Jiaxing Brother Fastener Co. v. United States
| Decision Date | 06 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | Slip Op. 16–45,Court No. 15–00313 |
| Citation | 179 F.Supp.3d 1156 |
| Court | U.S. Court of International Trade |
| Parties | Jiaxing Brother Fastener Co., Ltd., a/k/a Jiaxing Brother Standard Part Co., Ltd., IFI & Morgan Ltd., and RMB Fasteners Ltd., Plaintiffs, v. United States, Defendant, and Vulcan Threaded Products, Inc., Defendant–Intervenor. |
Gregory S. Menegaz, Alexandra H. Salzman, and J. Kevin Horgan, deKieffer & Horgan, PLLC, of Washington, D.C., for Plaintiffs.
Elizabeth Anne Speck, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, D.C., for Defendant. With her on the brief were Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch. Of counsel on the brief was Khalil Gharbieh, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, D.C.
In this action, Plaintiffs Jiaxing Brother Fastener Co., Ltd., et al . (collectively “Brother”) challenge various aspects of the Final Results of the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) in the fifth administrative review of the antidumping duty order covering certain steel threaded rod from the People's Republic of China. See Complaint1 ; Certain Steel Threaded Rod From the People's Republic of China: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: 2013–2014, 80 Fed.Reg. 69,938 (Nov. 12, 2015) (“Final Results”).
Now before the court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Proceedings, which seeks to hold this matter in abeyance pending a determination in another action involving all of the same parties. See Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Proceedings at 1, 3 ( )2 ; see also Joint Status Report and Scheduling Order at 2, 3. In that other action, which challenges the preceding (fourth) administrative review of the same antidumping duty order at issue in this action, Brother contests essentially the same aspects of Commerce's determination that Brother raises here. Compare Complaint (filed in this action), and First Amended Complaint, filed in Jiaxing Brother Fastener Co., Ltd., et al. v. United States, et al., Court No. 14–00316; Pls.' Brief at 1, 2, 3–4, 5; Joint Status Report and Scheduling Order at 3; see also American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215, 57 S.Ct. 377, 81 L.Ed. 605 (1937) ().3
Brother argues that—in light of the overlapping issues and parties in the two actions—a stay of this action pending a ruling by this court on Brother's Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record in Brother's action challenging the preceding administrative review (Court No. 14–00316) will conserve judicial resources and help minimize the parties' litigation costs. See Pls.' Brief at 3, 4, 5; Joint Status Report and Scheduling Order at 3.4 Brother further contends that such a stay will not prejudice the parties in any way. See Pls.' Brief at 4.
The Government opposes Brother's request, arguing that a stay will not achieve any economies, and that, in fact, a stay will harm other parties. See generally Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Proceedings (“Def.'s Opp. Brief”). Defendant–Intervenor Vulcan Threaded Products, Inc. elected not to brief the issue.5
As explained in greater detail below, a stay pendente lite of limited duration can be expected to sharpen the issues here and to streamline these proceedings (and thus will help conserve the resources of all concerned)—and, indeed, conceivably may result in the dismissal of one or more of Brother's claims in this action.6 Even more to the point, the record is devoid of evidence that such a stay will work any real hardship on the Government (or, for that matter, Defendant–Intervenor Vulcan). Brother's motion is therefore granted, and further proceedings in this action are stayed until 30 days following a determination in Jiaxing Brother Fastener Co., Ltd., et al., Court No. 14–00316.
The Government contends that, to justify the entry of a stay, a movant must “make a strong showing that a stay is necessary”—a showing that the Government maintains Brother has not made. See Defendant's Opp. Brief at 3 (quoting Georgetown Steel Co. v. United States, 27 CIT 550, 553, 259 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1347 (2003) ); see also Defendant's Opp. Brief at 2, 3–5. But, in fact, Landis —the seminal case on stays pendente lite, relied on in Georgetown Steel and invoked by both Brother and the Government here—makes it clear that “the suppliant for a stay must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward” with litigation (i.e., a “strong showing” of need for a stay) only where “there is ... a fair possibility that the stay ... will work damage to some one else.” Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936) (Cardozo, J.) (quoted in Georgetown Steel, 27 CIT at 553, 259 F.Supp.2d at 1346–47 ); see also Def.'s Opp. Brief at 2, 5 (citing Landis); Pls.' Brief at 2, 3 (same). This is not such a case.
In the instant action, the Government has failed to adduce any evidence that there is even “a fair possibility” that it (or any other party with a cognizable interest) will suffer harm as a result of the requested stay. See Pls.' Brief at 4, 5. The Government's sole allegation of potential prejudice posits that “[a] stay in this case could last months or years,” and that, during that time, “[a] stagnant case will remain dormant on the Court's docket,” while “the memories of agency personnel and other interested parties will fade” and “[n]ew personnel may replace the agency employees with knowledge of this case.” See Def.'s Opp. Brief at 5.7 To be sure, the risks that memories may fade and that evidence may be lost or destroyed might be compelling considerations in another case. However, international trade cases like this one are litigated on the administrative record. As such, all of the evidence that can be considered in this action already has been submitted and preserved. Any concerns about the potential for loss of evidence and dimming witness memories that might counsel against a stay in a de novo case simply are not present in this situation.
To the extent that the Government seeks to protect (for lack of a better term) the inchoate “institutional memory” of “agency personnel,” the Government has cited no authority for the proposition that such a nuanced and attenuated interest constitutes the type of harm that must be weighed in evaluating the appropriateness of a stay in circumstances like these. Moreover, quite apart from its lack of support in the law, the Government's argument is further undermined—as a practical and factual matter—by the not-infrequent turnover in agency staff during the pendency of international trade litigation in general. Certainly the Government does not represent that, absent a stay, there will be no changes in relevant agency personnel for the lifetime of this action.8 Contrary to the Government's claims, the proposed stay will not “prejudice the Government's ability to defend this case.” See Def.'s Opp. Brief at 3.9
In sum, the Government has failed to identify any concrete cognizable harm associated with the requested stay.
The remainder of the Government's arguments focus solely on disputing the advantages that Brother claims will flow from granting the requested stay and on contesting Brother's assertions that requiring it to proceed with this case at this time would constitute a hardship. See generally Def.'s Opp. Brief at 2, 3–5. However, absent a showing by the Government that the proposed stay “would severely affect the rights of others,” Brother is not required to “make a strong showing of necessity” for the stay. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Chilcott Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 713 F.2d 1477, 1484 (10th Cir.1983) (cited in Def.'s Opp. Brief at 3).10 Similarly, absent a showing by the Government that there is at least “a fair possibility that the stay ... will work damage to some one else,” Brother need not establish that going forward with this action would constitute a “clear case of hardship or inequity” for Brother. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 255, 57 S.Ct. 163 (cited in Def.'s Opp. Brief at 5).
In any event, Brother has made out a clear case that, at least to some extent, a stay will conserve the resources of all concerned (including the court), and that it is at least possible that the stay will result in very significant savings.11
Brother emphasizes that the first two counts of its complaints in both cases raise a threshold, overarching issue—Commerce's selection of Thailand as the surrogate country for use in the agency's non-market economy analysis. See Pls.' Brief at 2, 3; Joint Status Report and Proposed Scheduling Order at 3; Complaint, Counts I–II (filed in this action); First Amended Complaint, Counts I–II, filed in Jiaxing Brother Fastener Co., Ltd., et al., Court No. 14–00316. There are at least two critical dimensions to Brother's observation.
First, whether the decision favors Brother or not, a decision on Brother's challenge to Commerce's selection of Thailand as the surrogate country in Court No. 14–00316 will almost certainly have implications—indeed, likely major implications—for the parallel claims in this action. As noted above, the language of the first two counts of Brother's First Amended Complaint in its first action is identical to that of the first two counts of its Complaint in this action. See n.3, supra. Further, Brother litigated those issues in the same fashion at the administrative level in both the fourth and fifth...
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