Jensen v. Yonamine

Decision Date22 August 1977
Docket NumberCiv. No. 75-405.
Citation437 F. Supp. 368
PartiesDonald Frederick JENSEN, Jack S. Warriner, Paula Chambers, Sharon Dumas, Ann Kondo Corum, Van E. Corum, Joanne C. Kapahua, Harold W. Kuha, Linda M. McLean, Florence M. Hayslip, Harry Marshall Greenwood, Deborah M. C. Chu, E. Paul Vosburgh, Jerelene M. Aio, Plaintiffs, v. Noboru YONAMINE, Darrow L. K. Aiona, George S. Adachi, Richard E. Ando, Hubert P. Minn, Marion Saunders, Ruth Tabrah, Howard I. Takenaka, Hiroshi Yamashita, Individually and as members of Hawaii State Board of Education, and Albert Miyasato, Individually and as Superintendent of Education, Hawaii State Teachers Association, an unincorporated association, Hawaii Education Association, an unincorporated association, National Education Association, an unincorporated association, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jared H. Jossem, Roger W. Fonseca, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Nat. Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc.

Rex H. Reed, Fairfax, Va., Edwin Vierra, Silver Spring, Md., Michael E. Merrill, Edith D. Hakola, Fairfax, Va., for plaintiffs.

Thomas P. Gill, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Hawaii State Teachers Assn. & Natl. Ed. Assn.

James T. Paul, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Hawaii Ed. Assn.

Ronald Y. Amemiya, Atty. Gen., Charlotte E. Libman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. BACKGROUND

WONG, District Judge.

In May 1971, the Hawaii State Teachers Association (HSTA) was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for the bargaining unit composed of the public school teachers in the State of Hawaii pursuant to Chapter 89 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS). On or about October 27, 1971, the Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board (HPERB)1 certified a $77 service fee as authorized by HRS § 89-4 (Supp.1975).2 Since that date a service fee, in varying amounts, has been certified and charged pursuant to HRS § 89-4(a).

The plaintiffs are public school teachers employed by the defendant Board of Education, Department of Education, State of Hawaii (Board). The plaintiffs initiated this class action on December 3, 1975. The suit challenges the constitutionality of the mandatory service fee deducted from their wages by the Board and given to the HSTA pursuant to HRS § 89-4(a). Jurisdiction in this court is premised upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) for a cause of action asserted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986. The plaintiffs claim that their rights under the First, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and sections 2, 3, and 4 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii have been violated.

The plaintiffs are not nor do they desire to become members of the HSTA, the Hawaii Education Association (HEA), or the National Education Association (NEA).3 Neither do they desire to be represented by any of these organizations. The plaintiffs allege that their constitutional rights have been violated because the service fees automatically deducted from their wages have been, are being, and will continue to be used for purposes unrelated to the negotiation and administration of the collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter referred to as "political purposes").4 The plaintiffs seek to represent all public school teachers of a similar persuasion.5

The complaint charges that the Board, acting under HRS § 89-4, deducts monies from the plaintiffs' wages. Such funds are transferred to the HSTA. The HSTA, in turn, forwards substantial portions of those monies to the HEA and the NEA. The forced deduction is said to be a condition of continued employment.6

The plaintiffs allege that expenditures are made for "political purposes" with the knowledge of the Board and the defendant Superintendent of Education. The plaintiffs say that they have complained to the Board and the HSTA of the compulsory deductions and have transmitted copies of their protests to the HSTA.

The complaint seeks damages, declaratory relief, and an accounting as to the specific purposes to which the fees are applied, as required by HRS § 89-15 (Supp.1975).

The HSTA, the HEA, and the NEA are named as defendants. Also named as defendants are the Superintendent of Education and the members of the Board (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the individual defendants"). The defendants have responded to the complaint as follows:

1. The HSTA and the NEA have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)).

2. The HEA has moved for summary judgment.

3. The individual defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Subject matter jurisdiction

The plaintiffs have alleged federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). They assert a cause of action under the United States Constitution, the Hawaii Constitution, and federal statutes. This court has jurisdiction over the federal claims. There is pendent jurisdiction over the state claims.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

One of the plaintiffs' claims is an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).7 An allegation of a conspiracy is vital to a § 1985(3) action. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 495 F.2d 1, 11 (9th Cir. 1974). The HSTA and the NEA contend that the plaintiffs have failed to allege a conspiracy.

The plaintiffs respond that the term "conspiracy" need not necessarily be used. They say they have alleged that the defendants have participated in a continuing process whereby the plaintiffs' constitutional rights are being violated.

Notwithstanding that the term "conspiracy" need not be used, the plaintiffs have not alleged that the defendants acted together to violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The complaint does not allege a conspiracy, collusion, agreement, or other similar arrangement by the defendants. Therefore, it does not properly state a § 1985(3) action.

C. Failure to state a claim

The HSTA, the NEA, and the individual defendants contend that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because HRS § 89-4 is constitutional. Following a hearing, the court took the matter under advisement pending a decision by the United States Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, a case presenting the identical issue. The Supreme Court issued its decision in Abood on May 23, 1977. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). Abood resolves a major issue in this litigation, but it is not dispositive of this case.

1. Abood

a. Background

Abood involved the public school teachers employed by the Detroit Board of Education. The Detroit Federation of Teachers (Union) was selected as the teachers' exclusive bargaining representative. A collective bargaining agreement covering the period from July 1, 1969 until July 1, 1971 provided that every teacher was to pay a service charge equal to the regular dues required of Union members. 97 S.Ct. at 1787-88. Failure to pay the service charge could result in discharge. Id. at 1788.

Some teachers brought an action in the state court challenging the agency-shop clause of the collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter referred to as "the teachers' case"). The trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that Michigan law prohibited an agency shop in the public sector. Smigel v. Southgate Community School Dist., 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305 (1972). Judgment in the teachers' case was vacated and the case remanded. 97 S.Ct. at 1788.

Meanwhile, Abood had filed an identical action as the teachers' case in the same trial court. The Abood case had been stayed pending disposition of the first appeal. Upon remand of the teachers' case, the two cases were consolidated. Id. at 1788-89.

In 1973, the Michigan legislature enacted a law expressly authorizing the agency shop in the public sector. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.8 The court gave retroactive effect to the new statute, thus validating the pre-1973 agency-shop clause, and ruled that the clause did not violate the United States Constitution. Id. at 1789.

The Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had erred in giving retroactive effect to the 1973 act, but upheld the facial constitutionality of the agency-shop clause based upon Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112 (1956). The Michigan Supreme Court denied review. An appeal to the United States Supreme Court was taken.

b. The Supreme Court decision

The Supreme Court said that

consideration of the question whether an agency shop provision in a collective-bargaining agreement covering governmental employees is, as such, constitutionally valid must begin with two cases in this Court that on their face go far towards resolving the issue.

97 S.Ct. at 1790. The two cases are Hanson, supra, and International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961).

The agency-shop provision of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, was the topic of inquiry in Hanson. The Court found the provision constitutional because Congress had determined that a union and employer could conclude an agreement requiring employees who obtain the benefit of union representation to share in its cost because it would promote peaceful labor relations. 351 U.S. at 225, 76 S.Ct. 714; Abood, 97 S.Ct. at 1791. The agreement did not violate the First Amendment by requiring that all who benefit from it support the representative financially. 351 U.S. at 238, 76 S.Ct. 714; Abood, 97 S.Ct. at 1791.

In Hanson, there was no evidence that the union dues were used to "force ideological...

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2 cases
  • Besig v. Friend
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • 4 Enero 1979
    ...decision to abstain in a § 1983 suit in Newport Investments v. City of Laguna Beach, supra, 564 F.2d 893. See also Jensen v. Yonamine, 437 F.Supp. 368 (D.Hawaii 1977); Webber v. Skoko, 432 F.Supp. 810 (D.Or.1977) (abstention ordered in civil rights 13 Similarly, the legislative findings of ......
  • Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n-MEA-NEA
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • 11 Agosto 1982
    ...decision to abstain in Holman v. Board of Education of the City of Flint, 388 F.Supp. 792 (E.D. Mich.1975); see also, Jensen v. Yonamine, 437 F.Supp. 368 (D.C.Haw.1977). However, I find Holman to be inapposite to the case currently before me. In Holman, members of the Black Teachers Caucus ......

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