Jester v. Del. Dep't of Safety & Joshua Bushweller
| Decision Date | 29 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 14-1124-LPS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
| Parties | DEBORAH JESTER, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY and JOSHUA BUSHWELLER, Defendants. |
Michele D. Allen, Michele D. Allen LLC, Hockessin, Delaware Attorney for Plaintiff
Patricia Davis Oliva, Joseph C. Handlon, Deputy Attorneys General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware Attorneys for Defendant
September 29, 2015
Wilmington, Delaware
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Deborah Jester ("Plaintiff") filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2) alleging employment discrimination. Plaintiff filed her Original Complaint on September 3, 2014. (D.I. 1) ("Original Complaint") On August 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (D.I. 8) ("Amended Complaint")
Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (D.I. 9) Defendants seek to dismiss the Amended Complaint as untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) or, alternatively, for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part, and deny in part, Defendants' motion.
II. BACKGROUND1
The Amended Complaint (like the Original Complaint) alleges that Plaintiff was employed by the Division of State Police ("DSP"), an agency of Delaware's Department of Safety and Homeland Security ("DDSHS"), and that Joshua Bushweller (along with DDSHS, "Defendants") served as the Assistant Director of Human Resources for the DSP. (D.I. 8 ¶¶ 3-4, 7) According to the Amended Complaint, on April 5, 2011, Plaintiff was placed in the DSP Weight Control Program ("WCP"). (Id. ¶ 23) Plaintiff alleges that the DSP WCP requires officers to adhere to certain standards regarding body fat percentages and weight(See id. ¶¶ 12-14) Plaintiff further alleges she was unable to meet the standards required by the WCP. (See id. ¶¶ 25-45) Consequently, on May 18, 2013 Plaintiff was found to be in non-compliance with the WCP and on June 2, 2013 she was constructively discharged, i.e., she was "forced to submit her notice of retirement." (Id. ¶¶ 7, 47)
Plaintiff claims that her due process rights were violated when she was constructively terminated without an opportunity to challenge the basis for her termination. (Id. ¶¶ 54-61) Plaintiff further claims that the WCP has a disparate impact on female employees (id. ¶¶ 73-82) and that the WCP applies different standards to men and women officers (id. ¶¶ 86-96). Plaintiff is seeking compensatory damages, punitive damages, equitable relief, costs, and attorney's fees. (Id. at 16)
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
Evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires the Court to accept as true all material allegations of the complaint. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court may grant such a motion to dismiss only if, after "accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).'" Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The complaint must state enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [each] necessary element" of a plaintiff's claim. Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court is not obligated to accept as true "bald assertions," Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted), "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences," Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997), or allegations that are "self-evidently false," Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 69 (3d Cir. 1996).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed for lack of timeliness. (D.I. 9 at 1-2) The Court does not agree.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) provides that "[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course" within 21 days after service of a responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Here, Defendants have not provided written consent. The Court, however, will grant leave to amend.
The Third Circuit has held that courts should apply a liberal policy when deciding whether to allow a party to amend its pleadings. See Dole v. Arco Chemical Co., 921 F.2d 484, 468-87 (3d Cir. 1990); Mallinckrodt Inc. v. E-Z-Em Inc., 671 F. Supp. 3d 563, 567-68 (D. Del. 2009). "This approach ensures that a particular claim will be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities." Dole, 921 F.2d at 487; see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (). In the absence of "undue delay, bad faith . . . undue prejudice . . . [or] futility of amendment," leave to amend should be granted. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
Although Plaintiff failed to meet the deadline specified in Rule 15(a)(1) for amendment as of right, Plaintiff has provided an adequate and persuasive explanation for the delay. Specifically, Plaintiff's original attorney was suspended from practice and his suspension caused considerable confusion and delay. (See D.I. 11 at p. I)2 Under the circumstances, the delay in filing the Amended Complaint (although lengthy) was not undue. There is no evidence of bad faith, nor of unfair prejudice. Indeed, Defendants argue there are no substantial differences between the Amended Complaint and the Original Complaint (D.I. 9 at 2), making it difficult to understand how Defendants could be unduly prejudiced.
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's leave to file the Amended Complaint and deems the Amended Complaint to be filed. The Court now turns to Defendants' contention that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.3
Count I of the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Bushweller failed to provide Plaintiff with due process as required by the United States and Delaware Constitutions. (D.I. 8 ¶¶ 53-71)4 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Bushweller violated her due process rights by "[denying her] request to seek medical intervention by a divisional health care provider," refusing to provide a factual basis for her constructive termination, and failing to provide her with a pre-termination hearing before a neutral decision maker. (Id. ¶¶ 56-59) In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she was constructively terminated, that she exhausted her administrative remedies, or that Bushweller's actions violated her due process rights, and they further argue that Bushweller is protected by qualified immunity. (D.I. 9)
The Court has concluded that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Bushweller's actions violated her due process rights. Given this conclusion, the Court does not address the remaining deficiencies Defendants contend they find in the due process claim.
In order to state a claim under § 1983, "a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). At issue here is whether Bushweller violated Plaintiff's due process rights by effectuating her constructive termination. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997) (); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972).
In general, employee resignations are presumed to be voluntary. See Leheny v. City of Pittsburgh, 183 F.3d 220, 227 (3d Cir. 1999). However, this presumption can be rebutted if the employee "comes forward with sufficient evidence to establish that the resignation was involuntarily extracted." Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1995). In Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, the Third Circuit outlined the test courts should use to determine whether a retirement is involuntary:
a resignation will be deemed involuntary (i.e., deemed a constructive discharge) and will thus trigger the protections of the due process clause, and form the basis of a § 1983 due process claim, under only two circumstances: (1) when the employer forces the employee's resignation or retirement by coercion or duress, or (2) when the employer...
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