellants, Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., Impleaded Defendant.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

May 2, 1961.

Petersen, Suterland, Axley & Brynelson, James C. Herrick, Griffin Dorschel, Madison, for appellants.

Douglas Nelson, Madison, for respondent.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

It is respondent's position that there is no bill of exceptions properly before us. On October 7, 1960 he brought a motion before this court and if was argued that the time for settling the bill of exceptions had expired and it was further argued that no extension of time had been granted to settle the bill. On those grounds he moved to strike the bill and on other grounds he moved to dismiss the appeal. The motion was granted unless within ten days the appellants should pay counsel for respondent $25 costs of said motion. On October 31st the appellants paid the $25 costs. On December 8, 1960 counsel for respondent admitted service on the bill of exceptions. Under those circumstances there is no reason for striking the bill of exceptions.

The only questions raised by the appellants involve the jury award of $1,000 for respondent's personal injuries.

According to the report of the traffic officer who came to the scene of the accident, Mrs. Jennings was the only person injured. The officer testified that he asked the parties if they were injured; if they said they were, he noted that fact in the report; if they said 'no' he made no notation.

Respondent testified that at the time of impact he was 'pushed around' in the car and received some bruises and soreness, black and blue spots; that he was 'kind of dazed and dumbfounded for a couple of minutes' but received no injury to his head; that he was stiff for a week or so and 'shaky and nervous' for three or four days. He took his wife to the doctor immediately after the accident but never consulted a doctor about his own injuries. For two weeks he stayed at home because his wife needed care and during that time he did the housework, prepared meals, helped his wife in and out of bed, out of chairs and to the bathroom, and drove the car, taking his wife back and forth to the doctor about every other day. He testified he did not feel well the first week; during the second week he felt better but felt he could not do all the lifting required in his work. He lost $120 take-home pay during the two weeks. Four days after the accident he filled out a statement of claim for damages, listing only his wife as injured in the accident. He testified he had filled in the blank as honestly as he knew the situation at that time in regard to his damages.

The questions of the special verdict which are involved are:

'Question 6: What sum of money will reasonably compensate the plaintiff Robert G. Jennings for his damages resulting from the collision?

'(a) Personal injuries to himself? Answer: $1,000

'(b) Personal injuries to his wife? Answer: $112.49.

'(c) Damage to his automobile? Answer: $205.76'

The jury was properly instructed as to Question 6(b), but its answer included only the actual medical expense of the wife.

Appellants moved for a new trial on the ground of excessive damages, claiming that the record failed to support the jury's finding that respondent was damaged to the extent of $1,000 for personal injuries to himself.

In its decision on motions after verdict the trial court stated:

'With reference to the element of damages it is apparent to the court that the jury, in deliberating upon the element of damages to be awarded, included within their consideration of Subdivision (a) damages to the plaintiff for loss of his wife's services and loss of consortium and everything properly to be considered under Subdivision (b). The consideration by the jury of the loss of services and loss of consortium was done, I am satisfied, despite the fact that the court in its...