Jennings v. U.S.

Citation461 F.Supp.2d 818
Decision Date26 September 2006
Docket NumberCiv. Nos. 03-116-GPM.,Crim. No. 00-30122-GPM.
PartiesEugenia JENNINGS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 7th Circuit. Southern District of Illinois

John Sandberg, Sandberg Phoenix & Vongontard PC, St. Louis, MO, for Petitioner.

Suzanne M. Garrison, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Fairview Heights, IL, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence brought by Eugenia Jennings (Doc. 1). For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.

INTRODUCTION

On October 10, 2000, Eugenia Jennings entered an open plea of guilty to two counts of distributing crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At the plea hearing, Jennings admitted that in Alton, Illinois, on separate occasions in February 2000 she gave 1.3 grams and 12.6 grams of crack cocaine to a confidential informant working with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration and the Alton Police Department in return for designer clothing worth slightly more than $1,000. Because Jennings had two prior felony convictions for selling crack, she was eligible to be sentenced as a career offender under section 431.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Although Jennings originally faced a prison sentence of between thirty years and life, as a result of her guilty plea she received a three-level reduction in her offense level for acceptance of responsibility, bringing her down to a sentencing range of 262 to 327 months in prison. Jennings was sentenced to 262 months.

Jennings subsequently appealed from the Court's refusal to grant her a downward departure based upon her family ties and responsibilities, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See United States v. Jennings, 39 Fed.Appx. 322 (7th Cir.2002). Jennings now has filed a timely motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that her guilty plea and sentence were the result of ineffective assistance by her attorney, John Delaney.1 On December 1, 2004, the Court directed the government to respond to Jennings's motion; the government did so on January 25, 2005, whereupon Jennings filed a reply. Although counsel was appointed for Jennings and she was granted leave to file an amended motion for section 2255 relief, Jennings, presumably upon the advice of her attorney, has elected to stand upon her original pro se motion and supporting briefs.

An evidentiary hearing on a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is not required if the "motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See also Bruce v. United States, 256 F.3d 592, 597 (7th Cir.2001); Daniels v. United States, 54 F.3d 290, 293 (7th Cir.1995). Further, "in order for a hearing to be granted, the petition must be accompanied by a detailed and specific affidavit which shows that the petitioner had actual proof of the allegations going beyond mere unsupported assertions." Prewitt v. United States, 83 F.3d 812, 819 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Barry v. United States, 528 F.2d 1094, 1101 (7th Cir.1976)). "Mere unsupported allegations cannot sustain a petitioner's request for a hearing." Id. (quoting Aleman v. United States, 878 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir.1989)). The Court's careful review of the submissions of both Jennings and the government, together with the complete lack of evidentiary support for Jennings's motion, leads the Court to conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required in this case. Thus, the Court will resolve the motion without a hearing.

DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard

The Court must grant a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a federal prison sentence when "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. However, "[h]abeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for extraordinary situations." Prewitt, 83 F.3d at 816 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). Relief under section 2255 is available only if an error is "jurisdictional, constitutional, or is a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Barnickel v. United States, 113 F.3d 704, 705 (7th Cir.1997) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 961 F.2d 1339, 1341 (7th Cir.1992)). Motions under section 2255 are subject to various bars, including that of procedural default. A section 2255 motion is "neither a recapitulation of nor a substitute for a direct appeal." McCleese v. United States, 75 F.3d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir.1996). Thus, a section 2255 motion cannot raise: (1) issues that were raised on direct appeal, unless there is a showing of changed circumstances; (2) non-constitutional issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not; and (3) constitutional issues that were not raised on direct appeal. See Belford v. United States, 975 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717 (7th Cir.1994). Importantly, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel may properly be raised in a section 2255 motion regardless of whether the defendant raised the issue on direct appeal. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003); United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 976 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Hamzat, 217 F.3d 494, 501 (7th Cir. 2000). In this instance, the grounds for Jennings's section 2255 motion, none of which were raised on direct appeal, are couched as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to avoid procedural default.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Jennings shoulders a heavy burden. She must "show that [her] counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced [her] defense." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). An attorney's performance is deficient if it falls "below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). When a court reviews an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court's review is "highly deferential" to the attorney, "with the underlying assumption that `counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" United States v. Holman, 314 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Put another way, "[d]efense counsel is `strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and to have made significant decisions in the exercise of his or her reasonable professional judgment.'" Cooper v. United States, 378 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Traeger, 289 F.3d 461, 470 (7th Cir.2002)). To succeed on her claim, Jennings must show "errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as `counsel' guaranteed [to her] by the Sixth Amendment[.]" Holman, 314 F.3d at 839 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052).

In general, prejudice for purposes of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is established by showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Benefiel v. Davis, 357 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir.2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In a case where a movant under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 pleaded guilty as a result of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, to satisfy the second Strickland prong the movant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the movant would not have entered a guilty plea and instead would have gone to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Hays v. United States, 397 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir.2005); Bridgeman v. United States, 229 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2000). When analyzing counsel's performance at sentencing, prejudice exists when, but for counsel's action or inaction, the movant would have received a shorter sentence. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 202-04, 121 S.Ct. 696, 148 L.Ed.2d 604 (2001); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Moreover, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be supported by objective evidence, not merely by a movant's own self-serving testimony. See Cooper, 378 F.3d at 641-42; McCleese, 75 F.3d at 1179; Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir.1991). With this standard in mind, the Court turns to consideration of Jennings's section 2255 motion.

B. Jennings's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence
1. Voluntariness of Jennings's Guilty Plea "

Jennings contends that her counsel was ineffective because he coerced her to plead guilty by telling her that, unless she did so, the government would file new charges against her and members of her family and would submit to the Court audiotape evidence of additional drug-trafficking activity by Jennings. Also, Jennings claims that her attorney promised her that she would receive a reduced sentence in exchange for her assistance in an investigation of misconduct by guards at the Tri County Detention Center in Ullin, Illinois, where Jennings was held during her pre-trial detention. For these reasons, Jennings contends that her guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. The Court disagrees.

Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court must determine whether a defendant's plea is voluntary and intelligent by examining the plea in light of the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Cross, 57 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir.1995). Under Rule 11, the court can take into account the defendant's level of...

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