Jesus F. v. Saul
Decision Date | 16 December 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 1:18-cv-01072-DLP-TWP,1:18-cv-01072-DLP-TWP |
Parties | JESUS F., Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Jesus F.1 seeks judicial review of the denial by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") of his application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II and for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("the Act"). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 405(g). For the reasons set forth below, this Court hereby REVERSES the ALJ's decision denying the Plaintiff benefits and REMANDS this matter for further consideration.
On June 10, 2008, Jesus filed his initial application for Title II and Title XVI applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. [Dkt. 29 at 156-157 (R. 157-58).] On February 14, 2011, the Social Security Administration ("SSA") issued a preliminary determination that Jesus was not eligible for SSI benefits because of his monthly income of $1,200. [Dkt. 29 at 169 (R. 170).]
On March 1, 2011, Jesus filed a second application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits ("Second Application). [Dkt. 29 at 159-160 (R. 160-61).] On March 1, 2011, the SSA again issued a preliminary determination stating Jesus was not eligible for SSI benefits based on his monthly income of $1,200. [Dkt. 29 at 166 (R. 167).] On April 12, 2011, Jesus received a letter denying his application for Title II benefits because his physical impairments did not prevent him from working. [Dkt. 29-1 at 1-3 (R. 174-76).] Jesus did not request reconsideration of this decision.
On July 20, 2012, Jesus filed a third application for Title II disability insurance benefits and for Title XVI SSI benefits, collectively ("Third Application"). [Dkt. 29-1 at 4-13 (R. 177-186).] On September 27, 2012, the SSA denied Jesus's application for Title XVI SSI benefits based on income. [Dkt. 29-1 at 62 (R. 230).] On November 28, 2012, Jesus filed a request for reconsideration of his Third Application because he believed the SSA had incorrect information regarding his monthly income. [Dkt. 29-1 at 75 (R. 243).] On January 16, 2013, the SSA found that their initial decision denying Title XVI SSI benefits was correct. [Dkt. 29-1 at 82-84 (R. 250-52).] On March 8, 2013, Jesus filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. [Dkt. 29-1 at 94 (R. 262).] On July 11, 2013, Plaintiff's counsel submitted a letter to the SSA requesting to reopen Jesus's Second Application regarding his Title II application. [Dkt. 29-1 at 101-102 (R. 269-270).] On July 16, 2013, the SSA sent a letter to Jesus's counsel stating that he was medically denied for Title II benefits in his Third Application, and all subsequent Title II applications would be automatic technical denials based on res judicata. [Dkt. 29-1 at 135 (R. 303).] Moreover, the SSA concluded that "[a] new medical decision will never be made for Title II." [Id.]
On September 30, 2014, Jesus filed an application for Title II and Title XVI benefits with the SSA, and again requested reopening and consolidation of prior claims ("Fourth Application"). [Dkt. 29-1 at 142, 173 (R. 310, 336).]
On June 6, 2016, ALJ Albert J. Velasquez conducted a hearing, where Jesus testified. The ALJ determined that a supplemental hearing was necessary, where medical experts would be required to appear and testify. [Dkt. 29-11 at 50-51 (R. 1976-77).] The ALJ also gave Plaintiff's counsel an opportunity to provide a brief on why the ALJ should reopen and consolidate the previous cases, why no medical determination had been made previously, and the effect of Plaintiff's personal injury settlement. [Id.] On September 16, 2016, the ALJ conducted a supplemental hearing, where Jesus, vocational expert Dewey Franklin, and medical expert Dr. James Wargel testified.
On May 1, 2017, ALJ Velasquez issued a partially favorable decision finding that Jesus was disabled as of January 7, 2016 for purposes of SSI on his Fourth Application. [Dkt. 29 at 30 (R. 30).] The ALJ stated that he would not reopen Jesus's initial application for Title II and Title XVI benefits filed on May 30, 2008, nor would he reopen the Second Application requesting Title II benefits, filed on March 1, 2011. [Id.] In assessing Jesus's Title II claim in the Fourth Application, the ALJ found that Jesus was not disabled through the date last insured of December 31, 2010. [Id.] On February 6, 2018, the Appeals Council issued an order denying Plaintiff's Request for Review of the ALJ's decision. Jesus now requests judicial review of the Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
To prove disability, a claimant must show he is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To meet this definition, a claimant's impairments must be of such severity that he is not able to perform the work he previously engaged in and, based on his age, education, and work experience, he cannot engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The Social Security Administration ("SSA") has implemented these statutory standards by, in part, prescribing a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ must consider whether:
(1) the claimant is presently [un]employed; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant's impairment meets or equals any impairment listed in the regulations as being so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity; (4) the claimant's residual functional capacity leaves [him] unable to perform [his] past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is unable to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351-52 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). An affirmative answer to each step leads either to the next step or, at steps three and five, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 352. A negative answer at any point, other than step three, terminates the inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four. Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 352. If the first four steps are met, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Id. The Commissioner must then establish that the claimant—in light of his age, education, job experience and residual functional capacity to work—is capable of performing other work and that such work exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
The Court reviews the Commissioner's denial of benefits to determine whether it was supported by substantial evidence or is the result of an error of law. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). Evidence is substantial when it is sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the evidence supports the decision. Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2004). The standard demands more than a scintilla of evidentiary support but does not demand a preponderance of the evidence. Wood v. Thompson, 246 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, the issue before the Court is not whether Jesus is disabled, but, rather, whether the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence. Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995).
In this substantial-evidence determination, the Court must consider the entire administrative record but not "reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute our own judgment for that of the Commissioner." Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, the Court must conduct a critical review of the evidence before affirming the Commissioner's decision, and the decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate discussion of the issues, Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
When an ALJ denies benefits, he must build an "accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion," Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872, articulating a minimal, but legitimate, justification for his decision to accept or reject specific evidence of a disability. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2004). The ALJ need not address every piece of evidence in his decision, but he cannot ignore a line of evidence that undermines the conclusions he made, and he must trace the path of his reasoning and connect the evidence to his findings and conclusions. Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2012); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d at 872.
Jesus was 44 years old as of his date last insured in December 2010 and is 53 now. [Dkt. 29-1 at 20 (R. 189).] He obtained his General Educational Development ("GED") certification. [Dkt. 29-11 at 32-33 (R. 1958-959).] He has past relevant work history as a forklift driver, tree trimmer, roofer, construction laborer, and materials handler. [Dkt. 29 at 27 (R. 27).]
In determining whether Jesus qualified for benefits under the Act, the ALJ went through the five-step analysis required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). At step one, the ALJ found that Jesus was insured through December 31, 2010 and had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of disability. [Dkt. 29 at 22 (R. 22).] At step two, the ALJ found that Jesus had severe...
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