Jerauld County v. HURON REGIONAL MEDICAL
| Decision Date | 14 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 22864.,22864. |
| Parties | JERAULD COUNTY, a political subdivision, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HURON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Casey N. Bridgman, Jerauld County State's Attorney, Wessington Springs, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant.
Rodney Freeman, Jr. of Churchill, Manolis, Freeman, Kludt & Shelton Huron, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellee.
[¶ 1.] Justice RICHARD W. SABERS delivers the majority writing of the Court on Issue 1, which holds that the trial court did not err in determining that HRMC was entitled to summary judgment as to Article 16 16.06 of the lease agreement.
[¶ 2.] Justice STEVEN L. ZINTER delivers the majority opinion of the Court on Issue 2, which holds that the trial court did not err in determining that HRMC could reject County's offer to purchase equipment because the offer did not comply with Article 10 10.04(a) of the lease.
[¶ 3.] SABERS, Justice, writing the majority opinion on Issue 1.
[¶ 4.] Jerauld County appeals the trial court's grant of Huron Regional Medical Center's (HRMC) motion for summary judgment. County raises two issues on appeal: 1) whether HRMC was entitled to summary judgment as to Article 16 § 16.06 of the lease agreement; and 2) whether HRMC was entitled to summary judgment determining that County's offer to purchase equipment failed to comply with Article 10 § 10.04(a) of the lease.
[¶ 5.] Jerauld County owns the Weskota Memorial Medical Center in Wessington Springs (Weskota or Hospital). In 1986, County and HRMC entered into a written agreement whereby HRMC would lease the hospital from County. HRMC would then be responsible for operating the hospital.
[¶ 6.] In July 1997, the president of HRMC began a grant application process with the Fannie E. Rippel Foundation (Foundation). HRMC was pursuing the grant from the foundation in order to obtain two in-house stationary mammography units. In June 1998, HRMC was notified that the grant was approved. The grant gave $116,000 toward the purchase of two mammography units and was contingent upon HRMC contributing $15,000 toward the cost of each unit. The units were to be placed at Weskota and De Smet Memorial Hospital. The only unit at issue in this case is the one at Weskota.
[¶ 7.] One of the provisions of the agreement between HRMC and County entitled either party to terminate the lease after three years, provided they gave 180 days written notice. In late 1999, County provided notice that it intended to terminate the lease. After providing notice, County informed HRMC that it believed the mammography unit at Hospital belonged to County under the terms of the lease agreement. County offered to purchase the unit for $15,000, the amount HRMC spent above the grant, for purchase of the unit. HRMC rejected the offer.
[¶ 8.] County filed a motion for an order to show cause. The circuit judge denied County's request for delivery and possession of the unit and gave HRMC the right to retain use and possession of the unit while this matter was pending. HRMC made a motion for summary judgment which the court granted. County appeals, raising two issues:
[¶ 9.] Our standard of review on summary judgment is well-settled. In Thiewes, we noted the guiding principles in determining whether a grant or denial of summary judgment is appropriate:
(1) The evidence must be viewed most favorable to the nonmoving party; (2) The burden of proof is upon the movant to show clearly that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (3) Though the purpose of the rule is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the action, it was never intended to be used as a substitute for a court trial or for a trial by jury where any genuine issue of material fact exists; (4) A surmise that a party will not prevail upon trial is not sufficient basis to grant the motion on issues which are not shown to be sham, frivolous or so unsubstantial that it is obvious it would be futile to try them; (5) Summary judgment is an extreme remedy and should be awarded only when the truth is clear and reasonable doubts touching the existence of a genuine issue as to material fact should be resolved against the movant; and (6) Where, however, no genuine issue of fact exists it is looked upon with favor and is particularly adaptable to expose sham claims and defenses.
State, Dept. of Revenue v. Thiewes, 448 N.W.2d 1, 2 (S.D.1989) (citing Wilson v. Great Northern Railway Company, 83 S.D. 207, 212, 157 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1968)).
[¶ 10.] 1. WHETHER HRMC WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO ARTICLE 16 § 16.06 OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT.
[¶ 11.] In its memorandum opinion, the trial court stated:
Both parties agree that:
County contends that several of the forgoing facts were not agreed upon and that they are genuine issues of material fact that a jury must decide. Therefore, County maintains that the trial court erred in using these facts to support its decision.
[¶ 12.] The parties did agree that the interpretation of the contract was a matter of law for the court to decide and that Article 16 § 16.06 of the contract was unambiguous.
[¶ 13.] County argues that while it is true that HRMC applied for a grant from Foundation, the court erred in "finding" that HRMC received the unit as part of the grant. County contends that the evidence viewed in favor of County does not support the finding and instead, Hospital actually received the unit. In other words, County is arguing that the grant was given for the benefit of the hospital itself rather than HRMC.
[¶ 14.] If Hospital, rather than HRMC, "received" (or was given) the unit, County asserts that under Article 16 § 16.06 of the lease, the unit belonged to County once it was placed at Hospital.
[¶ 15.] Article 16 § 16.06 provides:
Gifts. It is further understood and agreed by both parties hereto that if after the execution of the agreement an individual or group of individuals, or an organization or a group of organizations desire to contribute to the Hospital any sum of money for the purchase of equipment or other articles to be used in and specifically designated as a contribution for the above-described Hospital, either as a memorial or other contribution, HRMC may accept such gifts, it being understood, however, that HRMC shall comply with the wishes of the donor, and that all items purchased with such gifts by HRMC, be and remain a part of the Hospital and the property of the County, except that should the terms or conditions of the gift, bequest, contribution or grant contain specific stipulations, restrictions or directions and wishes pertaining to the gift or the use thereof, then and in that event the terms, instructions and wishes of the donor will be strictly complied with.
In order to find that County acquired ownership of the unit, this provision requires:
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, County conceded that there was nothing in the grant indicating the contribution was "specifically designated as a contribution for [Hospital]" in the following exchange:
It appears that County conceded that the grant was not specifically designated for Hospital. County asserts that since there was not a specific requirement in the grant that the unit remain with HRMC, the unit belongs to the hospital pursuant to Article 16 § 16.06. There are at least three difficulties with this argument.
[¶ 16.] First, this Court has no way of determining what the provisions of the grant were as it was not made a part of the settled record.
[¶ 17.] Second, the lease provision requires that Foundation desired to contribute the funds to Hospital. The only evidence in the settled record with regard to Foundation's intent is a letter written by its CEO, Edward Probert. The letter provides in part:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Heib v. Lehrkamp
...207, 157 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1968). [¶ 46.] Summary judgment was never meant to be a substitute for a trial by jury. Jerauld County v. Huron Regional Medical Center, Inc., 2004 SD 89, ¶ 9, 685 N.W.2d 140, 142. Instead, this Court has recognized that summary judgment is an extreme remedy and shou......
-
Hall v. State
...under that new argument. Disputes of fact are not material unless they change the outcome of a case under the law. Jerauld Cnty. v. Huron Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 2004 S.D. 89, ¶ 41 n. 4, 685 N.W.2d 140, 149 n. 4. 4. See State v. McDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 352 P.2d 343, 350 (1960); Schnider v. Sta......
-
Stern Oil Co. v. Brown
...the law.” Hall v. State ex rel. S.D. Dep't of Transp., 2011 S.D. 70, ¶ 9 n. 3, 806 N.W.2d 217, 221 n. 3 (citing Jerauld Cnty. v. Huron Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 2004 S.D. 89, ¶ 41 n. 4, 685 N.W.2d 140, 149 n. 4). Here, even if we accept as true Brown's allegation that Stern Oil verbally guaran......
-
Up v. Lloyd's London Underwriters
...SD 17, ¶ 19, 746 N.W.2d 428, 433 (citing Kling v. Stern, 2007 SD 51 ¶ 8, 733 N.W.2d 615, 618 n. 3); See also Jerauld County v. Huron Regional Medical Center, Inc., 2004 SD 89, ¶ 36, n. 2, 685 N.W.2d 140, 148, n. 2; Nelson v. Schellpfeffer, 2003 SD 7, ¶ 8, 656 N.W.2d 740, 743. "An absurd res......
-
Burley v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equipment, Inc.: expert testimony in strict products liability cases in South Dakota.
...829, 834 (quoting State Dep't of Revenue v. Thiewes, 448 NW.2d 1, 2 (S.D. 1989)). (304.) Jerauld County v. Huron Reg'1 Med. Ctr., Inc., 2004 SD 89, [paragraph] 9, 685 NW.2d 140, 142 (quoting Thiewes, 448 NW.2d at (305.) Id. (306.) See Bauerline v. Equity Residential Props. Mgmt. Corp., No. ......