Jerme. D. Deas v. Diaz

• Decision Date: 22 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 31143.,31143.
• Citation: 998 A.2d 200,121 Conn.App. 826
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Jermaine D. DEASv.Enrique C. DIAZ et al.

121 Conn.App. 826

998 A.2d 200

Jermaine D. DEASv.Enrique C. DIAZ et al.

No. 31143.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 8, 2010.

Decided June 22, 2010.

Kevin W. Smith, for the appellant (defendant Transportation General, Inc.).

John W. Mills, New Haven, for the appellee (plaintiff).

FLYNN, C.J., and ALVORD and FRANCIS X. HENNESSY, Js.^*

FLYNN, C.J.

The defendant Transportation General, Inc., doing business as Metro Taxi (Metro),¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motions for remittitur and to set aside the jury verdict, which had been rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Jermaine D. Deas. On appeal, Metro claims that the court improperly denied (1) its motions for remittitur or to set aside the verdict when the jury verdict was excessive and (2) its motion to set aside the verdict when (a) the court made an incorrect evidentiary ruling and (b) the jury failed to follow the court's instructions with respect to a release signed by the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which are not in dispute, are relevant to our resolution of Metro's claims on appeal. The plaintiff worked as an independent contractor driving a taxi owned by Metro. On the morning of September 30, 2006, the plaintiff was driving west on Boston Post Road in West Haven, when his taxi was struck on the passenger's side by a vehicle driven by Enrique C. Diaz which also had been traveling in a westerly direction in an adjacent lane.² A large white van had been backing up in Diaz' lane, and, when Diaz swerved his vehicle to avoid the van, his vehicle hit the plaintiff's taxi. The van sped away, and its operator has not been located. The plaintiff brought an action against Diaz, Valdermar Hernandez, the owner of the vehicle driven by Diaz, and Metro. Diaz and Hernandez were defaulted for failure to appear. The plaintiff brought an uninsured motorists claim against Metro because the owner of the van could not be located. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding Diaz and Hernandez 20 percent negligent and Metro, on the basis of the uninsured motorists claim, 80 percent negligent. The jury awarded the plaintiff $25,500 for noneconomic damages and $19,116.50 for economic damages, which consisted of $4116.50 for medical bills and $15,000 for future medical expenses. Metro was awarded $1000 on its counterclaim against the plaintiff for money owed by the plaintiff on his taxi lease. Metro then filed motions for remittitur and to set aside the verdict, which the court denied. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

On appeal, Metro claims that the court improperly denied its motions for remittitur or to set aside the verdict on the ground that the verdict was excessive. Specifically, Metro argues: “There is no question that the plaintiff incurred $4,116.50 in medical bills regarding this accident.... The issue is whether the remaining $15,000 of the judgment for future economic damages is excessive.” (Citation omitted.) It also challenges the award of $25,500 for noneconomic damages. The plaintiff argues that there was evidence to support the jury's award, and, accordingly, the court properly denied the motions. We agree with the plaintiff.

We are mindful of two provisions in our General Statutes that directly relate to our analysis of Metro's claim, neither of which were cited by the parties. First, General Statutes § 52-216a provides in relevant part: “If the court at the conclusion of the trial concludes that the verdict is excessive as a matter of law, it shall order a remittitur and, upon failure of the party so ordered to remit the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial....” ³ Second, General Statutes § 52-228b provides in relevant part: “No verdict in any civil action involving a claim for money damages may be set aside except on written motion by a party to the action, stating the reasons relied upon in its support, filed and heard after notice to the adverse party according to the rules of the court. No such verdict may be set aside solely on the ground that the damages are excessive unless the prevailing party has been given an opportunity to have the amount of the judgment decreased by so much thereof as the court deems excessive....” On the basis of these statutes, if we determine that the court properly denied the motion for remittitur claiming an excessive jury verdict, the claim that it also improperly denied the motion to set aside the verdict on the basis of an excessive jury verdict would be moot. Pursuant to § 52-228b, the court may not set aside a verdict solely on the ground that damages were excessive unless it first has ordered a remittitur that the prevailing party has declined to accept.

We now move on to our standard of review regarding the court's denial of Metro's motion for remittitur. Metro argues that our standard of review is plenary. The plaintiff argues that our standard of review is abuse of discretion. Both parties cite to decisions of our Supreme Court to support their respective positions. After reviewing relevant case law, we concede that the standard is not straightforward. See generally Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, 117 Conn.App. 821, 829, 982 A.2d 178 ( Beach, J., concurring, and “writ[ing] separately to discuss the standard of review used in appeals from decisions granting or denying motions to set aside verdicts that are claimed to be excessive”), cert. granted, 294 Conn. 922, 984 A.2d 1083 (2009).

In Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg., Inc., 284 Conn. 645, 661-62, 935 A.2d 1004 (2007), a case relied on by the plaintiff, our Supreme Court, quoting other of its decisions, explained the standard of review as follows: “First, the amount of an award [of damages] is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of facts.... Second, the court should not interfere with the jury's determination except when the verdict is plainly excessive or exorbitant.... The ultimate test which must be applied to the verdict by the trial court is whether the jury's award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury [was] influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.... Third, the ruling of the trial court on the motion to set aside the verdict as excessive is entitled to great weight and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness.... The court's broad power to order a remittitur should be exercised only when it is manifest that the jury [has] included items of damage which are contrary to law, not supported by proof, or contrary to the court's explicit and unchallenged instructions.... The relevant inquiry is whether the verdict falls within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation or whether it so shocks the conscience as to compel the conclusion that it was due to partiality, prejudice or mistake.... Furthermore, [t]he decision whether to reduce a jury verdict because it is excessive as a matter of law [within the meaning of § 52-216a] rests solely within the discretion of the trial court....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Black v. Goodwin, Loomis & Britton, Inc., 239 Conn. 144, 167, 681 A.2d 293 (1996) (“[t]he decision whether to reduce a jury verdict because it is excessive as a matter of law rests solely within the discretion of the trial court, pursuant to ... § 52-216a” [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Although the court in Mahon and Black specifically stated that pursuant to § 52-216a, “[t]he decision whether to reduce a jury verdict because it is excessive as a matter of law ... rests solely within the discretion of the trial court”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg., Inc., supra, 284 Conn. at 662, 935 A.2d 1004; Black v. Goodwin, Loomis & Britton, Inc., supra, 239 Conn. at 167, 681 A.2d 293; it is not clear how a trial judge who concludes that a verdict that is “excessive as a matter of law” could have discretion on whether to reduce the verdict after making such a conclusion, especially when § 52-216a clearly directs that the court “shall order a remittitur” if it concludes that the verdict is excessive as a matter of law.

In Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 357-58, 407 A.2d 982 (1978), a case relied on by Metro, our Supreme Court, quoting other of its cases, stated: “The amount of the award is a matter within the province of the trier of the facts.... Then too, denial by the trial court of a motion to set aside a verdict claimed to be excessive is entitled to weighty consideration.... It is with these principles in mind that this court must examine the defendant's claim that the amount of the verdict is exorbitant and unjust in the light of all the evidence. Such a claim raises a question of law. The issue here is not whether this court would have awarded more or less. It is whether the total amount of the verdict falls within the necessarily flexible limits of fair and reasonable compensation or is so large as to offend the sense of justice and compel a conclusion that the jury [was] influenced by partiality, prejudice or mistake.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

In Shegog v. Zabrecky, 36 Conn.App. 737, 744, 654 A.2d 771, cert. denied, 232 Conn. 922, 656 A.2d 670 (1995), this court, citing the Vandersluis case, held: “The defendants' claim that the amount of the verdict is excessive ... raises a question of law and not of fact, and, therefore, the trial court's denial of the motion for remittitur is subject to our plenary review.”

In Presidential Capital Corp. v. Reale, 231 Conn. 500, 510, 652 A.2d 489 (1994), our Supreme Court stated: “We review the remittitur issue in the context of the state constitutional right to trial by jury, which includes...