Jensen v. Young

• Decision Date: 15 February 2019
• Docket Number: 4:18-CV-04041-RAL
• Parties: PAUL DEAN JENSEN JR., Plaintiff, v. DARREN YOUNG, WARDEN; and JASON RAVNSBORG, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

PAUL DEAN JENSEN JR., Plaintiff, v. DARREN YOUNG, WARDEN; and JASON RAVNSBORG, Defendants.

4:18-CV-04041-RAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA SOUTHERN DIVISION

February 15, 2019

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Petitioner, Paul Dean Jensen Jr. (Jensen) filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his 200-year sentence with the possibility of parole is cruel and unusual punishment violating the Eighth Amendment and contravening the holdings of Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2011), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). Docs. 1, 11. Defendants Darren Young, Warden of the Mike Durfee State Prison, and Marty Jackley,¹ then Attorney General of the State of South Dakota, moved to dismiss Jensen's petition, arguing that the petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Jensen was resentenced in June 2016 in accordance with recent Supreme Court precedent. Docs. 9, 10. For the reasons explained below, the 200-year sentence imposed on Jensen with the possibility of parole does not contravene the provision of the EighthAmendment prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment as interpreted in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery. Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.

I. Procedural Background

On January 14, 1996, fourteen-year-old Jensen and his co-defendant Shawn Springer—after discussing a plan to do so—kidnapped and robbed Michael Hare, and Jensen then murdered Hare.² South Dakota v. Jensen, 1998 SD 52, ¶¶ 3-13, 579 N.W.2d 613, 615-16. After being transferred to adult court, Jensen was tried before a jury and found guilty of first degree murder, kidnapping, and various other charges. Id. ¶ 17, 579 N.W.2d at 616; Doc. 10-1 at 2. On November 26, 1996, Judge Steven L. Zinter of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of South Dakota held a sentencing hearing. Doc. 10-5. Jensen was sentenced to life in prison without parole³ in accordance with South Dakota statutes in 1996. Jensen, 1998 SD 52, ¶¶ 62, 64, 579 N.W.2d at 624-25. Judge Zinter then informed Jensen that the time for taking an appeal was thirty days and appointed counsel to represent Jensen on appeal. Doc. 10-5 at 3.

Jensen filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of South Dakota challenging various issues. Jensen, 1998 SD 52, ¶ 18, 579 N.W.2d at 616. That court held, in part, that Jensen's transfer to adult court was supported by substantial evidence and that the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was not cruel and unusual punishment. Id. ¶¶ 55, 64, 579 N.W.2d at 623, 625. However, the court noted that "the characterization of his plight as 'without any chance of freedom' is not entirely accurate. There is always the chance the legislature will pass new laws that will lessen Jensen's term in prison." Id. ¶ 62 n.1, 579 N.W.2d at 624 n.1.

Following Miller, in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a juvenile homicide offender could not be sentenced to life in prison without parole absent consideration of the mitigating factors of youth, 567 U.S. at 489, on June 20, 2013, Jensen filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in state court, South Dakota v. Jensen, 2017 SD 18, ¶ 5, 894 N.W.2d 397, 399; Doc. 10 at 5-6. The state court issued several Orders to Stay due to uncertainty about the retroactive applicability of Miller. Doc. 10 at 6. On January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Montgomery, holding that Miller constitutes a substantive rule of constitutional law, which applies retroactively in juvenile murder cases, Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.

On June 2 and 3, 2016, Judge John L. Brown of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of South Dakota held a resentencing hearing for Jensen. Jensen, 2017 SD 18, ¶ 5, 894 N.W.2d at 399; Doc. 10-1. "[B]oth the State and Jensen presented expert testimony on the mitigating qualities of Jensen's youth, namely evidence related to Jensen's childhood and Jensen's emotional, social, psychological, and intellectual attributes as a juvenile offender [and on] on Jensen's changed, matured character as an adult." Jensen, 2017 SD 18, ¶ 5, 894 N.W.2d at 399. After considering Miller, Montgomery, the evidence presented, mitigating qualities of youth, the nature and circumstances of the crimes, and the prospects for rehabilitation, Judge Brown resentenced Jensen to 200 years in prison for the first-degree murder conviction and 200 years in prison for the kidnapping conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. Id. ¶¶ 5, 22, 894 N.W.2d at 399, 403; Doc. 10-1. Judge Brown then informed Jensen that the time for taking an appeal was thirty days and appointed counsel to represent Jensen on appeal. Doc. 10-1 at 4. Jensen timely filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of South Dakota. See Doc. 10-7 at 1.

On April 19, 2017, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed Jensen's June 3, 2016 sentence and held that Jensen's sentence was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Jensen, 2017 SD 18, ¶ 18, 894 N.W.2d at 402. The court determined that Jensen's sentence comported with Miller, which held that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing schemes that mandate life in prison without parole for juveniles, 67 U.S. at 489, because Jensen received an individualized sentence and did not receive a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole, Jensen, 2017 SD 18, ¶¶ 16-18, 856 N.W.2d at 402. The court reasoned that Jensen's 200-year sentence is not the functional equivalent of a life sentence because he has the opportunity for release at age 39. Id. ¶¶ 13, 16, 856 N.W.2d at 401-02.

The court also determined that Judge Brown did not abuse his discretion or abdicate his sentencing discretion to the parole board by saying:

Looking at this, this is somewhat unique. I was thinking there's not very many people that are sentenced to the penitentiary for any period of time that have an opportunity to come back before the Court after a period of, a significant period of time beyond the two years that's available and really have a full-blown resentencing hearing.

As I said, I thought that was unique and then I got to thinking a little more about that. Actually, that's what our parole system is. Maybe this Court doesn't sit as a parole board. The Court probably isn't well equipped to perform that function.

Id. ¶¶ 19-22, 856 N.W.2d at 402-03. The court reasoned that Judge Brown "did not leave for the parole board to decide Jensen's sentence," but instead decided Jensen's sentence "after weighing and considering all the evidence presented, the mitigating qualities of youth, the circumstances of Jensen's crime, and Jensen's prospects for rehabilitation." Id. ¶ 22, 856 N.W.2d at 403.

Jensen then filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with this Court on April 18, 2018. Doc. 1. Following a preliminary review of the petition pursuant toRule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, this Court ordered Defendants to respond. Doc. 6. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Jensen's petition pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2), Doc. 9, and submitted a memorandum in support of that motion, Doc. 10.

II. Discussion

A. Statute of Limitations

A person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment may petition a federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he or she is in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The prisoner is eligible for "relief if the underlying state court merits ruling was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law' as determined by [the Supreme] Court." Virginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S. Ct. 1726, 1727, reh'g denied, 138 S. Ct. 35 (2017) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Jensen's petition was filed after the enactment of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Doc. 1. Therefore, AEDPA applies to this petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); see also Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2004). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), a petition for writ must be filed within a one-year period. See also McMullan v. Roper, 599 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2010); Boston v. Weber, 525 F.3d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 2008). The one-year AEDPA statute of limitations runs from the latest of four specified dates, one of which is relevant here: "(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C).

Jensen maintains that he is being held in violation of the Eighth Amendment and relies on three cases decided in the last eight years by the Supreme Court of the United States, Graham v. Florida, Miller v. Alabama, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, Doc. 11. Such reliance would prompt application of § 2244(d)(1)(C) to determine the proper start date for AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations, but only if certain prerequisites are satisfied. In order for § 2244(d)(1)(C) to apply, the new constitutional right asserted must be present in Jensen's case, and, if present, the right must have retroactive application to cases on collateral review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Montgomery retroactively applied Miller, making the date Montgomery was decided, January 25, 2016, the proper start date for AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations on Jensen's claim. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732. However, "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be...