Jersey Sec. Co. v. Lottimer

• Citation: 28 A.2d 623,20 N.J.Misc. 432
• Decision Date: 15 October 1942
• Docket Number: No. 86199.,86199.
• Parties: JERSEY SECURITY CO. v. LOTTIMER et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

28 A.2d 623

20 N.J.Misc. 432

JERSEY SECURITY CO.

v. LOTTIMER et al.

No. 86199.

District Court of New Jersey, First District, Hudson County.

Oct. 15, 1942.

Replevin suit by the Jersey Security Company against Eleanor Lottimer, also known as Eleanor Day, and the Goodman Warehouse Corporation, to regain possession of certain furniture sold to Eleanor Lottimer, also known as Eleanor Day, by the plaintiff and stored in the Goodman Warehouse Corporation's warehouse.

Judgment for plaintiff.

Archie Usdin, of Hoboken, for plaintiff.

Nathan L. Goodman, of Jersey City, for defendant Goodman Warehouse Corp.

COZZI, Judge.

The facts in this case are briefly stated. One, Eleanor Lottimer, also known as Eleanor Day, bought certain furniture under two conditional sales agreements, which agreements were unrecorded. This furniture was subsequently stored with the defendant warehouse. There was default in the payment of the furniture and the plaintiff instituted suit to regain possession of this furniture, and now the warehouseman resists the suit by reason of its unpaid warehouseman's lien. The defendant warehouseman claims that because the conditional sales agreements were unrecorded, its lien has priority over the rights of the conditional vendor. The conditional vendee does not contest this replevin suit.

The question in this case is simply whether or not the defendant warehouseman is a pledgee under the definition of the words "Purchase" and "Purchaser", as set forth in 46:32-2 of the Revised Statutes of 1937, N.J.S.A. 46:32-2. The defendant warehouseman contends that it is a pledgee and the plaintiff contends that it is not.

To further understand this question it would be best to cite the common-law rule that the ownership of the conditional vendor is paramount to the rights of third party claimants against its vendee. Commercial Credit Corporation v. Hild, 11 A.2d page 428, 18 N.J.Misc. 72, affirmed Commercial Credit Corporation v. Colando, 125 N.J.L. 285, 15 A.2d page 762, and cases cited therein. At common law it was not necessary to record a conditional sales agreement.

In order that the defendant can prevail, it is necessary that it qualifies as a pledgee within the purview of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Revised Statutes 46:32-2, N.J.S.A. 46:32-2.

In 49 Corpus Juris page 900, Section 13, it is stated: "The necessary elements of a pledge are (1) A Pledgor and a Pledgee, (2) A debt or obligation, (3) A contract of pledge."

And on page 904, Section 24, as follows: "In order to constitute a pledge of personal property, there must be a contract whereby the property is to be held as security. * * * But whether express or implied, the intention of the parties that the property is to be held as a pledge must clearly appear, and accordingly...