JEWETT V. COMMISSIONER
| Decision Date | 23 February 1982 |
| Citation | 455 U. S. 305 |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Held: The "transfer" referred to in the Treasury Regulation excepting from the federal gift tax a refusal to accept ownership of an interest in property transferred by will if such refusal is effective under local law and made "within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer," occurs, as indicated by both the text and history of the Regulation, when the interest is created, and not at a later time when the interest either vests or becomes possessory. Hence, in this case, where disclaimers of a contingent interest in a testamentary trust, though effective under local law, were not made until 33 years, and thus not "within a reasonable time," after the interest was created, the disclaimers were subject to a gift tax under §§ 2501(a)(1) and 2511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, as indirect gifts to a successor in interest. P P. 309-919.
638 F.2d 93, affirmed.
A trust beneficiary's refusal to accept ownership of property may constitute an indirect gift to a successor in interest subject to federal gift tax liability. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2501, 2511. Under Treasury Regulation § 25.2511-1(c), however, such a refusal is not subject to tax if it is effective under local law and made "within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer." The petitioner husband (hereafter petitioner) in this case executed disclaimers of a contingent interest in a testamentary trust 33 years after that interest was created, but while it was still contingent. The narrow question presented is whether the "transfer" referred to in the Regulation occurs when the interest is created, as the Government contends, or at a later time when the interest either vests or becomes possessory, as argued by petitioner.
App. 9. Petitioner's mother is the sole surviving life tenant. Thus, under the testamentary plan, if petitioner survived his mother, he would receive one share of the corpus of the trust; if he predeceased his mother, that share would be distributed to his issue. Since petitioner's parents had two children, his share of the trust amounted to one-half of the principal.
In 1972, when petitioner was 45 years old, he executed two disclaimers. The disclaimers each recognized that petitioner had "an interest in fifty percent (50%) of the trust estate . . . provided that he survives" his mother. Id. at 15. In the
first disclaimer, petitioner renounced his right to receive 95% "of the aforesaid fifty percent (50%) of the remainder of the trust estate," ibid.; in the second, he renounced his right to the remaining 5%. In 1972, the value of the trust exceeded million.
Petitioner and his wife filed gift tax returns for the third and fourth quarters of 1972 in which they advised the Commissioner of the disclaimers, but did not treat them as taxable gifts. [Footnote 1] The Commissioner assessed a deficiency of approximately 0,000. He concluded that the disclaimers were indirect transfers of property by gift within the meaning of §§ 2501(a)(1) [Footnote 2] and 2511(a) [Footnote 3] of the Internal Revenue Code, and that they were not excepted from tax under Treas.Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) [Footnote 4] because they were not made "within a
reasonable time after knowledge" of his grandmother's transfer to him of an interest in the trust estate. Petitioner then filed this action in the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the deficiency.
In the Tax Court and in the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that, at the time the disclaimers were made, he had nothing more than a contingent interest in the trust, and that the "reasonable time" in which a tax-free disclaimer could be made did not begin to run until the interest became vested and possessory upon the death of the last surviving life tenant. [Footnote 5] Although a comparable argument had been accepted
by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57 (1973), [Footnote 6] it was rejected by the Tax Court [Footnote 7] and by the Ninth Circuit [Footnote 8] in this case. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 452 U.S. 904.
Petitioner relies heavily on the plain language of the Treasury Regulation and on early decisions that influenced its draftsmen. Before analyzing that language and its history, it is appropriate to review the statutory provisions that the Regulation interprets.
Section 2501(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax "on the transfer of property by gift." Section 2511(a) provides that the tax shall apply "whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible." As the Senate [Footnote 9] and House [Footnote 10] Reports explain:
Since the practical effect of petitioner's disclaimers was to reduce the expected size of his taxable estate and to confer a gratuitous benefit upon the natural objects of his bounty, the treatment of the disclaimers as taxable gifts is fully consistent with the basic purpose of the statutory scheme.
The controlling Treasury Regulation provides that a refusal to accept ownership of property transferred from a decedent does not constitute a gift if two conditions are met. First, the refusal must be effective under the law governing the administration of the decedent's estate. Second, the refusal
must be made "within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer."
There is no dispute in this case that the first requirement has been satisfied; the disclaimers were effective under Massachusetts law. The controversy arises from the second requirement; specifically, it is over the meaning of the word "transfer," which may be read to refer to the creation of petitioner's remainder interest by his grandmother's will, or to either the vesting of that interest or the distribution of tangible assets upon the death of the life tenant. Both positions find support in the language of the Regulation.
To a layman, the word "transfer" would normally describe a change in ownership of an existing interest, rather than the creation of a new interest. Moreover, the reference to a transfer of "ownership of a decedent's property" suggests that the transferee must acquire property that once had been owned by the decedent; petitioner's grandmother never owned the future interests that her will created, but she once did own the assets (or their equivalent) that the remaindermen will acquire when their interests become possessory in character. Thus, language in the Regulation implies that the relevant "transfer" had not yet occurred when petitioner renounced his interest in the trust.
Other language, however, indicates that the relevant "transfer" occurs at the time of the testator's death. The word "transfer" is the basic term used in the gift tax provisions to describe any passage of property without consideration that may have tax consequences. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2501, 2511, quoted in nn. 455 U. S. 2, 455 U. S. 3, supra. [Footnote 13] The Regulation
describes a transfer that "is effected by the decedent's will" (or by the law of descent and distribution of intestate property), not by a subsequent vesting event or distribution of property. The property must be transferred "from a decedent," not from an estate executor or trust administrator. The lack of any reference in the Regulation to future interests or contingent remainders, and the consistent focus on transfers effected by the decedent by will or through the laws of intestate distribution, undermine the suggestion that the relevant transfer occurs other than at the time of the testator's death. The Regulation also requires "knowledge of the existence of the transfer"; since a person...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Jewett v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 80-1614
-
Estate of Patterson v. Commissioner
... ... Keinath v. Commissioner, supra, Estate of Hoenig, supra at 477; First National Bank of Montgomery supra; Fuller v. Commissioner Dec. 25,106, 37 T.C. 147, 155 (1961). See also Jewett v. Commissioner 82-1 USTC ¶ 13,453, 455 U.S. 305 (1982). Under New York law, a disclaimer may be deemed valid even though a long period of time has passed prior to a legatee's entering a disclaimer; however, the reasonable time standard does not depend upon a pure mathematical calculation ... ...
-
Grant v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
... 84 T.C. 809 84 T.C. No. 54 WILLIAM W. GRANT, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 13985-79. United States Tax Court Filed May 6, 1985 ... During 1972, 1973, and 1974, ... The regulation meets the Supreme Court's test for validity. See Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah, supra; Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 318 (1982); Durbin Paper Stock Co. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 252 (1983); Friedman Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 ... ...
-
Poinier v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
... 86 T.C. 478 86 T.C. No. 32 LOIS W. POINIER, AS TRANSFEREE OF HELEN WODELL HALBACH ET AL., 1 Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket Nos. 23881-81 23882-81 23883-81. United States Tax Court Filed March 27, 1986 ... Decedent held a ... 25.2511-1(c), Gift Tax Regs., and thus constituted a taxable transfer under sec. 2511, I.R.C., 1954. Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982). HELD, FURTHER, decedent's children are liable as donee-transferees under sec. 6324(b), I.R.C. 1954, for the ... ...