Jewett v. Jewett
| Decision Date | 09 September 2003 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | BARBARA JEWETT v. DENIS JEWETT |
Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js. Bruce A. Chamberlain, for the appellant (defendant).
Stephen E. Reck, with whom, on the brief, was Linda L. Mariani, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendant, Denis Jewett, appeals1 from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Barbara Jewett, and ordering a property distribution pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-812 and attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-62.3 The issues decided in this appeal are whether the trial court: (1) abused its discretion by excluding, as irrelevant, evidence that the defendant claimed could be used to establish what portion of a settlement award that resulted from prior litigation was compensation for future earnings and, therefore, not part of the marital estate; (2) properly concluded that a portion of that settlement award received as compensation for future earnings should be included in the marital estate; (3) properly precluded the defendant from presenting extrinsic evidence regarding his settlement agreement on the ground that such evidence would violate the parol evidence rule; (4) properly allowed the plaintiff to submit an amended financial affidavit; (5) abused its discretion by allowing the plaintiff to testify about the reasons for the breakdown of the marriage; (6) abused its discretion by admitting into evidence an exhibit summarizing the plaintiff's financial contribution to improvements to the marital home; (7) made factual findings regarding the plaintiff's financial contributions to the home and family budget, the defendant's fault for the breakdown of the marriage, and the value of the defendant's personal assets that were unsupported by the record; and (8) abused its discretion when it awarded the plaintiff $7500 in attorney's fees.4
The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly found him in contempt and contends that the subpoena with which he refused to comply was overly broad, unduly burdensome, untimely and constituted intentional harassment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The trial court's findings of fact may be summarized as follows. The parties were married on October 14, 1974, in Mystic. In 1975, the parties purchased a home in Salem and, by agreement between them, the plaintiff took sole title to the house in 1976. The plaintiff has been a registered nurse since 1967, and has worked at various hospitals. At the time of trial, the plaintiff was employed as a director of nurses at a nursing home. The plaintiff also received a bachelor's degree in zoology in 1984 from Connecticut College. The defendant, who had graduated from the United States Merchant Marine Academy, was employed at the Electric Boat Division (Electric Boat) of General Dynamics Corporation (General Dynamics) as a marine engineer for the majority of the parties' marriage. The parties have no children of their own, but the plaintiff had a daughter, who is now an adult, from a previous marriage. The defendant adopted her soon after the parties were married. At the time of the dissolution action, the plaintiff was fifty-five years old and the defendant was fifty-four years old. Although the plaintiff testified that she had some concerns over the future state of her health, the defendant testified that he was in good health.
During his employment at Electric Boat, the defendant held a number of positions, including director of nuclear quality control. Shortly after attaining this position, however, the defendant was relieved of his quality control duties, but his salary was not diminished. As a result of this change, the defendant, in June, 1994, brought an action against General Dynamics, the corporate parent of Electric Boat, for wrongful demotion. In 1998, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant for $775,000. The jury award was not broken down into specific categories; rather, it was a lump sum award. After the jury rendered its verdict, General Dynamics appealed. Thereafter, the parties reached a settlement agreement that required General Dynamics to pay the defendant a lump sum of $337,260.02, and also to pay the defendant's attorneys $262,739.98 as attorney's fees, resulting in a total settlement award of $600,000. Although the settlement award had been invested in a Merrill Lynch account, the defendant converted it into cash soon after the plaintiff filed this dissolution action. Moreover, the trial court found that, beginning in May, 1999, the defendant embarked on an intentional course of conduct that resulted in converting several assets into cash in order to have a "`war chest'" with which to defend the marital dissolution proceedings.
The plaintiff filed this dissolution action seeking a dissolution of the marriage and an equitable property settlement in accordance with § 46b-81. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court noted the plaintiff's substantial contribution to the home in the form of capital improvements to the property and the payment of real estate taxes and insurance premiums. Consequently, the trial court ordered that the plaintiff retain the marital home. The trial court also ordered the defendant to transfer 40 percent of the value of his pension as of the date of the dissolution to the plaintiff. The trial court also awarded the defendant's one-half interest in the parties' joint retirement account to the plaintiff. The trial court ordered the defendant to reinstate his work-related life insurance to its original amount with the plaintiff named as the sole beneficiary so long as the defendant was employed. See footnote 4 of this opinion. Moreover, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay $7500 in attorney's fees to the plaintiff's attorney because it determined that much of the accrued fees were caused by the defendant's failure "promptly and candidly [to] comply with numerous motions and discovery."
The trial court also awarded the plaintiff $260 per week in alimony, to be paid until she receives her share of the defendant's pension. The parties were allowed to retain their own automobiles and the balances of their separate checking accounts. The trial court ordered that both parties retain their personal property listed on their financial affidavits. Additionally, the defendant and the plaintiff were each allowed to retain their separate individual retirement accounts.
The defendant was permitted to retain the cash proceeds from his action against General Dynamics as well as any other cash funds in his possession. Finally, the court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The following additional facts are necessary for the resolution of the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly excluded evidence regarding his litigation with General Dynamics. The defendant filed a notice of expert witnesses disclosing his intent to call Walter King, a financial expert, and Thomas Riley, an attorney, as witnesses in the marital dissolution proceedings. The notice stated that King would testify that two thirds of the jury award received by the defendant in his action against General Dynamics was compensation for future earnings. The defendant claimed that the portion of the subsequent settlement award that could be considered future earnings was nonmarital property and, therefore, not subject to division. The defendant also claimed that Riley, who had represented the defendant in the General Dynamics litigation, would testify that 90 percent of the proceeds received by the defendant was for future earnings.
In response to these disclosures, the plaintiff moved in limine to preclude as irrelevant the testimony of both King and Riley. The plaintiff claimed that any economic analysis of the jury verdict was irrelevant because that verdict subsequently was withdrawn after the parties had reached a settlement agreement. The plaintiff also claimed, in her motion in limine, that any testimony regarding the settlement agreement would violate the parol evidence rule.5 The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion in limine but, after the plaintiff moved for reconsideration, granted the motion as to King. The trial court concluded that King's testimony was irrelevant to the dissolution proceedings because of the subsequent settlement, and speculative because there was no way to divine how the jury came to its conclusion on damages and what portion of the subsequent settlement was for future income. The trial court, however, allowed Riley to testify about how he presented the claim for damages to the jury in the General Dynamics litigation,6 but sustained the plaintiff's objections to questions regarding the valuation of the jury's verdict and the subsequent settlement agreement.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly excluded evidence regarding his litigation with General Dynamics. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the expert testimony of King was irrelevant in the marital dissolution proceedings. The defendant also contends that the trial court improperly precluded the testimony of Riley as irrelevant. Moreover, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly refused to take judicial notice of the trial transcript of the defendant's action against General Dynamics.7 The plaintiff claims, in response, that because evidence that was presented to the jury in the defendant's claim against General Dynamics had no relevance to the parties' dissolution claim, and because any analysis of the settlement agreement is speculative, the trial court properly...
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