Jensen v. Johnson County Youth Baseball League

• Decision Date: 01 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. 93-2256-JWL.,93-2256-JWL.
• Citation: 838 F. Supp. 1437
• Parties: Ellen M. JENSEN, Plaintiff, v. JOHNSON COUNTY YOUTH BASEBALL LEAGUE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

838 F. Supp. 1437

Ellen M. JENSEN, Plaintiff, v. JOHNSON COUNTY YOUTH BASEBALL LEAGUE, Defendant.

No. 93-2256-JWL.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

November 1, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kara T. Burgess, Brian J. Klopfenstein, Von Erdmannsdorff & Mowry, Kansas City, MO, for plaintiff.

Nancy M. Landis, Michael F. Delaney, Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, Kansas City, MO, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LUNGSTRUM, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendant Johnson County Youth Baseball League's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Doc. # 5). The motion is opposed by plaintiff. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ellen Jensen brings this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Equal Pay provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206.¹ Plaintiff alleges that she worked for defendant since 1986 performing a variety of functions. Plaintiff claims that she was terminated in early 1993. Plaintiff alleges that immediately after her termination, defendant hired a man to perform similar duties as the plaintiff had performed but at a higher salary.

In lieu of answering plaintiff's complaint, defendant has filed this motion to dismiss claiming that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims. Defendant asserts that it is not an "employer" as defined in Title VII. Defendant also contends that it is not an "enterprise" as defined in the Fair Labor Standard Act 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1) for purposes of the Equal Pay provision. Defendant has filed a sworn affidavit of its Treasurer to support these contentions.

In response to defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff has filed documentation to support her position that defendant is a Title VII employer and meets the threshold definition of an enterprise. This documentation includes defendant's payroll and other financial statements, team and umpire schedules, and a sworn affidavit of the plaintiff.

DISCUSSION

Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, there is a strong presumption against federal jurisdiction. Penteco Corp. Ltd. Partnership 1985A v. Union Gas System, Inc., 929 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir.1991). A court lacking subject matter jurisdiction "must dismiss the case at any stage of the proceeding in which it becomes apparent that such jurisdiction is absent." Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir.1974). When the jurisdiction of the federal court is challenged, the party invoking such jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence. Armstrong v. Goldblatt Tool Co., 609 F.Supp. 736, 737 (D.Kan.1985).

Since both the defendant and the plaintiff have attached extraneous materials in reference to this motion to dismiss, the court will first discuss whether to treat this motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.²

Nature of the Motion under Review

A 12(b)(1) motion is considered a "speaking motion" and can include references to evidence outside the pleadings without converting it to a Rule 56 motion. Hancock v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 1993 WL 62105 (D.Kan.1993); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 259 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986, 108 S.Ct. 503, 98 L.Ed.2d 501 (1987). A court has wide discretion to allow affidavits and other documents to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1). Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 259. However, as a general rule, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion should not be converted into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Nichols v. United States, 796 F.2d 361, 366 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure # 1366 (Supp.1986)).

However, an exception to this general rule exists when the jurisdictional question is meshed with the merits of the case. Wheeler, supra, 825 F.2d 257, 259 (10th Cir. 1987). Under this exception, a court is required to convert a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss into a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a Rule 56 summary judgment motion.³ Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 259; Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.1982); Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 733 (11th Cir. 1982). The jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the case if subject matter jurisdiction is dependent on the same statute which provides the substantive claim in the case. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 259; McEndree v. Wilson, 774 F.Supp. 1292, 1294 (D.Colo.1991). When a federal statute serves as both the basis for the court's subject matter jurisdiction and the plaintiff's substantive claim, a court should assume jurisdiction and resolve the issue on the merits, unless the alleged cause of action is immaterial, insubstantial, or frivolous. St. Mary of the Plains College v. Higher Education Loan Program of Kansas, 724 F.Supp. 803, 805 (D.Kan.1989); Clark v. Tarrant County, Texas, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir.1986) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681, 66 S.Ct. 773, 775, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). If a dismissal is granted after the court assumes jurisdiction, such decision is made on the merits pursuant to Rule 56. Clark, supra, 798 F.2d at 741.

In the present case, plaintiff's claims of federal jurisdiction are dependent upon her Title VII and Equal Pay Act allegations. First, Jensen cannot establish either subject matter jurisdiction or discrimination at the hands of an "employer" without first establishing that defendant satisfies the definition of a Title VII employer. See Reith v. Swenson, 1993 WL 108056 (D.Kan.) (finding that Title VII served as basis for both subject matter jurisdiction and the substantive discrimination claim). Second, in order to establish both federal subject matter jurisdiction and a violation of the Equal Pay provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Jensen must establish that defendant fulfills the definition of an "enterprise" for purposes of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s). Therefore, the court finds that the jurisdictional claim and the merits of this action are interwoven, and the motion should be treated as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Wheeler, supra, 825 F.2d at 257; Clark, supra, 798 F.2d at 745.

Generally, when the court determines that it must treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, the parties are given notice and an opportunity to provide additional filings before the court determines the outcome. Phillips USA, Inc. v. Allflex USA, Inc., 150 F.R.D. 198 (D.Kan. 1993). However, the Tenth Circuit has held that when parties submit "material beyond the pleadings in support of or opposing a motion to dismiss, the prior action on the part of the parties puts them on notice that the judge may treat the motion as a Rule 56 motion." Wheeler, supra, 825 F.2d at 260. Therefore, in this case, where both parties have submitted materials beyond the pleadings, the court finds that no additional notice is required and will treat this motion as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.

Summary Judgment Standard

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S.Ct. 1187, 84 L.Ed.2d 334 (1985). If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it must show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant meets these requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate "factually unsupported claims or defenses...." Celotex Corp., supra, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. Failure to establish an essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial, leading to the conclusion that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The moving party is then entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the opposing party has failed to establish an essential element with respect to which he or she has the burden of proof. Id.

Title VII Claim

For purposes of Title VII, "employer" is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Defendant argues that it does not meet this definition because it has never employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in a calendar year. Defendant supports its contention based on the affidavit of its Treasurer. Plaintiff argues that this court should give a liberal reading to this definition and combine the weeks of 1992 and 1993 to find that defendant employed 15 or more employees for 20 or more calendar weeks. Plaintiff has submitted defendant's payroll records, tax returns, team and umpire schedules as well as her own affidavit.

When defining an "employer" as intended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), the first place to look is at the language of the statute. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete and that language controls absent rare and exceptional circumstances. U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981); Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 948 (10th Cir.1987).

The pertinent language of this statute is "twenty or more calendar...