Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona

Citation211 Ariz. 386,121 P.3d 1256
Decision Date27 October 2005
Docket NumberNo. 1 CA-CV 04-0048.,1 CA-CV 04-0048.
PartiesBelinda L. JETER, a married woman; William R. Jeter, a married man, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MAYO CLINIC ARIZONA d/b/a Mayo Clinic Scottsdale and/or Center for Reproductive Medicine, an Arizona corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Arizona

Levenbaum & Cohen by Geoffrey M. Trachtenberg, Phoenix, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. by Daniel J. McAuliffe, Barry D. Halpern, GinaMarie Slattery, Stephanie V. Hackett, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

KESSLER, Judge.

¶ 1 Belinda and William Jeter ("the Jeters") appeal from the dismissal of their lawsuit against the Mayo Clinic Arizona doing business as Mayo Clinic Scottsdale and/or the Center for Reproductive Medicine ("Mayo"). The Jeters sued Mayo for the alleged negligent destruction or loss of five of the Jeters' frozen human pre-implantation embryos or pre-embryos,1 which Mayo agreed to cryopreserve and store.

¶ 2 The superior court held the Jeters had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and dismissed their wrongful death claim because the pre-embryos were not "persons" under Arizona's wrongful death statutes, Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-611 to -613 (2003). It also held Arizona did not recognize the Jeters' claim for negligent loss of irreplaceable property. The court further rejected the Jeters' breach of fiduciary duty and breach of bailment contract claims as barred by Arizona's Medical Malpractice Act, A.R.S. §§ 12-561 to -594 (2003 & Supp.2004).

¶ 3 For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the superior court's dismissal of the wrongful death claim and hold that absent legislative action expanding the wrongful death statutes, as a matter of law, a cryopreserved, three-day old fertilized human egg is not a "person" for purposes of that statute. However, we reverse the dismissal of the other three claims and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Since the complaint was dismissed at the pleading stage for failure to state a claim, we review the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint as true. Shannon v. Butler Homes, 102 Ariz. 312, 315, 428 P.2d 990, 993 (1967) (court will accept as true only well-pleaded facts). However, we do not accept as true allegations consisting of conclusions of law, inferences or deductions that are not necessarily implied by well-pleaded facts, unreasonable inferences or unsupported conclusions from such facts, or legal conclusions alleged as facts. Id.; Dockery v. Central Ariz. Light and Power Co., 45 Ariz. 434, 439, 45 P.2d 656, 658 (1935) (only well-pleaded facts accepted as true, not inferences that are not necessarily implied by such facts); Kellogg v. Nebraska Dep't of Corr., 269 Neb. 40, 690 N.W.2d 574, 578 (2005) (court will ignore legal conclusions in form of factual allegations).

¶ 5 The Jeters went to Mayo for information on medical procedures that would assist them in conceiving a child. Mayo offered certain services for harvesting, storing and implanting pre-embryos, including in vitro fertilization. With the consent of the Jeters, Dr. Anita Singh at Mayo retrieved or harvested multiple eggs from Belinda Jeter, which were fertilized in vitro (outside Mrs. Jeter's womb) with William Jeter's sperm. The resulting zygotes were permitted to progress through several divisions in the laboratory over a period of forty-eight to seventy-two hours, developing from single-cell organisms to two- to eight-cell organisms. While the Jeters' complaint refers to these fertilized eggs as "viable embryos," such a characterization is a conclusion that is not necessarily implied from the well-pleaded facts. Pursuant to a written consent form, Mayo and the Jeters agreed to have Mayo cryopreserve and store the pre-embryos.2

¶ 6 Belinda Jeter underwent two unsuccessful non-surgical in vitro fertilization procedures at Mayo attempting to implant the pre-embryos into her womb. The Jeters then began looking at alternative procedures.

¶ 7 The Jeters decided to utilize the services of Dr. Jay Nemiro at the Arizona Center for Fertility Studies Ltd. ("Arizona Center"). Dr. Nemiro offered them an alternative procedure called a tubal embryo transfer. A tubal embryo transfer also requires initial egg retrieval and fertilization of the eggs in a laboratory. Unlike the procedures at Mayo, however, in a tubal embryo transfer the physician injects the pre-embryos into a woman's fallopian tube(s) during a laparoscopy, enabling them to reach the uterus via their biological route.

¶ 8 The Jeters made arrangements to personally transfer their ten remaining cryopreserved pre-embyros from Mayo to the Arizona Center, obtaining proper storage equipment and arranging for delivery to the Arizona Center. The Jeters executed a transfer request form, obtaining Mayo's release of the remaining cryopreserved pre-embryos in four labeled straws.

¶ 9 The Jeters alleged they transferred the pre-embryos to the Arizona Center. Belinda Jeter then went to the Arizona Center for a tubal embryo transfer. Before the surgical implantation, the doctor told her that two of the four straws did not contain, and had never contained, any embryonic matter. If this is accurate, Mayo had actually produced only five of the Jeters' ten remaining pre-embyros. Mayo failed to account for the allegedly missing pre-embryos.

¶ 10 The Jeters proceeded with the tubal embryo transfer at the Arizona Center with the five remaining pre-embryos. The procedure was successful and Belinda Jeter conceived and delivered a daughter. However, the Jeters would like to have more children and now must undergo the additional discomfort and cost of harvesting and fertilizing more eggs. In addition, the Jeters remain concerned about the fate of the allegedly missing pre-embryos, wondering whether Mayo lost or destroyed them or whether Mayo may have given them to the wrong people, resulting in the birth of one or more of the Jeters' biological children to another woman.

¶ 11 The Jeters sued Mayo alleging four claims. Count One asserted a claim for "Negligence—Loss of Potential Children" under Arizona's wrongful death statutes. Count Two asserted a claim for "Negligence—Loss of Irreplaceable Property." Under that count, the Jeters alleged Mayo had breached its duty to store and safeguard the fertilized eggs. Count Three asserted a claim for "Breach of Fiduciary Duty," alleging that, because the organisms were "potentially viable human beings, their custody was entitled to `special respect' and [the] highest standards of care." Finally, Count Four asserted a claim for breach of a bailment contract.

¶ 12 Mayo moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing as to Count One that the cryopreserved three-day old, eight-cell pre-embryos were not "persons" under the Arizona wrongful death statutes. Mayo further asserted as to Count Two that Arizona did not recognize a claim for loss of irreplaceable property. As to Count Three, Mayo argued that the medical malpractice act barred the claim for breach of fiduciary duty because it was not an enumerated cause of action against a health care provider allowed by that act. Finally, as to Count Four, Mayo asserted that A.R.S. § 12-562(C) (Supp.2003) barred the breach of bailment contract claim because there was no written bailment contract between the parties as required by that statute.

¶ 13 The Jeters opposed the motion, asking the court to recognize the first two causes of action and to hold the medical malpractice act unconstitutional if it abrogated their claims. They also contended they had a written bailment contract with Mayo.

¶ 14 The superior court granted Mayo's motion, holding:

The Court specifically finds that the wrongful death statute does not provide relief for frozen cell embryos and that the same are not "persons."

The Court also specifically finds that there is no common law cause of action in Arizona for the alleged negligent loss of viable human embryos.

And lastly, the Court finds that the Arizona medical negligence (malpractice) act is not unconstitutional.

¶ 15 The Jeters moved for partial reconsideration and clarification of the ruling. They asked the court to reconsider its holding that Arizona did not recognize a common law cause of action for negligent loss of irreplaceable property. They further asked the court to clarify its ruling as to their claim for breach of bailment contract, asserting they had shown they had a written contract with Mayo.

¶ 16 The superior court denied the motion for reconsideration. The court noted that perhaps the third paragraph of its prior minute entry (regarding the constitutionality of the medical malpractice act) could be removed but stated that this "entire `subject' needs to be handled by the Appellate Courts and/or Legislature." The court entered judgment granting Mayo's motion to dismiss, and the Jeters timely filed this appeal.3

ISSUES

¶ 17 The Jeters argue the superior court improperly dismissed their complaint because: (1) the Jeters' cryopreserved pre-embryos were "persons" under the Arizona wrongful death statutes; (2) Arizona recognizes a cause of action for the negligent loss or destruction of the cryopreserved pre-embryos; (3) to the extent A.R.S. §§ 12-561(1) and -562(A) bar the Jeters' claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of bailment contract, those statutes are unconstitutional; and (4) the Jeters adequately pled the existence of a written bailment contract as required by A.R.S. § 12-562(C).

DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

¶ 18 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) (2003). We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim. Fairway Constr., Inc. v. Ahern, 193 Ariz. 122, 124, ¶ 4, 970 P.2d 954,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
96 cases
  • McQueen v. Gadberry, ED 103138
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • November 15, 2016
    ...253 (originally published in 2001). In addition, egg and sperm are collectively referred to as "gametes." Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona, 211 Ariz. 386, 121 P.3d 1256, 1266 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). Based on the foregoing, we will refer to pre-zygotes not yet transferred to a uterus as "pre-embr......
  • Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 2 CA–CV 2014–0123.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Arizona
    • January 19, 2016
    ...held that plaintiffs could seek emotional damages for the destruction of their fertilized human eggs, see Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 211 Ariz. 386, ¶¶ 73–75, 121 P.3d 1256, 1273 (App.2005), and for suffering, as a tenant, the annoyance and discomfort of living in inadequate housing, see Th......
  • Cain v. Horne, 2 CA-CV 2007-0143.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Arizona
    • May 15, 2008
    ...constitutional issues relating to a statute unless absolutely necessary to resolve a case." Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 211 Ariz. 386, n. 23, 121 P.3d 1256, 1273 n. 23 (App.2005). Because we find the school voucher statutes violate the aid prohibition in article IX, § 10, irrespective of an......
  • Steinberger v. McVey
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Arizona
    • January 30, 2014
    ...1303 (citing McCutchen, the court held that § 323 liability includes economic harm as well as physical harm); Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 211 Ariz. 386, 402, ¶ 70, 121 P.3d 1256, 1272 (App.2005) (a person assuming a duty under § 323 may, in addition to liability for physical harm, be liable......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT