Jennings v. State, 53S01–1209–CR–526.
| Decision Date | 20 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 53S01–1209–CR–526.,53S01–1209–CR–526. |
| Citation | 982 N.E.2d 1003 |
| Parties | Joey JENNINGS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jeremy M. Noel, Bloomington, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Robert J. Hill, Joel M. Schumm, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Marion County Public Defender Agency.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, James Thomas Whitehead, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 53A01–1010–CR–00541
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation: does the phrase “term of imprisonment,” as it is used in Indiana's misdemeanor sentencing statute, include time suspended from a sentence? We hold it does not.
A jury convicted Joey Jennings of criminal mischief as a Class B misdemeanor for vandalizing another man's truck. The trial court sentenced him to 30 days executed, 150 days suspended, and 360 days of probation. Jennings appealed, arguing that 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and 2) his sentence was illegal under Indiana Code § 35–50–3–1(b) (2008), which states
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding the evidence sufficient to support Jennings's conviction but finding the sentence was inconsistent with Indiana Code § 35–50–3–1(b). Jennings v. State, 956 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). The court reasoned “term of imprisonment” was not defined in the Indiana Code and the courts had not settled on a definition. The court concluded that for purposes of the misdemeanor sentencing statute, “term of imprisonment” must include not only executed time, but also suspended time. Thus, in order to comply with the statute, the aggregate sentence—including time executed, suspended, and on probation—may not exceed one year. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for a redetermination of Jennings's period of probation, not to exceed 185 days.
The State petitioned for rehearing, arguing the court's holding conflicted with Smith v. State, 621 N.E.2d 325 (Ind.1993). The court granted the State's petition, but reaffirmed its previous decision, citing Collins v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1010 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) and Mask v. State, 829 N.E.2d 932 (Ind.2005). Jennings v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1260, 1261 (Ind.Ct.App.2012).
Jennings petitioned for transfer to this Court on the sufficiency of the evidence issue alone. The State petitioned for transfer on the sentencing issue and asked us to clarify the meaning of “term of imprisonment” as it is used in Indiana's misdemeanor sentencing statute. We granted both petitions, thereby vacating the opinion below. Jennings v. State, 974 N.E.2d 1020 (Ind.2012) (table); Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 639 (Ind.2010). Rather, we look to the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the verdict and affirm the conviction if a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
When construing a statute, “our primary goal is to determine and effect legislative intent.” Freeman v. State, 658 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ind.1995) (); State v. Gilbert, 247 Ind. 544, 550, 219 N.E.2d 892, 895 (1966) ().
Based on the record before us, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Jennings's conviction. Jennings, 956 N.E.2d at 204–05. Thus, we summarily affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals's opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).
In 1993, we established a guiding principle for misdemeanor sentencing, holding that “a combined term of probation and imprisonment exceeding one year is inconsistent with the maximum term for conviction for a misdemeanor.” Smith v. State, 621 N.E.2d 325, 326 (Ind.1993). We now clarify our holding in Smith: a combined term of probation and imprisonment may not exceed one year, notwithstanding the maximum term of imprisonment for the misdemeanor. We further hold that “term of imprisonment,” for purposes of misdemeanor sentencing, does not include suspended time.
Dennis Smith was convicted of battery, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to one year imprisonment with 255 days suspended, to be followed by a one-year probation period. Smith argued on appeal that the trial court's imposition of one year of probation, in addition to his 110–day executed sentence, was not proper because a person convicted of a Class A misdemeanor may be imprisoned for a period of not more than one year. We found that “[w]hile the trial court may have had sound reasons for the sentence it imposed, it was error to extend a misdemeanant's penalty to a term exceeding the one-year statutory limitation, whether by imposition of a prison sentence, an assessment of probation under a suspended sentence, or a combination thereof.” Id. Importantly, probation and suspended sentence were considered together as two parts of the same whole.
When this Court decided Smith, Indiana's misdemeanor sentencing law provided “whenever the court suspends a sentence for a misdemeanor, it may place the person on probation ... for a fixed period of not more than one (1) year.” Id. (quoting Ind.Code § 35–50–3–1(b) (1993)). Thus, probation, under the statute, could last for up to one year beyond the executed time served. This Court, in Smith, held that time served in prison plus probation could not exceed the statutory limitation. Id. The effect of the Court's ruling was to amend the statute by limiting a combination of time spent incarcerated and on probation to the corresponding maximum sentence possible under law.1 The Court based its decision on an “absence of clear legislative authorization to the contrary,” and applied the principles used in felony sentencing 2 to determine that imprisonment and probation could not exceed the statutory maximum. Id.
While this Court may have intended the combination of imprisonment and sentence suspended to probation to be limited to the maximum term prescribed in statute, it appears judicial practice did not follow that pronouncement. After Smith was handed down, some trial courts imposed probation for Class B and Class C misdemeanors so that the probation period plus the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for the misdemeanor, but did not exceed one year—a practice clearly in contravention of this Court's Smith decision. So, in an effort to remedy the inconsistency between precedent and practice, the legislature amended the statute in 2001 as follows (amendments in bold):
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), whenever the court suspends in whole or in part a sentence for a Class A, Class B, or Class C misdemeanor, it may place the person on probation under IC 35–38–2 for a fixed period of not more than one (1) year, notwithstanding the maximum term of imprisonment for the misdemeanor set forth in sections 2 through 4 of this chapter. However, the combined term of imprisonment and probation for a misdemeanor may not exceed one (1) year.
Ind.Code § 35–50–3–1(b) (2008) (emphasis added); see also Act of May 1, 2001, P.L. 90–2001, § 1, 2001 Ind. Acts 451.3 The statute thus is clear enough: 1) a sentence may be suspended in whole or in part; 2) a misdemeanant may be sentenced to probation for up to one year; and 3) the combined term of imprisonment plus probation may not exceed one year.
In contrast, Jennings argues that “term of imprisonment” must include both executed and suspended time, and a “term of imprisonment” plus probation cannot exceed one year. If we adopted Jennings's interpretation, we would have to apply it to the entire chapter and all levels of misdemeanors, with results that would frustrate legislative intent and undermine accountability measures that encourage reflection, remorse, and rehabilitation.4 Thus, we reject it.
Under Jennings's proposed interpretation, it would be possible for a B or C misdemeanant—but not for an A misdemeanant—to have a portion of his maximum statutory sentence suspended and still serve probation. In fact, a Class A misdemeanant could never be sentenced to the statutory maximum of one year and have a portion of that sentence suspended subject to probation. That surely was not the legislature's intent, and we will not so hold. The statutory language singles out each level of misdemeanor—A, B, and C—and says a court may suspend the sentences for each of those “in whole or in part” and then place the misdemeanant on probation for up to one year. This clearly and unambiguously shows the legislature, by “term of imprisonment,” meant only that time during which a misdemeanant is incarcerated.
Today's straightforward holding—that a judge may suspend all or part of a misdemeanor sentence and place the defendant on probation for the rest of a year—aims to clarify practice in our highest-volume criminal courts.5 Multiple defendants raising this issue have...
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