Jewett v. Tomlinson
Citation | 36 N.E. 1106,137 Ind. 326 |
Decision Date | 04 April 1894 |
Docket Number | 16,745 |
Parties | Jewett v. Tomlinson |
Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
From the Clark Circuit Court.
The judgment is affirmed.
P. H Jewett, for appellant.
H. A Burtt and J. E. Taggart, for appellee.
The facts in this case are as follows: On the 18th day of October, 1882, one Merritt N. Hall was the owner in fee of the real estate described in the complaint, and on said day he executed a mortgage, his wife joining therein, to the appellee to secure a debt of $ 1,300. On the 14th day of April, 1887, one John C. Rapp recovered a judgment against said Hall and another in the Clark Circuit Court for $ 258 which became a lien on said real estate junior to said mortgage. On the 22d day of April, 1887, Rapp caused an execution to be issued on said judgment. On the 14th day of June, 1887, said execution was levied upon said real estate as the property of the mortgagor, Hall, and the same was duly advertised and sold on the 16th day of July, 1887, to the appellant for $ 91.60. The appellant paid the purchase-money and the sheriff of Clark county, Indiana, on July 23d, 1887, executed to appellant a conveyance of said real estate, and on the 7th day of May, 1890, executed another conveyance of said real estate to appellant for a period of seven years. On the 7th day of October, 1887, the appellee commenced an action in the Clark Circuit Court against said Merritt N. Hall and wife to foreclose said mortgage, but the appellant was not a party to the suit. On the 20th day of October, 1887, appellee recovered a judgment against said Hall for the sum of $ 1,489.92, and for the foreclosure of said mortgage and sale of said real estate. On the 27th day of October, 1887, an order of sale was issued on said judgment, and on the 19th day of November, 1887, said real estate, after having been advertised as required by law, was sold to appellee for $ 1,561.55. On the 13th day of December, 1888, the sheriff of said county executed to appellee a conveyance of said real estate. On the 8th day of July, 1888, said Hall and wife conveyed said real estate, by warranty deed, to the appellee. On the 11th day of February, 1891, the appellant filed in the office of the clerk of the Clark Circuit Court, being the county in which the real estate in controversy is situated, his complaint in ejectment against the appellee and for damages for the alleged unlawful detention thereof. On March 25th, 1891, the appellee filed her answer in general denial thereto. Upon the issues thus joined the cause was submitted to the court for trial without the intervention of a jury, and at the request of the plaintiff the court made a special finding of facts, with the conclusion of law thereon that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover; to which conclusion of law the plaintiff excepted, and from the judgment rendered prosecutes this appeal and specifies as the only error that "the court erred in its conclusion of law." At the time of the commencement of this suit the appellee was in possession of the real estate in litigation, claiming it as her own.
At the time of the commencement of the action to foreclose appellee's mortgage, appellant had no interest in the real estate in controversy, except a lien thereon by virtue of his purchase from the sheriff under the execution issued on the judgment against Hall and in favor of Rapp. The purchaser at a sheriff's sale does not obtain the title to the land by the sale, for the title does not pass until the year for redemption expires and a deed is executed by the sheriff. Such purchaser has only a statutory lien. His rights are such only as the lien created by the statute gives him. He has no title to the land, but only such privileges as the statute creates. The extent and effect of the rights are measured and limited by the statute. Shirk v. Thomas, 121 Ind. 147, 149, 22 N.E. 976, and cases cited.
The holder of a sheriff's certificate is not the owner, nor entitled to possession until the year for redemption expires. Ross v. Donaldson, Sheriff, 123 Ind. 238, 24 N.E. 109.
The owner of such certificate remains the holder of a lien, and a lien only. Robertson v. Van Cleave, 129 Ind. 217, 277, 26 N.E. 899.
And the fact that the appellant bought the real estate sought to be recovered for a term of years, does not change the rule, as the year for redemption runs just the same on a sale of the rents and profits for a term of years as on a sale of the fee. A purchaser at a sheriff's sale of the rents and profits of lands has no right to possession until the year for redemption expires. Johnson v. Briscoe, 92 Ind. 367; Ragsdale v. Mathes, 52 Ind. 495.
Appellant was, as we have shown, at the time of the commencement of the action to foreclose appellee's mortgage, only the holder of a lien on said real estate, which was subsequent and junior to appellee's said mortgage; and appellant was not a necessary party to said proceeding. Meredith v. Lackey, 16 Ind. 1; Harris v. Harlan, 14 Ind. 439; Meredith v. Lackey, 14 Ind. 529, and cases cited.
The only effect of the failure of appellee to make appellant a party to the action to foreclose her said mortgage, was that appellant's right of redemption was not barred or foreclosed, and the appellant, therefore, was not limited to one year's time in which to redeem. The only right the appellant has in said real estate is the equitable right of redemption. Coombs v. Carr, 55 Ind. 303; Nesbit v. Hanway, 87 Ind. 400; Robertson v. Van Cleave, supra.
Boone on Mortgages, section 118.
The appellant insists that any interest in, or claim upon, said real estate, that appellee held by virtue of her mortgage, was merged in the fee by the deed of Hall and wife to the appellee, executed July 8, 1888.
We think there is nothing in this...
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Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser
...12 N. E. 303, 13 N. E. 105. Except for its express provisions, it would not have conferred the right of possession. Jewett v. Tomlinson (1896) 137 Ind. 326, 36 N. E. 1106. But granting these propositions, and granting the further proposition that the owner of the property, in order to be de......
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Baldwin v. Moroney
...he shall have possession thereof. Section 1133, Burns' 1908; section 1099, Burns' 1901; section 1086, Rev. St. 1881; Jewett v. Tomlinson, 137 Ind. 326, 36 N. E. 106. The title remains in the mortgagor; the mortgage being a mere security for the debt. Grable et al. v. McCulloh, 27 Ind. 472;R......
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Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser
... ... 303, ... [98 N.E. 53] ... 13 N.E. 105. Except for its express provisions, it would not ... have conferred the right of possession. Jewett v ... Tomlinson (1894), 137 Ind. 326, 36 N.E. 1106. But ... granting these propositions, [179 Ind. 122] and granting the ... further ... ...
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Baldwin v. Moroney
... ... specially ... [91 N.E. 7] ... provides that he shall have possession thereof. § 1133 ... Burns 1908, § 1086 R. S. 1881; Jewett v ... Tomlinson (1894), 137 Ind. 326, 36 N.E. 1106. The ... title remains in the mortgagor, the mortgage being a mere ... security for the debt ... ...