Jennings v. Stephens

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
• Citation: Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S. Ct. 793, 190 L. Ed. 2d 662, 574 U.S. 271 (2015)
• Decision Date: 14 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–7211.,13–7211.
• Parties: Robert Mitchell JENNINGS, Petitioner v. William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.

574 U.S. 271

135 S.Ct. 793

190 L.Ed.2d 662

Robert Mitchell JENNINGS, Petitioner

v.William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.

No. 13–7211.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Oct. 15, 2014.

Decided Jan. 14, 2015.

Randolph L. Schaffer, Jr., Houston, TX, for Petitioner.

Andrew S. Oldham, Austin, TX, for Respondent.

Jeffrey T. Green, Erika L. Maley, Paul J. Sampson, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, Randolph L. Schaffer, Jr., Counsel of Record, Houston, TX, for Petitioner.

Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Daniel T. Hodge, First Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Andrew S. Oldham, Deputy Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Arthur C. D'Andrea, Alex Potapov, Assistant Solicitors General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Respondent.

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Robert Mitchell Jennings was sentenced to death for capital murder. He applied for federal habeas corpus relief on three theories of ineffective assistance of counsel, prevailing on two. The State appealed, and Jennings defended his writ on all three theories. We consider whether Jennings was permitted to pursue the theory that the District Court had rejected without taking a cross-appeal or obtaining a certificate of appealability.

I

In July 1988, petitioner Robert Mitchell Jennings entered an adult bookstore to commit a robbery. Officer Elston Howard, by unhappy coincidence, was at the same establishment to arrest the store's clerk. Undeterred, Jennings shot Howard four times, robbed the store, and escaped. Howard died from his wounds.

Howard was merely the most recent victim of Jennings' criminality. The State adjudicated Jennings a delinquent at 14, convicted him of aggravated robbery at 17, and of additional aggravated robberies at 20. He murdered Officer Howard only two months after his most recent release from prison.

Jennings was arrested, tried, and convicted of capital murder, and the State sought the death penalty. During the punishment phase, the State introduced evidence of Jennings' lengthy and violent criminal history. Jennings' attorney called only the prison chaplain, who testified about Jennings' improvement and that Jennings was not "incorrigible." Jennings' attorney acknowledged the difficulty of his sentencing defense in his closing remarks, commenting that he could not "quarrel with" a death sentence, but was nonetheless pleading for mercy for his client. The jury returned a special verdict, consistent with Texas law, that Jennings acted deliberately in the murder and that he would present a continuing threat to society. The trial court sentenced Jennings to death. Texas courts affirmed Jennings' conviction and sentence and denied postconviction relief. Jennings v. State , No. AP–70911 (Tex.Crim.App., Jan. 20, 1993); Ex parte Jennings, 2008 WL 5049911 (Tex.Crim.App., Nov. 26, 2008).

Jennings applied for federal habeas corpus relief, asserting, as relevant here, three theories of ineffective assistance of counsel in the punishment phase of his trial. Jennings first claimed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of his disadvantaged background, including that his conception was the product of his mother's rape, that his mother was only 17 when he was born, and that he grew up in poverty. Jennings offered his mother and sister as witnesses.

Jennings next argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate and to present evidence of Jennings' low intelligence and organic brain damage. His trial attorney admitted in affidavit that he failed to review the case files from Jennings' prior convictions, which contained a report suggesting Jennings suffered from mild mental retardation and mild organic brain dysfunction. (The report also suggested that Jennings malingered, feigning mental illness in order to delay proceedings.) Jennings argued that trial counsel should have examined Jennings' prior case files, investigated Jennings' mental health problems, and presented evidence of mental impairment in the punishment phase.

Finally, Jennings argued that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for stating that he could not "quarrel with" a death sentence. According to Jennings, this remark expressed resignation to—even the propriety of—a death sentence.

Jennings cited our decision in Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), as establishing constitutional ineffectiveness when counsel fails to investigate or to introduce substantial mitigating evidence in a sentencing proceeding. Though he did not cite our decision in Smith v. Spisak , 558 U.S. 139, 130 S.Ct. 676, 175 L.Ed.2d 595 (2010), he also argued that counsel's closing remarks amounted to constitutional ineffectiveness. The parties referred to these alleged errors as the "Wiggins errors" and the "Spisak error"; we use the same terminology.

The federal habeas court granted Jennings relief on both of his Wiggins theories, but denied relief on his Spisak theory. Jennings v. Thaler , 2012 WL 1440387 (S.D.Tex., Apr. 23, 2012). The court ordered that the State "shall release Jennings from custody unless, within 120 days, the State of Texas grants Jennings a new sentencing hearing or resentences him to a term of imprisonment as provided by Texas law at the time of Jennings['] crime." Id., at *7.

The State appealed, attacking both Wiggins theories (viz., trial counsel's failure to present evidence of a deprived background and failure to investigate evidence of mental impairment ). Jennings argued before the Fifth Circuit that the District Court correctly found constitutional ineffectiveness on both Wiggins theories, and argued again that trial counsel performed ineffectively under his Spisak theory. The Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of habeas corpus under the two Wiggins theories and rendered judgment for the State. 537 Fed.Appx. 326, 334–335 (2013). The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Jennings' Spisak theory. Id., at 338–339. Implicitly concluding that raising this argument required taking a cross-appeal, the panel noted that Jennings failed to file a timely notice of appeal, see Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A), and failed to obtain a certificate of appealability as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Section 2253(c) provides, as relevant here, that "[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from ... the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding."

We granted certiorari, 572 U.S. 1015, 134 S.Ct. 1539, 188 L.Ed.2d 556 (2014), to decide whether Jennings was required to file a notice of cross-appeal and seek a certificate of appealability to pursue his Spisak theory.

II

The rules governing the argumentation permissible for appellees urging the affirmance of judgment are familiar, though this case shows that familiarity and clarity do not go hand-in-hand.

A

An appellee who does not take a cross-appeal may "urge in support of a decree any matter appearing in the record, although his argument may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court." United States v. American Railway Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560, 68 L.Ed. 1087 (1924). But an appellee who does not cross-appeal may not "attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary." Ibid. Since Jennings did not cross-appeal the denial of his Spisak theory, we must determine whether urging that theory sought to enlarge his rights or lessen the State's under the District Court's judgment granting habeas relief.

The District Court's opinion, in its section labeled "Order," commanded the State to "release Jennings from custody unless, within 120 days, the State of Texas grants Jennings a new sentencing hearing or resentences him to a term of imprisonment as provided by Texas law at the time of Jennings['] crime." 2012 WL 1440387, at *7. The District Court's corresponding entry of judgment contained similar language. App. 35. The intuitive answer to the question whether Jennings' new theory expands these rights is straightforward: Jennings' rights under the judgment were what the judgment provided—release, resentencing, or commutation within a fixed time, at the State's option; the Spisak theory would give him the same. Similarly, the State's rights under the judgment were to retain Jennings in custody pending resentencing or to commute his sentence; the Spisak theory would allow no less.

The State objects to this straightforward result. A conditional writ of habeas corpus, it argues, does not merely entitle a successful petitioner to retrial (or resentencing), but it entitles him to retrial (or resentencing) without the challenged errors . Because each basis for habeas relief imposes an additional implied obligation on the State (not to repeat that error), each basis asserted by a successful petitioner seeks to lessen the State's rights at retrial, and therefore each additional basis requires a cross-appeal.

This is an unusual position, and one contrary to the manner in which courts ordinarily behave. Courts reduce their opinions and verdicts to judgments precisely to define the rights and liabilities of the parties. Parties seeking to enforce a foreign court's decree do not attempt to domesticate an opinion; they domesticate a judgment . Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 481 – 482 (1987). A prevailing party seeks to enforce not a district court's reasoning, but the court's judgment . Rogers v. Hill , 289 U.S. 582, 587, 53 S.Ct. 731, 77 L.Ed. 1385 (1933). This Court, like all federal appellate courts, does not review lower courts' opinions, but their judgments . Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). And so a rule that contravenes this...