Jewell v. Carpentier
| Decision Date | 14 June 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 36134,36134 |
| Parties | James J. JEWELL, Appellant, v. Charles F. CARPENTIER, Secretary of State, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Alfred M. Loeser and Edward A. Myerson, Chicago, for appellant.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen. , for appellee.
This is an action under the Administrative Review Act to review an order of the Secretary of State suspending the driving privileges of the plaintiff, James J. Jewell. The circuit court of Cook County affirmed the suspension order, and the plaintiff appeals directly to this court, asserting that the statute under which his license was suspended is unconstitutional, and that the Secretary's action violated his constitutional rights.
In May of 1955 a judgment was entered in the superior court of Lake County, Indiana, against James J. Jewell, the present plaintiff, for damages growing out of an automobile accident that took place in Indiana. Upon appeal the judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court of Indiana. See Jewell v. Floyd, 127 Ind.App. 191, 134 N.E.2d 52. In June of 1959, the superior court of Cook County, Illinois, entered its judgment against the plaintiff, based upon the registration of the Indiana judgment. Thereafter the Secretary of State suspended the plaintiff's Illinois motor vehicle operator's license under the financial responsibility provisions of the Motor Vehicle Law of 1957. Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 95 1/2, pars. 7-301 to 7-329. The plaintiff then brought this action to set aside the order of suspension.
The plaintiff first contends that 'it is without the purview of authority of the legislature to authorize the Secretary of State to do anything based on the happening outside the State of Illinois * * * of any occurrence,' and that section 7-303 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 95 1/2, par. 7-303) is invalid as an attempt to authorize the exercise of jurisdiction outside of this State. This contention is based upon article I of the Illinois constitution, S.H.A., which sets forth the 'boundaries and jurisdiction' of the State. That article of the constitution does not prohibit the General Assembly from providing for suspension of the privilege of operating a motor vehicle within Illinois upon the basis of conduct that occurred in another State. While 'No law of this state has any effect as a law, by its own force, beyond the territorial limits of the state, * * * a law effective in this state as such may create rights and liabilities arising from acts occurring outside of the state.' Union Bridge and Construction Co. v. Industrial Com., 287 Ill. 396, 398, 122 N.E. 609, 610; Beall Bros. Supply Co. v. Industrial Com., 341 Ill. 193, 199, 173 N.E. 64; Durite Co. v. Industrial Com., 394 Ill. 338, 345, 68 N.E.2d 717; see Leflar, The Law of Conflict of Laws, sec. 4; see also Render v. Mann, Ala.1961, 126 So.2d 94; In re Balcain's Petition, 361 Mich. 570, 106 N.E.2d 160; Carlyle v. Karns, 9 Wis.2d 394, 101 N.E.2d 92; Commonwealth v. Moyer, 193 Pa.Super. 599, 165 A.2d 100; Commonwealth v. Gross, 193 Pa.Super. 46, 163 A.2d 682; Commonwealth v. Halteman, 192 Pa.Super. 379, 162 A.2d 251; Sullivan v. Kelly, 7 N.Y.2d 462, 199 N.Y.S.2d 481, 166 N.E.2d 493. Statutes similar to our financial responsibility provisions have uniformly been upheld in other States as valid exercises of the police power, (see cases collected, 35 A.L.R.2d 1011,) and the plaintiff has advanced no reason to support a different result here.
Section 7-307 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 95 1/2, par. 7-307), which provides that clerks of courts shall notify the Secretary of State of unsatisfied judgments is challenged on the same constitutional ground, apparently on the theory that it purports to impose duties upon the clerks of courts outside of this State. Whether the section should be interpreted to impose such a duty is not involved in this case, since it was the clerk of the superior court of Cook County who reported the judgment to the Secretary of State.
Several of the plaintiff's contentions are based upon a misunderstanding of the procedure provided in the Administrative Review Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 110, pars. 272, 274. He alleged in his complaint for administrative review that he was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident and he now contends that 'The Secretary of State could not interfere with such commerce by revoking or suspending his license.' The statute (par. 6 of section 7-202), provides that certain of its provisions shall not apply 'To the operator or owner if such owner at the time of such accident was in compliance with the Federal 'Motor Carrier Act of 1935'.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 95 1/2, par. 7-202. In his complaint for administrative review, the plaintiff also alleged that he 'has operated in the State of Illinois and other states as a truck driver' and that 'He has complied with the Federal 'Motor Carrier Act of 1935. " In this court he refers to section 40 of the Civil Practice Act which provides that allegations not denied are deemed to be admitted (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 110, par. 40), and argues that the allegations in his complaint concerning interstate commerce and his compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Act must be deemed to have been admitted because they were not denied.
The difficulty with this argument is that the Administrative Review Act does not contemplate that issues of fact shall be framed by complaint and answer. It provides that the answer of the administrative agency 'shall consist of the original or a certified copy of the entire record of proceedings under review * * *', and that 'No pleadings other than as herein enumerated shall be filed by any party unless required by the court.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 110, par. 272. The statute thus provides for a review upon the record of the administrative agency, and the provision of the Civil Practice Act upon which the plaintiff relies is not applicable. The record before the administrative agency contained no suggestion that the plaintiff was an interstate trucker or that he had complied with the Federal Motor Carrier Act, and those questions are not open...
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