Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority

• Decision Date: 07 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-2468,96-2468
• Citation: 162 F.3d 627
• Parties: 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 311 JEWS FOR JESUS, INC., and Steve Cohen, Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY AVIATION AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 627

162 F.3d 627

12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 311

JEWS FOR JESUS, INC., and Steve Cohen, Individually Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY AVIATION AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-2468.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 7, 1998.

Mathew D. Staver, Frederick H. Nelson, Staver & Associates, Orlando, FL, James Paul Eriksen, General Counsel for Jews for Jesus, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Richard Anthony Harrison, Allen, Dell, Frank & Trinkle, David P. Rhodes, Tampa, FL, Patricia A. Millett, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT and COX, Circuit Judges.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

This case arises out of a First Amendment challenge to literature distribution policies at the Tampa International Airport. The challenged policies were revoked during the pendency of this lawsuit, and the district court dismissed the case as moot. We affirm.

The plaintiff, Jews for Jesus, is a nonprofit Christian missionary organization. ¹ One of the organization's main activities is the distribution of free literature in airports. In 1994, Jews for Jesus contacted the Tampa International Airport (which is operated by defendant Hillsborough County Aviation Authority) about distributing literature at the airport. Jews for Jesus was informed that the airport's policy regarding literature distribution was presently under review, ² and that, pending completion of that review, literature distribution at the Tampa International Airport was completely prohibited. After discussions with various airport officials, Jews for Jesus brought this lawsuit in August 1995 seeking injunctive and declaratory relief that would permit the organization to distribute literature at the Tampa International Airport. ³

Approximately one month after the commencement of the lawsuit, in September 1995, the airport lifted the prohibition on the distribution of literature. Since that time, individuals and organizations--including Jews for Jesus--have been freely permitted to distribute literature at the Tampa International Airport. Jews for Jesus, however, maintains that the possibility of a return to the prior prohibition (or to the restrictive policy in place before the prohibition, see supra note 2) means that there was still a justiciable "case or controversy" before the district court, and thus it was error for the district court to dismiss the case as moot. We review the district court's determination de novo. See Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. J.S. Tarwater Developmental Ctr., 97 F.3d 492, 496 (11th Cir.1996).

A case is moot when events subsequent to the commencement of a lawsuit create a situation in which the court can no longer give the plaintiff meaningful relief. See Pacific Ins. Co. v. General Dev. Corp., 28 F.3d 1093, 1096 (11th Cir.1994). In this case, the airport's change of policy has already given Jews for Jesus the relief they seek--the ability to distribute literature at the airport--and there is therefore no meaningful relief left for the court to give. The only remaining issue is whether the airport's policy was constitutional--which, at this stage, is a purely academic point. See Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 102, 102 S.Ct. 867, 869, 70 L.Ed.2d 855 (1982) ("We do not sit to decide hypothetical issues or to give advisory opinions about issues as to which there are not adverse parties before us.").

Jews for Jesus, however, correctly points out that the mere voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not render a case moot. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979). Otherwise, a party could moot a challenge to a practice simply by changing the practice during the course of a lawsuit, and then reinstate the practice as soon as the litigation was brought to a close. Thus, voluntary cessation of a challenged practice renders a case moot only if there is no "reasonable expectation" that the challenged practice will resume after the lawsuit is dismissed. See id.; United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953); see also National Advertising Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 934 F.2d 283, 286 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that the case was not moot because there was a reasonable expectation that the challenged conduct would recur). See generally 13A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.5 (2d ed.1984).

The district court found that there was no reasonable expectation that the Tampa International Airport would return to its prior policy. We agree. The new "open door" policy appears to have been the result of substantial deliberation on the...