Jeske v. Maxim Healthcare Servs. Inc

• Decision Date: 10 January 2012
• Docket Number: Doc. 9.,CASE NO. CV F 11-1838 LJO JLT
• Parties: JENNIFER JESKE, Plaintiff, v. MAXIM HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

JENNIFER JESKE, Plaintiff,

v.MAXIM HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. CV F 11-1838 LJO JLT

Doc. 9.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: January 10, 2012

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' F.R.Civ.P. 12 MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

Defendants Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. ("Maxim") and two of its supervisors seek to dismiss plaintiff Jennifer Jeske's ("Ms. Jeske's") wage and hour violation claims as inadequately pled and lacking necessary elements. Ms. Jeske counters that the claims alleged in her original complaint ("complaint") are pled adequately to defeat defendants' challenges. This Court considered defendants' F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the record and VACATES the January 13, 2012 hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons discussed above, this Court DISMISSES nearly all of Ms. Jeske's claims.

BACKGROUND¹

Maxim provides medical staffing as an independent contractor to clients, including Wasco State Prison ("Wasco"). Wasco, an inmate reception center, processes new inmates with its 400-bed, medium custody facility. During April 2010 to October 2010, Maxim employed Ms. Jeske as a non-exempt, certified nursing assistant who was staffed at Wasco. Ms. Jeske generally worked from 10:30 p.m. to 6:30 a.m. five days per week. Her duties included watching suicidal inmates and providing inmate care at the Wasco clinic. Defendant Alvin Tagayun ("Mr. Tagayun") was an account manager/supervisor of Ms. Jeske. Defendant Ashley Blankenship ("Ms. Blankenship") was an manager/supervisor of Ms. Jeske.²

On behalf of Ms. Jeske, the complaint alleges seven California wage and hour violation, fraud and wrongful termination claims.³ More specifically, the complaint alleges that defendants failed to provide Ms. Jeske proper meal and rest periods, failed to pay her timely premium wages, defrauded her into working for Maxim, and wrongfully terminated her in violation of public policy. On behalf of Ms. Jeske and other aggrieved Maxim employees, the complaint alleges 11 claims to pursue civil penalties pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), Cal. Lab. Code, §§ 2698, et al. More specifically, the complaint alleges that as to Ms. Jeske and other aggrieved employees, Maxim failed to provide accurate wage records, adequate seating and sanitary bathrooms, and to maintain adequate room temperatures.

The complaint seeks to recover unpaid wages, civil penalties, attorney fees, damages for Ms. Jeske's emotional distress, and punitive damages.

Defendants fault the complaint's failure to meet federal pleading standards and to establish that Mr. Tagayun and Ms. Blankenship are employers or corporate agents, officers or directors subject to the complaint's claims.

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Standards

The primary thrust of defendants' challenges to the complaint's claims is that they are conclusory and lack supporting facts.

"When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Graehling v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1995). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addressing dismissal, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a court is not required "to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations," U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643, n. 2 (9th Cir.1986), and must not "assume that the [plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897 (1983). A court need not permit an attempt to amend if "it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by an amendment." Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005).

A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, a court "will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action." Student Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, a complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court explained:

. . . a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.)

After discussing Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized: "In sum, for a complaint to survive [dismissal], the non-conclusory 'factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).

The U.S. Supreme Court applies a "two-prong approach" to address dismissal:

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . . . Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not "show[n]"-"that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950.

Moreover, a plaintiff suing multiple defendants "must allege the basis of his claim against each defendant to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires a short and plain statement of the claim to put defendants on sufficient notice of the allegations against them." Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F.Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1988). "Specific identification of the parties to the activities alleged by the plaintiffs is required in this action to enable the defendant to plead intelligently." Van Dyke Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.Supp. 277, 284 (D. Wis. 1975).

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to defendants' challenges to the complaint's claims.

Ms. Jeske's Unpaid Wages

The complaint's first claim alleges that Maxim failed to pay all of Ms. Jeske's earned wages in that she was not paid her meal and rest period wages, waiting time penalties, and other due compensation to violate California Labor Code section 204.⁴

Defendants argue that no private right of action exists under section 204 which provides for only civil penalties. Section 204(a) provides that wages "are due and payable twice during each calendar month, on days designated in advance by the employer as the regular paydays." Defendants argue that section 204 "does not provide any right to wages" in that it addresses wage payments "at certain intervals." See In re Moffet, 19 Cal.App.2d 7, 13, 64 P.2d 1190 (1937) ("sole purpose" of the statute "is to require an employer of labor who comes within its terms to maintain two regular pay days each month").

Defendants continue that ...