Jerelds v. City of Orlando

• Decision Date: 27 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 6:98CV876-ORL31 JGG.,6:98CV876-ORL31 JGG.
• Citation: 194 F.Supp.2d 1305
• Parties: Roy JERELDS, James H. Hill, and Reginald Pride, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF ORLANDO, a municipal corporation, and Donald Harkins, individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

194 F.Supp.2d 1305

Roy JERELDS, James H. Hill, and Reginald Pride, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF ORLANDO, a municipal corporation, and Donald Harkins, individually, Defendants.

No. 6:98CV876-ORL31 JGG.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division.

March 27, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jacob A. Rose, The Rose Law Firm, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, Don Stephens, Bernard A. Lebedeker, Olds & Stephens, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, Larry H. Colleton, P.A., Richard Burton Bush, Bush, Brooks & Augspurger, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Thomas C. Garwood, Jr.,Lori R. Benton, Daniel P. O'Gorman, Ford & Harrison LLP, Orlando, FL, Arthur Randell Brown, Jr., Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, Orlando, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

PRESNELL, District Judge.

This cause came on for consideration on the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of the Magistrate Judge (Doc. 289), the Plaintiffs' objections thereto (Docs. 290 & 294), and the Defendant's response to those objections (Doc. 299). The Court has reviewed these documents and the accompanying memoranda and affidavits de novo, reviewed the transcripts of the hearings held before the Magistrate Judge, heard testimony of the parties and their attorneys at the evidentiary hearing held on October 17, 2001, reviewed the written arguments of counsel following the evidentiary hearing, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case have been fully detailed in the "Factual Background" section of the R & R (Doc. 289) that is the subject of this Order and the Court's previous orders (Docs. 240 & 244). However, for purposes of this Order, some discussion of those facts, as well as the additional facts adduced at the evidentiary hearing, is necessary.

Plaintiffs Jerelds, Hill, and Pride worked for the City of Orlando ("City") as firefighters. In order to be promoted to lieutenant, district chief, or assistant chief, candidates must pass an examination. All who pass the examination are placed on the eligibility list and the fire chief selects the person whom he believes is the best candidate for the position from the eligibility list. These selections are subject to administrative review.

In 1995, both Hill and Pride passed the examination for promotion to district chief. Therefore, they were placed on the eligibility list with twenty-six other candidates. In 1996, Chief Harkins promoted three Caucasian candidates from the list. The Civil Service Board approved Harkin's recommendations for promotion to district chief without opposition or challenge.¹

Also in 1995, Jerelds took the examination for assistant chief, which he failed. Jerelds filed an appeal with the Civil Service Board challenging his failure of the examination. A hearing was held and the Board rejected Jerelds' challenge and request to be placed on the assistant chief eligibility list. Subsequently, Jerelds filed a charge with the EEOC claiming racial discrimination. On June 17, 1997, the EEOC issued a Letter of Determination finding that there was reasonable cause to believe that "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was violated and that the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated blacks were victims of discrimination as well."

Prior to the 1998 district chief examination, Chief Harkins strongly encouraged all candidates on the 1995 district chief eligibility list to take the 1998 examination, promising to give them additional consideration.² Neither Hill nor Pride took the 1998 examination. Nevertheless, Hill and Pride remained on the merged district chief eligibility list along with eighteen other candidates. Although Chief Harkins recommended two Caucasian candidates for promotion in 1998, neither Hill nor Pride sought administrative review of the 1998 promotions.

On July 20, 1998, Plaintiffs Jerelds, Hill, and Pride filed a class action complaint against the City of Orlando under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based upon a theory of disparate impact claiming that Harkin's requirement of a paramedic certification and a four-year degree, when combined, had a disparate impact on the black promotional candidates for the district chief and assistant chief positions.³ Plaintiffs also filed individual claims against the City alleging violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and § 1981 based upon a theory of disparate treatment. Additionally, Jerelds claimed racial discrimination in the grading of the 1995 assistant chief examination that he had failed.

In June 1999, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a retaliation claim on behalf of Jerelds and to add Chief Harkins as a defendant to the § 1981 and § 1983 claims. Defendants moved for dismissal on the grounds that Chief Harkins was entitled to qualified immunity. On August 19, 1999, Plaintiffs amended their complaint a second time to add a claim based on a new legal theory of Title VII disparate impact. Defendants again moved for dismissal, or in the alternative, partial summary judgment asserting that Chief Harkins was entitled to qualified immunity.⁴ In April 2000, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. In August 2000, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on all of Plaintiffs' claims.⁵

Subsequently, Defendants moved for Attorney's Fees and Costs (Doc. 250), and Plaintiffs filed their Opposition (Doc. 260). On November 16, 2000, the Magistrate Judge heard arguments on Defendants' Motion (Doc. 265). The Magistrate Judge directed Defendants to file a proposed order. Plaintiffs objected to the proposed order filed by the Defendants and to the hours billed, but did not provide a reason for their objection, as required (Docs. 280 & 282).

Thereafter, the Magistrate Judge filed a well-reasoned and extremely thorough R & R granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion for fees (Doc. 289). In the R & R, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiffs and their counsel had taken "a simple case and artificially inflated it into a class action and multi-count complaint without any basis in law or fact." (Id. at 1). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended that both Plaintiffs and their counsel be liable for over $200,000.00 in fees and costs incurred by the City. Plaintiffs and their counsel filed objections with accompanying memoranda and affidavits. (Docs. 290, 291, 294, 295, & 296). Defendants filed their Response and accompanying affidavits. (Docs. 299, 304, 305, & 307). On October 17, 2001, this Court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter in which it heard oral argument and testimony of the Plaintiffs and their attorneys. (Doc. 314). Following the hearing, the parties submitted additional briefs. (Docs. 311, 313, 315, & 316).

At the evidentiary hearing, the Court heard the following evidence. Attorney Don Stephens testified that when the City Attorney from Riviera Beach contacted him about the Plaintiffs' claims, Stephens advised the Plaintiffs to contact Attorney Jacob Rose who practiced in federal court and also handled civil rights claims. Stephens, along with Rose, the City Attorney for Riviera Beach, and Attorney Bernard Lebedeker met with the Plaintiffs and fourteen other African-American firefighters in December 1996 to hear the firefighters' complaints and decide whether to take the case. However, counsel did not take the Plaintiffs' case immediately. Rather, they met with the three Plaintiffs and a potential fourth plaintiff, whose case the attorneys refused to take, and explained to them the process and necessary expenditures to prosecute the case. It was only at this point that the attorneys decided to take the Plaintiffs' case.

The attorneys decided to wait on the receipt of the EEOC determination letter before they filed suit. The reason they waited was because Stephens knew how difficult it was to get a reasonable cause letter and that without one it was difficult to prove race discrimination. Stephens indicated that only 2.2% of all EEOC claims result in a finding of reasonable cause.

Stephens admitted to writing a letter to the City in September 1997 threatening a boycott unless the City agreed to the Plaintiffs' non-negotiable demands. He claimed that the use of the threatening language was at the insistence of one of the Plaintiffs. Stephens also admitted that, in hindsight, he never should have sent that letter. He indicated that the letter was sent to the City because the EEOC investigator stated that the City was being uncooperative. Stephens contacted the City after the letter was sent to try and resolve the matter, but his efforts were unsuccessful.

After receiving the EEOC determination letter, an extensive research memorandum was prepared and reviewed with the Plaintiffs prior to filing suit. However, the attorneys abstained from filing suit until they received the right to sue letter from the EEOC. The attorneys also contacted Mr. Spriggs, an attorney in Tallahassee, Florida, who specializes in class action cases. Once the suit was filed, the attorneys required Plaintiffs to pay for costs including the cost to copy the City's records, which was approximately $7,000.00. The attorneys indicated that they did this because the attorneys wanted the Plaintiffs to have a stake in the litigation. Also, the Plaintiffs paid for the costs of examining all of the raw data provided in discovery by the Defendants, which totaled approximately $5,000.00.

The attorneys testified that they divided the work between themselves and that they and a paralegal poured over the thousands of documents received in discovery. Additionally, the attorneys also consulted with Dr. Brandon, an expert on disparate impact. Although Dr. Brandon was not used because there were not enough persons for a proper statistical analysis, Dr. Brandon determined that because the City had promoted no African-Americans, then the Plaintiffs met the EEOC's required 4/5's rule. Finally, counsel thought that the testimony of the...