Jensen v. Jensen

• Decision Date: 01 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 744,744
• Citation: 103 Md.App. 678,654 A.2d 914
• Parties: Patricia Donnelly JENSEN v. John G. JENSEN. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 678

103 Md.App. 678

654 A.2d 914

Patricia Donnelly JENSEN v. John G. JENSEN.

No. 744, Sept. Term, 1994.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 1, 1995.

On October 2, 1975, after the final hearing but before the circuit court filed its written order, Ms. Jensen wrote a letter to the Chancellor, in which she said that she was "unable to understand nor accept without better explanation than [she had] been given by ... counsel the reported decision to eliminate alimony payments...." In response, the Chancellor wrote Ms. Jensen the following letter:

By the Order which will be submitted to me for signature, and which was agreed upon in open Court several days ago the question of alimony, so far as you are concerned, will be reserved.

However, there will be no provision for alimony at the present time because of the fact that, considering support for the children, you are making just as much if not more money than Mr. Jensen.

(Emphasis added). ¹

On October 14, 1975, the circuit court issued an order (the "1975 Order") stating, in pertinent part, as follows:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Decree of December 7, 1970 relative to the payment of permanent alimony by the Plaintiff, John G. Jensen, unto the Defendant Patricia Donnelly Jensen, is hereby modified to the extent that said Plaintiff, John G. Jensen shall not be required to pay alimony unto the Defendant, Patricia Donnelly Jensen, said modification to be effective as of the 14th day of October, 1975, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the right of the Defendant, Patricia Donnelly Jensen, to alimony is hereby reserved, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matters of this cause and shall pass such Orders in the future as the circumstances may then warrant.

(Emphasis added).

In an unpublished opinion filed May 26, 1976, this Court affirmed the 1975 Order. Jensen v. Jensen, No. 1074 (Ct.Sp.App. May 26, 1976).

B. The Present Proceedings

In February, 1987, Ms. Jensen fell at work and was injured. She received worker's compensation benefits but those benefits terminated after two years. Ms. Jensen claims that she has been unable to continue working for the State. She avers that, since the injury, she has subsisted on disability assistance, food stamps, and less than 20 hours per week in part-time work. She applied for other Social Security benefits but did not receive a response for several years. Unable to pay her continuing medical expenses, Ms. Jensen filed for bankruptcy protection in 1992.

On February 8, 1993, seventeen years after the circuit court's 1975 Order terminating alimony, Ms. Jensen filed her Petition. She alleged a drastic change in circumstances and claimed that "she [was] no longer able to support herself."

On September 27, 1993, a hearing was held before a domestic relations master concerning the Petition. The Master declined to resolve Mr. Jensen's legal argument that Ms. Jensen was precluded, as a matter of law, from seeking alimony. Instead, the Master proceeded to the merits of the Petition and heard testimony from the parties as to their present circumstances. Mr. Jensen testified that he was then earning $35,000 annually. In stark contrast, Ms. Jensen said she received $7,560 annually, including public assistance funds. Both parties testified extensively as to their respective health problems.

On September 27, 1993, the Master filed her Findings of Fact and Recommendation. She recommended that Mr. Jensen pay $250 per month of indefinite alimony, retroactive to July, 1993, reduced by whatever amount Ms. Jensen ultimately receives from Social Security. Mr. Jensen filed exceptions, which were heard by the circuit court on November 23, 1993.

As a preliminary matter, the court limited the parties' arguments to the question of whether, notwithstanding the reservation, Ms. Jensen was precluded as a matter of law from seeking alimony seventeen years after alimony had been terminated. Both parties agreed that the Alimony Act of 1980 (the "Alimony Act"), 1980 Md.Laws 2057, does not govern the 1975 Order. Further, both parties cited Turrisi v. Sanzaro, 308 Md. 515, 520 A.2d 1080 (1987), as support for their respective positions. Mr. Jensen argued that Turrisi recognized the fact that it has never been appropriate to reserve alimony based on some vague, future expectation of a change in circumstances; rather, chancellors could only reserve based on contingencies that were reasonably foreseeable and could only reinstate alimony for reasons that were foreseeable. Ms. Jensen noted that the holding of Turrisi specifically addressed only the issue of whether the Alimony Act had abrogated the circuit court's ability to reserve. She cited the history of the Alimony Act, as recounted in Turrisi, to contrast the present law of alimony with the law prior to 1980.

After the conclusion of legal argument, the Chancellor declined to allow the parties to reach the issues actually considered by the Master. The court said:

I want to address solely, from the beginning, the issue of whether or not a reservation of seventeen years is appropriate. If I find that it was, then I'll hear you on the other issues. But right now I want to address that issue. I'll take it sub curia on the narrow issue of whether or not you can come back after seventeen years and revive a reservation of alimony.

(Emphasis added).

On December 20, 1993, the Chancellor issued an order granting Mr. Jensen's exceptions. The court was concerned that an award of alimony seventeen years after the 1975 Order, premised on changes in circumstances that apparently were unforeseeable in 1975, would effectively convert alimony "into a form of disability insurance." The Chancellor stated, in pertinent part:

There is nothing to indicate the trial judge's reasons for making the reservation [in 1975]. Perhaps the Petitioner's recitation of her medical and mental problems prior to the 1975 modification and reservation contained in her current testimony before the Master persuaded the court in 1975 that, should these conditions recur, the reinstatement might be appropriate. Assuming that is so, in the absence of any other indications for reserving alimony, that is not why Petitioner seeks reinstatement. Her compensable accident in 1987, and her resulting disability were not "foreseeable" in 1975. As alluded to in Turrisi, [308 Md. at 528-29, 520 A.2d 1080], to hold otherwise would turn reserved alimony into a form of disability insurance.

(Emphasis added).

Issues Presented

Ms. Jensen presents two questions for our review:

1. "Did the Circuit Court err in finding as a matter of law that Appellant Patricia Donnelly Jensen could not seek alimony in a petition filed in 1993 and based on a reservation of jurisdiction regarding alimony in a 1975 Order?"

2. "If Appellant may seek alimony at this time, did she demonstrate her entitlement to alimony, at the hearing before the Master, sufficient to require a remand to the Circuit Court for consideration by the Court of that issue?"

Mr. Jensen contends that this case presents but a single issue: "Whether the Chancellor's judgment to deny alimony after more than 17 years under the facts of this case, after giving consideration to the Recommendations of the Master and exercising his independent judgment, was an arbitrary abuse of discretion or clearly wrong."

We hold that the circuit court erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, Ms. Jensen was not entitled to pursue her claim for alimony. The trial court erroneously found that appellant could not base her Petition on events that had occurred long after the reservation of jurisdiction and that were unforeseeable at the time of reservation.

The Standard of Review

As a threshold matter, we note that the standard of review of the Chancellor's decision turns on the nature of his decision. If the Chancellor exercised discretion to deny alimony based on the facts of the case, then the decision ordinarily would not be disturbed unless the exercise of discretion was "arbitrarily used" or the decision was "clearly wrong." Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 388, 614 A.2d 590 (1992); Brodak v. Brodak, 294 Md. 10, 28-29, 447 A.2d 847 (1982). If, on the other hand, the Chancellor limited his decision to a narrow issue of law, such as whether Ms. Jensen could revive alimony based on changes in circumstances that were unforeseeable in 1975, then the decision is not entitled to any deference. Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443, 446 n. 2, 505 A.2d 113 (1986).

The court clearly expressed a desire to limit the decision to the "narrow issue of whether or not you can come back after seventeen years and revive a reservation of alimony." Moreover, the court refused to permit the parties to discuss the facts at the hearing and told the parties they would return to address the facts should the court find that Ms. Jensen was legally entitled to petition for alimony. From this, it is clear to us that the trial court never considered the facts found by the Master and, instead, limited his decision to the legal issue presented. We shall review his decision accordingly.

Discussion

In the 1975 Order, the court unequivocally reserved jurisdiction as to alimony. The parties agree here, as they did below, that the 1975 Order is governed by the substantive law that was in effect prior to the enactment of the Alimony Act. Similarly, Ms. Jensen's Petition, which is based on the 1975 Order, must be analyzed and considered based on the law in effect at the time of the 1975 Order; the Alimony Act expressly affects only those cases filed after the effective date. Young v. Young, 61 Md.App. 103, 107-09, 484 A.2d 1054 (1984) (petition, filed in 1982, requesting modification of alimony order that had been issued prior to effective date of Alimony Act, is not governed by Alimony Act) (citing Athanason v. Athanason, 48 Md.App. 231, 426 A.2d 16 (1981)).

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