Jerry & Golda Wash. v. Countrywide Home Loans Inc.
Citation | 655 F.3d 869 |
Decision Date | 27 October 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 10–1340.,10–1340. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Parties | Jerry & Golda WASHINGTON, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., Defendant–Appellee. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Kip D. Richards, argued, R. Frederick Walters, J. Michael Vaughan, David M. Skeens, Garrett M. Hodes, on the brief, Kansas City, MO, for appellants.Thomas M. Hefferon, argued, Washington, DC, Mark A. Olthoff, R. Lawrence Ward, Kansas City, MO, Joseph F. Yenouskas, Eric I. Goldberg, Washington, DC, on the brief, for appellee.Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BENTON and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Jerry W. and Golda M. Washington sued Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA), Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 408.231–.241. The Washingtons alleged, for a putative class, that Countrywide charged them unauthorized interest and fees in violation of section 408.233.1 of the MSMLA. The case was removed from state court on diversity grounds based on the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). The district court granted summary judgment for Countrywide. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court reverses and remands.
In April 2005, the Washingtons applied for a second mortgage loan from Countrywide. The principal amount of the loan was $23,000, payable over 15 years at 12 percent interest. Before closing, Countrywide sent the Washingtons a Settlement Statement on a form, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Settlement Statement (HUD–1). The HUD–1 statement notified them of four additional charges in connection with the loan: (1) $690 loan discount, (2) $100 settlement/closing fee, (3) $60 document processing/delivery fee, and (4) $37.80 in prepaid interest. These fees were included in the $23,000 principal. The Washingtons signed the HUD–1.
The Washingtons signed the loan agreement on April 21. Within the next five days, a Countrywide audit determined that the $690 loan discount and the $100 settlement/closing fee should not have been assessed. Countrywide wired Servicelink (the title company) $790, which was paid to the Washingtons as part of their disbursement. Servicelink revised the HUD–1 statement to reflect the payment, removing $790, the amount of the loan discount and the settlement/closing fee. The Washingtons were not told of the final HUD–1 statement and never asked to sign it. Interest on the loan began accruing April 26 and the first disbursement of the loan proceeds, including the extra $790, was made on April 28.
On appeal, the Washingtons allege that Countrywide violated the MSMLA by charging them all four amounts listed above. This court filed an opinion, 647 F.3d 850, which is now vacated.
This court first considers the $690 loan discount and $100 settlement/closing fee. The district court did not decide whether these two charges violated the MSMLA, holding that because these amounts were paid to the Washingtons in the first disbursement, they suffered no loss and thus lacked standing. This court reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment, viewing all evidence most favorably to, and making all reasonable inferences for, the non-moving party. Country Life Ins. Co. v. Marks, 592 F.3d 896, 898 (8th Cir.2010).
To recover actual damages for a violation of the MSMLA, a person must suffer “any loss of money or property” as a result of a violation. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 408.562. The facts in this case are undisputed. Countrywide charged the Washingtons $790 for the loan discount and settlement/closing fee, which was financed as part of the principal of the loan. Although the Washingtons received the $790 as part of the loan disbursement, Countrywide did not reduce the principal by $790. Countrywide argues, and the district court agreed, that because the $790 was disbursed to the Washingtons, they suffered no loss.
Countrywide's disbursement of the $790, however, did not make the Washingtons whole. During the two days between April 26 (the date interest began) and April 28 (the date the Washingtons received the first disbursement, including the $790), the Washingtons paid 12 percent interest but were not able to use the $790—which constitutes “any loss of money.” 1 See Fielder v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 19 F.Supp.2d 966, 982 (W.D.Mo.1998), vacated in part on other grounds, 188 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir.1999) ( ). The Washingtons have raised a material issue of fact as to whether they suffered “any” loss.
Countrywide further objects that the Washingtons cannot establish causation that any loss was “as a result” of the alleged MSMLA violations. Countrywide asserts that because the Washingtons received the $790, they must present evidence that they would have changed the terms or amount of the loan if they had received notice of the extra $790. Because interest accrued for the two days before the Washingtons received the $790 as a result of the alleged MSMLA violations, the Washingtons have raised a material issue of fact as to whether the alleged violations caused their loss.2
On appeal, the Washingtons request that summary judgment be entered for them on the $690 loan discount and the $100 settlement/closing fee. The district court entered summary judgment for Countrywide based on the Washingtons' lack of statutory standing. Neither party moved for summary judgment on, and the district court did not consider, whether the loan discount and settlement/closing fees violated the MSMLA. This court cannot decide whether the $690 loan discount and the $100 settlement/closing fee violated the MSMLA. See Williams v. City of St. Louis, 783 F.2d 114, 116 (8th Cir.1986) ( ); Global Petromarine v. G.T. Sales & Mfg., Inc., 577 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir.2009) (); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Clark, 562 F.3d 943, 947 (8th Cir.2009) ( ); Missouri Coalition for Env't Found. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 542 F.3d 1204, 1212–13 (8th Cir.2008) ( ).
As for the $60 document processing/delivery fee, the district court held that it was an authorized closing cost under § 408.33.1(3) of the MSMLA. Missouri regulates the fees lenders may charge in connection with a second mortgage loan. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 408.233. In exchange for allowing lenders to offer interest rates that exceed the statutory usury rate, the MSMLA limits the closing costs and fees that lenders may charge. See Thomas v. U.S. Bank N.A. ND, 575 F.3d 794, 796 n. 1 (8th Cir.2009) (); see also U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. v. Brents, 676 S.W.2d 839, 841 (Mo.App.1984) ( ). Specifically, § 408.233.1(3) authorizes “[b]ona fide closing costs paid to third parties, which shall include ... (b) Fees for preparation of a deed, settlement statement, or other documents.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 408.233.1(3) (emphasis added).
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in Mitchell v. Residential Funding Corp., addressed and rejected Countrywide's arguments here. 334 S.W.3d at 499 (2010) ( ). In a diversity case, the law declared by the state's highest court is binding. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) (). The Missouri Supreme Court allowed the Mitchell opinion to stand as authority by denying transfer of the case from the court of appeals. The Mitchell case is, thus, the best evidence of Missouri law. “Decisions from Missouri's intermediate appellate court (the Missouri Court of Appeals) ... must be followed when they are the best evidence of Missouri law.” Bockelman v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 403 F.3d 528, 531 (8th Cir.2005); see also Eubank v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 626 F.3d 424, 427 (8th Cir.2010) () ; Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. National Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 621 F.3d 697, 707 (8th Cir.2010) (same); United Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 328 F.3d 411, 413 (8th Cir.2003) (same). See generally Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 230, 238, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) ( ).
This court follows the Mitchell decision to resolve whether the $60 document processing/delivery fee was an authorized...
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