Jennings v. Trunkett & Trunkett, P.C.
| Decision Date | 10 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 18 C 1413,18 C 1413 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | KATRINA JENNINGS, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. TRUNKETT & TRUNKETT, P.C., Defendant. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Katrina Jennings ("Plaintiff") brings this putative class action alleging that the law firm of Trunkett & Trunkett ("Defendant") violated multiple provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., in connection with its efforts to collect a debt from her. (R. 1, Compl.) Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (R. 13, Mot.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted.
Plaintiff is a resident of Illinois and a "consumer" as defined by the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(3). Defendant is an Illinois law firm and a "debt collector" as defined by the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6). (Id. ¶¶ 4-6.) Plaintiff incurred a "debt" within the meaning of the FDCPA on a credit account issued by Maroon Financial Credit Union. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) She subsequently defaulted on this debt. (Id. ¶ 8.)
In October 2017, Defendant filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff on behalf of Maroon Financial Credit Union in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to collect the debt. (Id. ¶¶ 10-13.) In early February 2018, Plaintiff was served with a copy of the complaint filed in the state court action and a summons to appear in state court on February 21, 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15, Ex. B at 4.) The state court complaint alleged that principal, interest, and attorneys' fees were "presently due" to Maroon Financial Credit Union. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 27.) On February 21, 2018, the Circuit Court of Cook County entered a default judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of $3,182.53 plus costs. (R. 13, Mot., Ex. B.)1
Two days after the judgment was entered, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit, alleging that Defendant violated several provisions of the FDCPA in connection with the state court action, (R. 1, Compl.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated §§ 1692e, e(2), and e(10) because the state court complaint listed the plaintiff as "Maroon Financial Credit Union," while the summons listed the plaintiff as "Maroon Financial C." (Id. ¶¶ 17-26, 60.) Plaintiff contends that "both entities cannot be the plaintiff, and thus both entities cannot be the creditor to which the debt is owed." (Id.) Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated §§ 1692e(5) and 1692f(1) when it alleged in the state court complaint that attorneys' fees were "presently due," because Defendant "had neither a contractual, nor a statutory, right to attorneys' fees[.]" (Id. ¶¶ 29-44, 61-62.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant "misrepresented the amount and status of an allegeddebt" and "attempted to collect an amount not expressly authorized by any agreement." (Id. ¶¶ 61-62.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant made a false statement in violation of § 1692e(10) when it attached a "notice" to the state court complaint advising her that if she contested the debt within 30 days, Defendant would "obtain verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment against you" and provide such documentation to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff argues that this was a false statement because it implied that "there was already a judgment [against Plaintiff] and the case was already lost" (Id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff further asserts that she "was damaged as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct in the State Action, in that she incurred financial loss, and suffered . . . emotional distress, lost time, worry, embarrassment, aggravation, restlessness, depression, nervousness, and inconvenience." (Id. ¶ 51.)
In April 2018, Defendant filed the present motion seeking to dismiss the action in its entirety. (R. 13, Mot.) Defendant first argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of jurisdiction over Plaintiff's FDCPA claims.2 (Id. at 6-8.) Defendant relatedly argues that Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata. (Id. at 9-11.) Defendant alternatively argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under the FDCPA. (Id. at 11-16.) Plaintiff responded to Defendant's motion to dismiss, (R. 27, Resp.), and Defendant replied, (R. 28, Reply).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court's "power to decide the claim before it[.]" Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 562 (2017). "The party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating its existence." Farnik v. F.D.I.C., 707 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir.2013). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) allows the moving party to dispute the existence of the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). In evaluating a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must first determine whether a facial challenge or a factual challenge has been raised. Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015); Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009). "Facial challenges require only that the court look to the complaint and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject-matter jurisdiction." Apex, 572 F.3d at 443 (emphasis in original). A court evaluating a facial challenge must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor. Bultasa Buddhist Temple of Chi. v. Nielsen, 878 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2017).
"In contrast, a factual challenge lies where the complaint is formally sufficient but the contention is that there is in fact no subject-matter jurisdiction." Apex Digital, 572 F.3d at 443 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In a factual challenge, "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations," and the Court is "free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Id. at 444 (citation omitted). The Court "may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ciarpaglini v. Norwood, 817 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing same standard).
"A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 796 F.3d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 2015) (); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must "containsufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor. Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 2018). "A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based only on the complaint itself, documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice." Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 648 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
Defendant first contends that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff is asking this Court to "undo" the default judgment entered against her in the state court action, and, therefore, her complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (R. 13, Mot. at 5-7.) Plaintiff responds that Rooker-Feldman does not bar her claims because she is not seeking to disturb the state-court judgment and instead "seeks relief on a completely different and independent basis than the previously rendered state court order[.]" (R. 27, Resp. at 6.)
"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced." Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 2017). That is because "no matter how wrong a state court judgment may be under federal law, only the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review it." Jakupovic v. Curran,850 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted); see also Kelley v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008) (). Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman bars (1) claims that "directly seek to set aside a state-court judgment;" and (2) "claims that were not raised in state court, or that do not on their face require review of a state court's decision," but are "closely enough related to a state-court judgment." Mains, 852 F.3d at 675. To determine whether Rooker-Feldman applies, the Court must "ask whether the federal plaintiff is alleging that his injury was caused by the state-court judgment." Id. If so, the plaintiff's claim is barred. Id. If "the claim alleges an injury independent of the state-court judgment that the state court failed to remedy, Rooker-Feldman does not apply." Id.
Applying these principles, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claims are...
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