Jennissen v. City of Bloomington

• Citation: 913 N.W.2d 456
• Decision Date: 20 June 2018
• Docket Number: A17-0221
• Parties: Joel JENNISSEN, et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

913 N.W.2d 456

Joel JENNISSEN, et al., Appellants,

v.CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Respondent.

A17-0221

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: June 20, 2018

Gregory J. Joseph, Joseph Law Office, PLLC, Waconia, Minnesota, for appellants.

George C. Hoff, Shelley M. Ryan, Hoff Barry, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota, for respondent.

Susan L. Naughton, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities.

OPINION

LILLEHAUG, Justice.

This case requires us to decide whether state law preempts a proposal to amend the charter of the City of Bloomington (the City) to require voter approval before the City can implement organized collection of solid waste. Appellants, a group of Bloomington residents, proposed the charter amendment. The city declined to place the proposed amendment on a ballot on the ground that Minn. Stat. § 115A.94 (2016), which specifies processes that municipalities must follow before implementing organized collection, preempted the "field" of regulation of the process by which a city organizes waste collection. The district court and the court of appeals agreed with the City. We reverse.

FACTS

Late in 2014, the City initiated a process to switch from a system of "open collection" of mixed solid waste to a system of "organized collection." In open collection, individual residents contract with city-licensed solid waste collectors of their choice. In a system of organized collection, by contrast, a municipality contracts with a single solid-waste collector or an organization of collectors, who "collect from a defined geographic service area or areas." Minn. Stat. § 115A.94, subd. 1.

The City initiated this process by passing a resolution to negotiate with existing City-licensed trash haulers. The City subsequently formed an "Organized Collections Options Committee" ("OCOC") to explore the details of implementing organized collection, while simultaneously negotiating with the haulers. The haulers submitted a proposal in April 2015. The OCOC produced a report that included an option to proceed with the haulers’ proposal. The City held a public hearing on the option. The city council then voted for organized collection. On December 21, 2015, the City executed a contract with the haulers for organized waste collection.

During this process, appellants petitioned the City for a ballot initiative seeking the enactment of an ordinance that would require voter approval before the City could implement organized collection. The city attorney rejected the ballot initiative on two grounds. The first ground was that the proposed ordinance was preempted by state law. Specifically, the city attorney opined that Minn. Stat. § 115A.94, which outlines steps that a municipality must take before organizing collection of solid waste, preempted the "field" of regulation of the process by which a city organizes collection. The second ground was that the ballot initiative was premature because it put an issue to the voters relating to an ordinance that the City had not yet passed.

In Hennepin County District Court, appellants challenged the city attorney’s decision not to approve the ballot initiative. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. Jennissen v. City of Bloomington , No. 27-CV-15-11494, Order at 2 (Henn. Cty. Dist. Ct. filed Apr. 25, 2016). The court determined that appellants’ initiative was "not a proper ordinance" because the citizens’ "initiative power and the city council’s power to enact ordinances are co-extensive." Id. at 8, 9. Thus, held the court, appellants’ "proposed limitation on the power of the city council must be accomplished, if at all, by amendment of statute or city charter, not by ordinance." Id. at 7.

Appellants then submitted a proposed charter amendment to the City for placement on a ballot. It read:

Unless first approved by a majority of voters in a state general election, the City shall not replace the competitive market in solid waste collection with a system in which solid waste services are provided by government-chosen collectors or in government-designated districts. The adoption of this Charter amendment shall supersede any ordinances ... related to solid waste adopted by the City Council in 2015–2016.

The City declined to place the proposal on the ballot, again deciding that the proposal was preempted by state law.¹ Again, appellants sued.

The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that Minn. Stat. § 115A.94 preempted the proposed charter amendment by fully occupying the field of regulation of the process by which a city organizes collection. The court of appeals agreed. Jennissen v. City of Bloomington , 904 N.W.2d 234, 243 (Minn. App. 2017). We granted review.

ANALYSIS

The only issue before us is whether appellants’ proposed charter amendment is preempted by state law. Whether state law preempts a municipal charter provision, "and therefore charter amendments," is a question of law that we review de novo. See Bicking v. City of Minneapolis , 891 N.W.2d 304, 312 (Minn. 2017).

In considering whether Minn. Stat. § 115A.94 preempts appellants’ proposed charter amendment, we bear in mind that Bloomington is a home rule charter city. "Any local government unit when authorized by law may adopt a home rule charter for its government." Minn. Const. art. XII, § 4. A city charter "may provide for any scheme of municipal government not inconsistent with the constitution, and may provide for the establishment and administration of all departments of a city government, and for the regulation of all local municipal functions, as fully as the legislature might have done before home rule charters for cities were authorized...." Minn. Stat. § 410.07 (2016).

Nevertheless, "charter provisions (and therefore charter amendments) must be consistent with state law and state public policy." Bicking , 891 N.W.2d at 312. "Notwithstanding a city’s broad power to legislate in regard to municipal affairs, state law may limit the power of a city to act in a particular area." City of Morris v. Sax Invs., Inc. , 749 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cities have no power to regulate in a manner that conflicts with state law or invades subjects that have been preempted by state law. Bicking , 891 N.W.2d at 313.

We have recognized three types of state preemption of municipal legislative authority: express preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption. See id. at 313 n.8. Express preemption occurs when "the legislature has expressly declared that state law shall prevail over municipal regulation." Id. ; see also State v. Kuhlman , 722 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 2006) (citing Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield , 274 Minn. 347, 143 N.W.2d 813, 816 (1966) ), aff’d , 729 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. 2007). Conflict preemption occurs when state and local laws "contain express or implied terms that are irreconcilable with each other, when [local law] permits what the statute forbids, or when [local law] forbids what the statute expressly permits." Bicking , 891 N.W.2d at 313 (quoting Mangold , 143 N.W.2d at 816 ) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted). Field preemption occurs when "the Legislature has comprehensively addressed the subject matter such that state law now occupies the field." Id. at 313 n.8 ; see also Mangold , 143 N.W.2d at 819 (explaining the " ‘occupation of the field’ concept").

Both parties assert, and the courts below assumed, that only field preemption is at issue in this case.² To determine whether state law has "occupied the field," leaving no room for supplemental municipal legislation, we consider four questions:

(1) What is the ‘subject matter’ which is to be regulated? (2) Has the subject matter been so fully covered by state law as to have become solely a matter of state concern? (3) Has the legislature in partially regulating the subject matter indicated that it is a matter solely of state concern? (4) Is the subject matter itself of such a nature that local regulation would have unreasonably adverse effects upon the general populace of the state?

Mangold , 143 N.W.2d at 820 ; see also City of Morris , 749 N.W.2d at 6–7. We refer to these four questions as "the Mangold factors."

A.

We begin with the subject matter. In identifying the subject matter, we look first to the relevant state statute to determine what the Legislature intended to regulate. See Swanson v. Brewster , 784 N.W.2d 264, 284 (Minn. 2010) ("Our primary goal in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.").

Chapter 115A of the Minnesota Statutes is the Minnesota Waste Management Act. "It is the goal of [chapter 115A] to protect the state’s land, air, water, and other natural resources and the public health by improving waste management in the state...." Minn. Stat. § 115A.02(a) (2016). The relevant statute, Minn. Stat. § 115A.94, outlines certain procedures related to the process of implementing organized collection of solid waste.

Based on the plain language of section 115A.94, we conclude that the subject matter is the process a city must follow before it can organize waste collection. The parties disagree about how extensively the statute defines this process and whether it includes the actual decision to establish organized collection. To determine whether the statute completely and exclusively describes the process, we turn to the second Mangold factor.

B.

Under the second Mangold factor, we ask whether "the subject matter [has] been so fully covered by state law as to have become solely a matter of state concern." Mangold , 143 N.W.2d at 820. Understanding what is—and is not—within the reach of section 115A.94 is critical to our preemption analysis.

Specifically, if a city is considering adopting organized collection, and the city has "more than one licensed collector," the city must first "notify the public and all licensed collectors in the community." Minn. Stat. § 115A.94,...