Ji-Da Dai v. University of North Carolina

• Decision Date: 02 September 2003
• Docket Number: 1:02CV224.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: JI-DA DAI, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA at CHAPEL HILL and LAWRENCE I. GILBERT, in his Individual and Official Capacity, Defendants.

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JI-DA DAI, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA at CHAPEL HILL and LAWRENCE I. GILBERT, in his Individual and Official Capacity, Defendants.

1:02CV224.

United States District Court, Middle District of North Carolina.

September 2, 2003.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

BEATY, District Judge.

For the reasons set forth in the contemporaneously filed Memorandum Opinion, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [Document #8].

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [see Document #6] is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety as to both Defendant UNC-CH and Defendant Gilbert.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill ("UNC-CH" or the "University") and Lawrence I. Gilbert's ("Gilbert") Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Document #8]. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED entirely and Plaintiff Ji-Da Dai's ("Plaintiff" or "Dai") Amended Complaint [see Document #6¹] will be DISMISSED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In this action Dr. Ji-Da Dai, a 58 year old man of Chinese origin, has filed a seven count suit against the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Dr. Lawrence I. Gilbert, Professor of Biology, in his individual and official capacity. Specifically, Count I of the Complaint alleges a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 solely against UNC-CH; Count II alleges a violation of the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.1 et seq. ("NCEEPA"), solely against UNC-CH; Count III alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 solely against UNC-CH; Count IV alleges a Breach of Contract solely against UNC-CH; Count V alleges Intentional Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress against both UNC-CH and Gilbert; Count VI alleges Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress against both UNC-CH and Gilbert; and Count VII alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both UNC-CH and Gilbert. (See Mot. to Dismiss Amended Complaint, Exh. 1, ¶¶ 31-78 (hereinafter "Am. Compl.").)

Following his graduation in 1991 with a Doctorate Degree in Biology from UNC-CH, Plaintiff took employment with UNC-CH as a Research Associate. (Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) In 1992 he was appointed as a Research Assistant Professor with the Department of Biology at UNC-CH. (Id. ¶ 8.) Then, in 1994, he was appointed as a Research Associate Professor, a position which he held until the termination of his professional relationship with UNC-CH in 2000. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was under Gilbert's supervision throughout Plaintiff's professional relationship with UNC-CH. (Id. ¶ 9.)

Around May 1999, Dai signed his employment contract with UNC-CH for a term of three years effective from July 1, 1999 through June 30, 2002. (Id. ¶ 10.) When Plaintiff Dai signed his contract, he was aware that the continuation of his contract and his salary, $31,780, were both contingent upon the availability of grant funding for Gilbert's research projects, which was the sole source of funding for Dai's salary. (Am. Compl. ¶ 10; Dr. Alan Feduccia Aff., Exh. 1.)

Soon after Dai signed his contract, he informed Gilbert that he would no longer perform "personal services" for him. (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) In the past, Dai had cleaned Gilbert's home, performed yard work and provided rides for him. (Feduccia Aff., Exh. 3 and Dunbar Aff., Exh. 1.) Also, during a series of conversations with Gilbert, Dai raised concerns that he felt that he was being underpaid in comparison to his American counterparts and questioned why he was not chosen to attend international and national workshops like others in the Biology Department. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.) According to Dai, the response from Gilbert was that Dai's American counterparts had better English, were younger, and could learn new things. (Id. ¶ 14.)

In early August 1999, Gilbert informed Plaintiff in a handwritten note that Plaintiff's services would no longer be required by the Biology Department due to non-availability of funds. (Id. ¶ 16.) On August 18, 1999, Dai received formal typewritten notification that Gilbert's inability to obtain continuation of a major grant would mean that funds necessary to support Dai's salary would no longer be available after December 31, 1999. (Id. ¶ 17; Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., Exh. 4.) This letter effectively terminated Dai's employment with UNC-CH.

Following his termination, Dai filed a grievance with the University's Faculty Grievance Committee (the "Committee"). (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) In Dai's grievance, he alleged that Gilbert had discriminated against him on the basis of age and national origin when Gilbert terminated his employment contract for lack of funds. (Dunbar Aff., Exh. 1.) The Committee found that Dai's allegations were unsupported by substantial and credible evidence. (Dunbar Aff., Exh. 1.) The Committee, however, found that the Department of Biology did not make "every reasonable effort" to provide twelve months notification of termination to Dai, as it was obligated to do by the Code of the University of North Carolina when terminating an employee because of the failure of the continuation of funds, where such an employee, like Dai, had two or more years of continuous service. (Dunbar Aff., Exh. 1.) The Committee concluded that the Department of Biology had to make every reasonable effort to find funds for Plaintiff's salary so as to ensure twelve months notice of termination to Dai from the time the Department had notified him of its termination decision. (Dunbar Aff., Exh. 1.)

Once the Committee issued its findings and recommendations, Dr. Alan Feduccia, Chair of the Department of Biology, declined to accept the Committee's recommendation concerning obtaining funding to ensure twelve months notice of termination to Dai. (Feduccia Aff. ¶¶ 7, 8.) Following the Committee's recommendations and Dr. Feduccia's rejection, the Interim Chancellor of UNC-CH reviewed the report and agreed with the Committee's recommendations with one exception, which was that the Biology Department did not have to procure funds from other areas to support Dai's salary for twelve months notice. (Feduccia Aff. ¶ 8 & Exh. 4.) Instead, it was decided that only funds from those sources that were appropriate for Dai's salary had to be used. (Id.) Dr. Feduccia only found resources to pay Dai six months additional salary from January 1, 2000 through June 30, 2000. (Feduccia Aff. ¶ 9.)

Thereafter, Dai appealed to the University's Board of Trustees ("Board of Trustees"). The Board of Trustees agreed with the Interim Chancellor's recommendations. However, the Board of Trustees recommended that Dai be paid an additional six months salary which now provided him with the salary equivalent of twelve months notice of termination, as he was entitled under the Code of the University of North Carolina. (Feduccia Aff., Exh. 6.) Finally, Dai appealed the Board of Trustees' decision to the Board of Governors who sustained the institutional decision and dismissed Dai's appeal. (Feduccia Aff., Exh. 7.)

After Dai exhausted all the University's avenues of recourse, he then filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in May 2001. (Mot. To Dismiss Am. Compl. Exh.4.) The investigator with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission wrote Dai informing him that his charge of discrimination would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to untimeliness. (Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., Exh. 6.)

Plaintiff then filed his original Complaint in this matter in the Superior Court of Orange County, North Carolina on February 19, 2002. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, which was then the only named Defendant, timely removed the action to this Court on March 25, 2002. On the same day, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint in the Superior Court of Orange County, which added Dr. Gilbert as a named defendant. The Amended Complaint filed in the Orange County Superior Court is now the document that sets forth the nature of this action. Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [Document #8]. The Court will address Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as it relates to each of Plaintiff's claims in the order in which those claims are presented in the Amended Complaint.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court reviews the plaintiff's complaint using a relaxed standard, "accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor . . . ." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, dismissal is only appropriate when it is "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). Relying on these principles, the Court now reviews Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

B. Count I - Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Defendant UNC-CH

The basic allegation of Count I is that "[b]y engaging in and/or condoning . . . discriminatory acts, practices and conduct . . . UNC has condoned and/or failed to prevent the maintenance of a racially discriminatory work environment, discriminated against Plaintiff in the terms and/or conditions of his employment on the basis of his race and national origin . . . ." (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) Defendant UNC-CH asserts that this claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff has offered no response to this argument.

Title VII establishes an elaborate administrative process, requiring the expeditious filing of a charge of discrimination and the prompt consideration of the charge by the...