Jerome v. Water Sports Adventure Rentals & Equip., Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 April 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2009-092
• Parties: DENISE M. JEROME, Plaintiff, v. WATER SPORTS ADVENTURE RENTALS AND EQUIPMENT, INC., d/b/a/ ISLAND FLIGHT ADVENTURES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

DENISE M. JEROME, Plaintiff,

v.WATER SPORTS ADVENTURE RENTALS AND EQUIPMENT, INC.,d/b/a/ ISLAND FLIGHT ADVENTURES, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2009-092

DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. CROIX

Date: April 12, 2013

Attorneys:

A. Jeffrey Weiss, Esq.,

St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.

For the Plaintiff

Robert L. King, Esq.,

St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.

For the Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lewis, District Judge

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" (Dkt. No. 175) filed by Defendant Watersports Adventure Rentals and Equipment, Inc., doing business as Island Flight Adventures ("IFA"), seeking to limit its liability in this personal injury action pursuant to the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. Because there are factual disputes that preclude the resolution of the limitation issue on the existing record, the Court will deny IFA's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

By Complaint filed on November 10, 2009, Plaintiff Denise Jerome initiated the instant action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained during a jet ski andsnorkeling tour provided by IFA in the waters off of Christiansted, St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands on March 12, 2009. (Dkt. No. 1).¹ Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 15, 2010, claiming that IFA is liable for her injuries under theories of negligence and gross negligence because a jet ski operated by one of IFA's employees, Michael Mahon, struck her in the head while she was swimming back to the jet ski following the snorkeling portion of the tour. (Dkt. No. 7). IFA filed an Answer on March 29, 2010 and an Amended Answer on April 7, 2010 (Dkt. Nos. 10, 11). Discovery was conducted thereafter.

After the close of discovery, IFA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that: (1) Plaintiff's negligence claim is barred by a release of liability she executed before participating on the tour; and (2) the evidence does not establish gross negligence as a matter of law. (Dkt. No. 104). Plaintiff opposed the Motion. While most of the facts were not disputed, the parties presented conflicting evidence regarding the cause of the accident and whether Mr. Mahon was operating the jet ski under power when it struck Plaintiff. By Memorandum Opinion dated February 26, 2013 (Dkt. No. 214), the Court granted in part and denied in part IFA's Motion. Specifically, the Court found that the release was enforceable and barred Plaintiff's negligence claim, but declined to enter summary judgment on Plaintiff's gross negligence claim after concluding that a rational trier of fact viewing the disputed facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff could find that the accident was the result of gross negligence. (Id. at 19).

On October 29, 2012, IFA filed the instant "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" (Dkt. No. 175) seeking to limit its liability pursuant to the Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act, 46U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512. In support of the Motion, IFA filed a "Statement of Undisputed Facts" (Dkt. No. 176), a Memorandum (Dkt. No. 177), and supporting exhibits (Dkt. Nos. 176-1-176-7, 177-1-177-7).² After requesting and receiving three extensions of time to respond (see Dkt. Nos. 179, 181, 186), on January 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion (Dkt. No. 184), "Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts" (Dkt. No. 183), and supporting exhibits (Dkt. Nos. 183-1-183-12). In her filings, Plaintiff contends that IFA's Motion is untimely and lacks merit. After requesting and receiving two extensions of time to respond (see Dkt. Nos. 186, 191), IFA filed a Reply on February 4, 2013 (Dkt. No. 195). The matter is now ripe for consideration.

II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512 (formerly 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 181-189) (the "Limitation Act"), is "a statute that has been part of the fabric of our laws since 1851," and "operates to shield from liability shipowners charged with wrongdoing committed without their privity or knowledge." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 517 (2008). As the Supreme Court has explained, "Congress passed the Limitation Act in 1851 'to encourage ship-building and to induce capitalists to invest money in this branch of industry.'" Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 446 (2001) (quoting Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104, 121 (1872)). The Limitation Act "also had the purpose of 'putting American shipping upon an equality with that of other maritime nations' that had their own limitation acts." Id. at 446-47 (quoting The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 128 (1894)).³

To achieve these aims, the Limitation Act "limits the owner of a vessel's liability for, among other things, 'any loss, damage, or injury by collision . . . done, occasioned, or incurred without the privity or knowledge of the owner,' to 'the value of the vessel and pending freight.'" In re City of New York, 522 F.3d 279, 283 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30505(b)); see also Lewis, 531 U.S. at 446 ("The [Limitation] Act allows a vessel owner to limit liability for damage or injury, occasioned without the owner's privity or knowledge, to the value of the vessel or the owner's interest in the vessel."); Gorman v. Cerasia, 2 F.3d 519, 522 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The [Limitation] Act provides that the liability of a shipowner for any damage arising from a maritime accident which occurs 'without the privity or knowledge of such owner' shall not exceed the value of the vessel and its freight.") (quoting prior codification at 46 U.S.C. App. § 183(a)).⁴ Thus, "[i]nstead of being vicariously liable for the full extent of any injuries causedby the negligence of the captain or crew employed to operate the ship, the owner's liability is limited to the value of the ship unless the owner himself had 'privity or knowledge' of the negligent acts." In re City of New York, 522 F.3d at 283 (citations omitted).

When the Limitation Act is invoked, courts focus on whether the shipowner was "without the privity or knowledge" of the act or condition that caused the injury. See 46 U.S.C. § 30505(b); Carr v. PMS Fishing Corp., 191 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999). As the Second Circuit has noted, privity or knowledge "'can be actual or constructive. Either way, the term usually implies some degree of culpable participation or neglected duty on the shipowner's part; that, for example, it committed a negligent act . . . or through the exercise of reasonable diligence could have prevented the commission of the act . . . .'" Otal Invs. Ltd. v. M/V Clary, 673 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Carr, 191 F.3d at 4); see also Tittle v. Aldacosta, 544 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) ("In the typical situation of a corporate owned ocean vessel the privity and knowledge scrutiny focuses in on whether the shore-based high-level management is aware (or should have been) of the likelihood of the occurrence happening after the ship is underweigh.") (citations omitted). A "captain's negligence or navigational errors," however, are "not within the owner's knowledge or privity if the vessel's owner has selected a competent captain." Otal, 673 F.3d at115 (emphasis added, citation omitted). The shipowner bears the burden of demonstrating the lack of privity and knowledge necessary to qualify for the Limitation Act's protections. Carr, 191 F.3d at 4; Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 948 n.14 (3d Cir. 1985)).

III. DISCUSSION

In her Opposition, Plaintiff contends that IFA's Motion is procedurally barred and lacks merit for several reasons. The Court will address each argument in turn before describing the procedures that will govern the ultimate resolution of this issue.

A. Procedural Arguments

1. Dispositive Motions Deadline

Plaintiff argues that IFA's "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" should be stricken because it was filed in contravention of the Court's Scheduling Order (Dkt. No. 75), which set March 30, 2012 as the deadline for filing dispositive motions in this case. (Dkt. No. 184 at 2-5). In particular, Plaintiff notes that IFA filed the instant Motion on October 29, 2012, seven months after the deadline for dispositive motions had passed and over nine months after IFA filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 104). Because IFA failed to file a motion requesting leave to file the instant Motion and demonstrating excusable neglect pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B), Plaintiff asserts that the Court should strike the Motion. (Dkt. No. 184 at 2-5).⁵

IFA claims that the Motion is timely and its filing did not violate the Court's dispositive motions deadline. Specifically, IFA argues that the Motion is not dispositive because if granted, it would not extinguish or terminate any claim set forth in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 195 at 2). IFA also contends that the Motion "is in the nature of a motion in limine," which is "styled" as a motion for partial summary judgment because it is supported by affidavit. (Id. at 1-2). IFA advanced this argument in its Reply filed on February 4, 2013, over a month before the March 8, 2013 motion in limine deadline established by the Court's Trial Management Order (Dkt. No. 209).

The Court agrees that IFA's Motion advances arguments which may properly be raised in a motion in limine, and thus was not filed in contravention of the Court's Scheduling Order (Dkt. No. 75). As the Third Circuit has explained, "it is the relief desired, not the title of the motion, that dictates how this Court should view a particular filing." Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Eun Hee Choi v. Kim, 258 F. App'x 413, 415 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007). Moreover, in differentiating between the two types of motions, the Third Circuit has stated that "[u]nlike a summary judgment motion, which is designed to eliminate a trial in cases where there are no...