Jennings v. State
| Decision Date | 15 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 615,615 |
| Parties | DAMETRIES JENNINGS v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Prince George's County
Case No. CT181321X
UNREPORTED
Opinion by Berger, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
Dametries Jennings, appellant, was convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of reckless endangerment.1 Appellant asks the following question on appeal:
Whether the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the absence of flight and defense of property.
For the following reasons, we shall affirm the judgment.
For more than 20 years, two families, the Herndons and the Jenningses, lived next to each other in end unit townhomes in a townhouse complex on Forest Run Drive in Prince George's County. The Jenningses lived on the left with their front door on the right-hand side of their house, and the Herndons lived on the right. Parking spaces were located in front of the townhouses. A common area owned by their community association separated their yards.
On August 4, 2018, the two families became involved in a verbal and physical altercation that ended when appellant fired his shotgun once. The parties disputed most aspects of the argument, including who started it, where it occurred, and what was appellant's intent in firing his shotgun. Testifying for the State, among others, were several members of the Herndon family and the responding police officer. Testifying for the defense, among others, were several members of the Jennings family, including appellant.Because the issue here is whether a jury instruction should have been given -- and not the sufficiency of evidence to establish guilt -- we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant. Under that lens, the following was elicited at appellant's trial.
Tony Herndon testified that on the morning of August 4, he was cleaning his fenced-in backyard when appellant approached and said, "We both are men and . . . I see that your gate is open, and we can settle this as men."2 Tony was not asked why appellant said what he did, but he testified that he took it to mean that appellant wanted to fight. Fearful of a physical altercation because he had recently had hand surgery, Tony went into his house and called the police. He then tried to obtain "a stay away order" against appellant but was unsuccessful.
Later that evening, Tony, his wife, his son, his daughter, and his grandchild had dinner in their backyard. Around 8:30 p.m., Tony walked out the front door of his house with his son to take him home, when appellant came off his front porch and approached them. A verbal argument ensued between Tony's son and appellant. At one point, appellant pulled out his cell phone. Because Tony believed that appellant was calling people to help him fight, Tony called his brother, Bennett, and asked him to come to the house.
The men were still arguing when Tony's brother Bennett arrived, and soon afterward, Bennett and appellant's brother, Steven, started arguing. According to both Tony and Bennett, at some point Steven "jumped" out at Tony like he was going to hit him,and Bennett hit Steven in response. Steven fell to the ground, and Bennett fell on top of him and held him down. Appellant's mother then came out of her home and started hitting Bennett on the back with a golf club. Tony pushed her away. Appellant then came out of the house, and when he asked who had pushed his mother, she pointed to Tony and said, "Shoot him." Appellant then raised a shotgun up in the air and cocked it. According to both Tony and Bennett, appellant then pointed the gun in Bennett's direction. Bennett rolled himself and Steven away, and appellant fired the gun where they had lain. Both Tony and Bennett testified that they were close enough that dirt "popped up" on both of them. Dirt from the shotgun blast was also thrown up onto Tony's cars that were parked in front of the common area, photographs of which were entered into evidence. After appellant fired the shotgun, everyone dispersed, and appellant went inside his house.
Tony testified that the argument and shooting occurred in the front common area between the two townhomes. He testified that he was familiar with the common area because he had been president of the community's homeowner's association. Tony's wife, Stephanie, testified that she witnessed the argument and shooting from her front porch and her testimony was similar to Tony's and Bennett's testimony. She also testified that the men argued in the common area between their homes but conceded that Bennett could have rolled onto the Jennings' property when he rolled to avoid being shot by appellant. The investigating officer testified that she responded to the scene of the shooting and determined that the shooting occurred in the common area between the two houses.
Appellant's mother testified for the defense. She testified that earlier that afternoon, around 2:30 p.m., she and her two sons were in their backyard barbecuing and playingmusic when the police knocked on their door and said their neighbor had complained about them playing their music too loud. She testified that later that evening, around 8:00 p.m., as Steven was on the front porch and she was walking toward the porch after walking her dog, Tony ran over. He pushed her, and then "all these other men [started] coming over." In response, Steven ran off the front porch to protect her, but Bennett attacked him from behind, after which the other men started attacking Bennett. Tony pushed her a second time, so she grabbed her "putter" from the porch and went into the house to call the police. She denied striking anyone with the putter. She and Steven testified that during the altercation they were on their property.
Appellant testified that he was inside the house when he saw his mother return home from walking the dog. He saw Tony shove his mother and saw Bennett "sn[ea]k up" on his brother and start "choking him." When others joined in the beating of his brother, appellant went upstairs and got his rifle. He put a single shell in it and ran out the front door. When he saw his mother pushed a second time, he shot the gun by his own foot on his mother's property. He took the gun inside, and then returned to the porch to wait for the police. Appellant testified that he did not point his gun at anyone, and he fired only one shot because he wanted people to leave his family alone and to leave their property.
That night, appellant was interviewed at the police station and made a statement that largely mirrored his trial testimony. He told the police that he shot his gun "to make these people leave us alone." He said that earlier in the day when the police responded to the house, the police told him that he could defend himself "if they come on your property" or "[i]f they come on your property trying to hurt you or your family[.]"
Appellant argues on appeal that we must reverse his conviction for reckless endangerment because the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on absence of flight and defense of property. The State argues that the trial court did not err in refusing to give an absence of flight instruction, and appellant failed to preserve for our review his defense of property argument.
Md. Rule 4-325(c), governing a trial court's instructions to a jury, provides:
The court may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the instructions are binding. The court may give its instructions orally or, with the consent of the parties, in writing instead of orally. The court need not grant a requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given.
In sum, a trial court is required to give a requested instruction when: "'(1) the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2) the requested instruction is applicable under the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the requested instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in the jury instruction actually given.'" Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 291, 302-03 (2006) (quoting Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 58 (1997)).3
We review a trial court's denial of a requested jury instruction under an abuse of discretion standard. Hall v. State, 437 Md. 534, 539 (2014) (citation omitted). However, whether "the evidence is sufficient to generate the desired instruction in the first instance is a question of law for the judge." Roach v. State, 358 Md. 418, 428 (2000) (citation omitted). In such a case, "[o]ur review is limited to determining whether the criminal defendant produced that minimum threshold of evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case that would allow a jury to rationally conclude that the evidence supports the application of the legal theory desired." Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95, 131 (quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 390 Md. 91 (2005). In determining whether competent evidence exists to generate the requested instruction, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the accused. Fleming v. State, 373 Md. 426, 433 (2003) (citation omitted).
Maryland does not have a pattern jury instruction on the "absence of flight" but defense counsel asked the court to give the following instruction:
DEFENSE REQUEST FOR JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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