Jeter v. Cartledge

• Decision Date: 28 March 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 8:14-cv-04798-RBH
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: FREDERICK F. JETER, Petitioner, v. LARRY CARTLEDGE, Respondent.

FREDERICK F. JETER, Petitioner, v. LARRY CARTLEDGE, Respondent.

Civil Action No.: 8:14-cv-04798-RBH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

March 28, 2016

ORDER

Petitioner Frederick F. Jeter, an inmate with the South Carolina Department of Corrections proceeding pro se, brought this habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [ECF #1]. In his petition, he raises seventeen grounds for habeas relief. [ECF #1].

Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the Perry Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. [ECF #1]. Currently pending before this Court is Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF #36] and the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin. [ECF #50]. The Magistrate Judge recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of Respondent on all grounds. [ECF #50]. Petitioner responded to Respondent's motion on August 3, 2015. [ECF #46]. Petitioner also timely filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on March 7, 2016. [ECF #56].

Petitioner was indicted in October of 2008 for distribution of crack cocaine. [ECF #37, p. 1]. He proceeded to trial and was ultimately found guilty. [ECF #37, p. 2]. He was sentenced on June 3, 2009 to twenty-eight (28) years confinement. [ECF #37, p. 2]. Petitioner then appealed his conviction to the South Carolina Court of Appeals by way of an Anders brief. [ECF #37, p. 3].¹ The South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal in a per curiam opinion. [ECF #37, pp. 3-4]. Petitioner then filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). [ECF #37, p. 4]. The PCR court dismissed the PCR application with prejudice on December 27, 2012. [ECF #37-2]. Petitioner filed a pro se Motion to Alter or Amend, pursuant to Rule 59(e), however this motion was denied on February 8, 2013. [ECF #37, p. 12]. Petitioner then appealed the denial of his post-conviction relief by way of a Johnson petition for Writ of Certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court, but this petition was denied. [ECF #37, p. 14].² A more detailed procedural history and factual background is adequately set forth in the Report and Recommendation (the "R&R"). [ECF #50, pp. 2-16]. The Petitioner asserts seventeen grounds for relief, listed as follows as renumbered by the Magistrate Judge and quoted substantially verbatim:

Ground One: The trial judge erred in allowing in evidence of the unredacted audio recording of the phone call including the officer's comments referencing "crack."

Ground Two: The trial judge erred in admitting the drug evidence where the prosecution failed to establish, as far as practicable, a complete chain of custody.

Ground Three: The trial judge erred in not instructing Mr. Jeter of his Constitutional rights that he would give up by not testifying in his own behalf.

Ground Four: The trial judge improperly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt.

Ground Five: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Jack Westmoreland not being able to testify as state's witness, before and during trial.

Ground Six: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to allowing the jury to hearprejudice comment referencing "crack" prior and or during trial, when in fact the term "crack" was never mentioned in the recorded conversation.

Ground Seven: Appella[nt] argues and seek[s] answers to why a certain allegation was inadvertently left out and not ruled on in judge's order of dismissal.

Ground Eight: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to reasonable doubt instruction.

Ground Nine: Appella[nt] argues whether PCR judge Mark Hayes erred by not stating the findings of fact and conclusion of law to each and every allegation that the appella[nt] raise[d] at the PCR hearing.

Ground Ten: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and should have filed a motion for drug evidence to be excluded from the jury for lack of proper identification.

Ground Eleven: PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to raise all appella[nt's] issues at PCR hearing.

Ground Twelve: PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to "subpoena" all witnesses and documentation to the PCR hearing as requested and or motion for continuance.

Ground Thirteen: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to CI's testimony to challenge credibility and reliability to impeach CI prior to trial.

Ground Fourteen: Trial counsel was ineffective for lack of preparation time for second trial.

Ground Fifteen: Trial judge erred in allowing audio portion of tape recording to be played in it's entirety.

Ground Sixteen: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the altered video being played prior to trial.

Ground Seventeen: Trial judge erred in admitting the drug evidence where the prosecution failedto establish as far as practicable, a complete chain of custody.

As was previously addressed by the Magistrate Judge, Grounds One and Fifteen and Grounds Two and Seventeen raise essentially the same issues.³ Accordingly, in this Court's review of those Grounds, the Court will address those Grounds and related objections in the discussion section at the same time. Petitioner brought this action pro se, which requires this Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This matter is now before the Court for disposition.

Legal Standards of Review

I. Review of the Magistrate Judge's Report & Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which specific objection is made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The right to de novo review may be waived by the failure to file timely objections. Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). The district court is obligated to conduct a de novo review of every portion of the Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to aspecific error in the [M]agistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Id.⁴

II. Summary Judgment Review

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2010). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . .; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). When no genuine issue of any material fact exists, summary judgment is appropriate. See Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). The facts and inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. However, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

Respondent moves for summary judgment and seeks dismissal of Petitioner's § 2254 petition arguing Petitioner is unable to satisfy the legal standard for the requested habeas relief. Petitioner set forth seventeen grounds for relief in his § 2254 petition, including allegations related to an alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, a violation of his constitutional right to testify, andconfront witnesses, and several allegations regarding the admission of evidence during trial and procedural issues during trial [ECF #1, pp. 16-21]. The motion requesting summary judgment in favor of Respondent is based on the following general arguments: (1) several of Petitioner's claimed grounds are procedurally barred; (2) Petitioner's claimed grounds related to ineffective assistance of counsel do not meet the requisite standard; and (3) several of Petitioner's claimed grounds are not cognizable for federal habeas review.

III. Federal Habeas Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Therefore, in considering Petitioner's claims, the Court's review is limited by the deferential standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 618 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d 306, 312 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining federal habeas relief will not be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless it "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law," or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding"). As this Court will discuss...